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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three essays examining the roles of markets and intrinsic motivation in 
public organisations. 
 
Chapter 1 examines the impact of establishing Independent Sector Treatment Centres in the 
English National Health Service (NHS) during the 2000s on the performance of neighbouring 
NHS (public) hospitals. It finds that NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed nearby became 
more efficient (measured using pre-surgical length of stay for orthopaedic surgery), but also 
received sicker patients on average, as ISTCs avoided treating the sickest patients. Average cost 
per patient at ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals increased, suggesting that any efficiency gains were 
swamped by the negative effect on costs of worsened patient casemix. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the 2006 introduction of patient choice of hospital for elective surgery 
within the English NHS, using Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) of health gain 
from surgery as a measure of hospital quality. The hospital competition brought about by this 
reform appears to have led to lower varicose vein surgery quality, but no change in groin hernia 
surgery quality. For orthopaedic surgery quality, the evidence in support of a negative effect of 
competition outweighs the evidence to the contrary. We explain these findings by explicitly 
modelling the hospital as a multi-product firm. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the rationale for the 2011 Busan Declaration, which states that foreign 
aid should be given in line with the priorities of recipients, by constructing a model of the 
interaction between donors and charitable entrepreneurs, where occupational choice is endogenous, 
donors can choose whether to give, and donors and entrepreneurs are paired in a stable matching. 
We show that mission conflict in the charitable sector can arise when mission preferences and 
income earnings ability in the private sector are correlated, and examine policy options to 
encourage the charitable sector to give greater weight to recipients’ objectives. 
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Introduction 
This thesis comprises three essays that examine the roles of markets and intrinsic motivation 
in public organisations.  
 
Following Besley and Ghatak (2003), we define a public organisation not as an organisation 
that is owned by government (although it may be so owned), but rather as an organisation that 
is wholly or partly concerned with the provision of public goods and services – that is, goods and 
services for which price signals do not adequately convey the social value of consumption, and 
which unregulated markets consequently under-provide relative to the social optimum. Under-
provision of such goods and services may occur because consumption has collective or external 
benefits beyond those to the individual; because of information asymmetries that lead to market 
failures such as adverse selection; or because there is an equity- or merit-based argument for 
providing higher levels of the good than are provided otherwise. 
 
The underlying questions that motivate this thesis are: How do public organisations differ 
from organisations that exist to provide goods and services whose benefits are overwhelmingly 
private in nature? In public organisations, and in markets for the provision of public goods and 
services, under what circumstances will standard economic prescriptions formulated within 
private sector settings – such as the promotion of improved performance using competition, or 
using monetary incentives – be effective, and in what circumstances will they be 
counterproductive?  And finally, what role is played, both in general and in determining the 
answers to the previous questions, by the fact that many individuals employed by public 
organisations are intrinsically motivated by their work, in the sense of deriving utility from the 
provision of these public goods and services to others, or from the mission to which their 
organisation adheres? 
 
Part One of this thesis consists of two essays that study the impact of a wide-ranging series 
of market-oriented reforms to the English National Health Service (NHS) in the 2000s. As part of 
these reforms, a number of new types of health care provider were introduced within the NHS, 
with sharper incentives to compete for market share than existing NHS providers. A leading 
example of this drive to increase provider diversity within the NHS was the establishment of a 
series of privately owned, privately run Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) for the 
provision of routine diagnostic and elective surgical procedures to NHS patients.  
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Chapter 1 examines the impact of the ISTC programme on the performance of NHS hospitals 
that had an ISTC placed nearby. The main challenge to identifying a causal effect from the ISTC 
programme is that ISTCs were placed where nearby NHS hospitals were thought to be 
underperforming. These drivers of ISTC placement imply that NHS hospitals that had an ISTC 
placed nearby may be systematically different to those that did not. Systematic differences of this 
kind could confound attempts to establish a comparable control group for hospitals ‘treated’ by 
the establishment of an ISTC nearby. For many outcome variables of interest, however, we argue 
that standard difference-in-differences methods are sufficient to estimate the causal effect of ISTC 
placement, because pre-treatment trends are parallel for NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed 
nearby and NHS hospitals that did not have an ISTC placed nearby. Using pre-surgical length of 
stay for hip and knee replacement surgery as an indicator of hospital efficiency, we find that the 
increase in competition brought about by ISTC establishment led to leaner production at NHS 
hospitals with an ISTC in their immediate vicinity, without any concomitant deterioration in 
clinical quality. This finding suggests that markets and competition can play a positive role even 
in industries where market failures are pervasive, such as health care.  
 
At the same time, we find that NHS hospitals exposed to the ISTC programme received 
sicker patients on average (as captured by patients’ Charlson scores 1  for hip and knee 
replacement surgery), a finding that we ascribe to the fact that ISTC contracts specified a range 
of ‘exclusion criteria’ – that is, acceptable grounds for refusing to treat a patient. We conclude 
that the net effect of ISTC proximity on NHS hospital performance was negative, in the sense 
that the increase in cost per patient due to worsened patient casemix outweighed the raw 
efficiency gains due to increased competitive pressure. 
 
Given that ISTCs were explicitly granted a different set of exclusion criteria to NHS 
hospitals in the contracts they were offered by the British government, the fact that they made 
use of these criteria should not, at one level, come as a surprise – nor should it necessarily be 
cited as evidence that the ISTC programme was misconceived. Nevertheless, the very existence of 
these exclusion criteria, and the fact that they appear to have been widely used by ISTCs, 
highlights the role played by an important source of market failure in health care markets. 
Whereas in private markets (for example, the market for books or chairs) the profitability of 
selling to a particular customer is determined solely by their willingness to pay, the profitability 
of treating a patient will be influenced by characteristics of the patient that are often imperfectly 
                                               
1 The Charlson score indicates a patient’s 10 year survival probability based on the presence of 17 conditions likely 
to lead to death. 
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observed.  The influence of patient characteristics on profitability provides hospitals with an 
incentive to refuse to treat the sickest patients – and these incentives will be sharper when 
providers operate on a for-profit basis, as most ISTCs did. 
 
While patient selection of this kind is not necessarily socially undesirable, it does mean that 
competing health care providers can impose negative externalities on each other by trying to 
treat only the healthiest and most profitable patients – a practice known as cherry picking, or 
cream skimming – and leaving sicker and more complex patients to competitors. Chapter 1 of 
this thesis contributes to the development of a better understanding of these features of health 
care markets in the British context.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of a major competition-promoting reform to the English NHS 
in 2006, in which patients were allowed to choose which hospital they attended for elective 
surgery. It examines the impact of this reform using Patient Reported Outcome Measures 
(PROMs) of health gain from elective surgery as an indicator of hospital quality. Previous 
econometric studies of the 2006 patient choice reforms have used mortality-based indicators of 
hospital quality – yet mortality is a rare outcome of elective surgery, the area of hospital activity 
that was affected by the introduction of patient choice. Chapter 2 motivates its re-examination of 
this reform by modelling the hospital as a multi-product firm that sets separate quality levels for 
each output. The model presented draws directly from the economic literature on multi-tasking 
(e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), which examines the effect of economic incentives on 
performance when organisations produce multiple outputs, some of which are observed and some 
of which are not. This literature suggests that incentivising observable dimensions of performance 
may have a positive or negative effect on unobservable dimensions of performance, depending on 
whether there are complementarities or substitutabilities between outputs in production.  
 
Standard one-output-type models of hospital competition and quality in markets with 
regulated prices (e.g. Gaynor 2006) suggest that, so long as the regulated price is set above 
marginal cost, increasing hospital competition will lead to higher quality. The theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2, which models the hospital as a multi-product firm, suggests 
that hospital competition may have more ambiguous effects on quality than is suggested by such 
one-output-type models. 
 
We estimate the effect on clinical quality – as captured by PROMs health gains from hip and 
knee replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery – of the hospital competition 
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that resulted from the introduction of patient choice. Although our estimates are sensitive to 
specification, and therefore provisional, our best reading is that competition led to lower varicose 
vein surgery quality, and had no effect on the quality of groin hernia repair surgery. For 
orthopaedic surgery quality, our results are contradictory, but the evidence in support of a 
negative effect of competition outweighs the evidence in the other direction.  
 
We suggest that these negative effects of competition on clinical quality – which are contrary 
to the findings of the existing literature – may have arisen because hospitals in high-competition 
areas responded to the introduction of patient choice by focusing on improving performance in 
high-profile and well-observed areas such as mortality – which is surely a good thing in itself – 
but that these improvements may have come at the expense of performance in less high-profile 
areas or areas where quality is poorly observed, including, possibly, elective surgery quality. 
 
We also offer a second possible explanation for our findings in terms of differences in the 
quality elasticity of demand. If a multi-product firm faces a high quality elasticity of demand for 
one good and a low quality elasticity of demand for another good, they may respond to an 
increase in competitive pressure by increasing the quality of the high elasticity good, where there 
are larger returns to quality improvements, at the expense of quality of the low elasticity good. 
Such an effect could explain our finding of a negative effect of quality on varicose vein surgery 
quality, as this is a relatively minor surgical procedure for which we hypothesise that there will 
be a low quality elasticity of demand. However, it is not very helpful for explaining the possible 
decrease in orthopaedic surgery quality, as hip and knee replacement are both major surgical 
procedures that, we hypothesise, should have a relatively high quality elasticity of demand. 
 
Part Two of the thesis consists of a single chapter, which examines a different kind of public 
organisation – namely donor-funded NGOs and charities that provide goods and services to 
deserving recipients. These NGOs are public organisations because, although the goods and 
services they provide may themselves be private, in one decisive respect they have a public 
character – namely, donors and service providers value the provision of these goods and services, 
and cannot be prevented from deriving utility from the improvements in recipients circumstances 
that are brought about by their provision. 
 
Chapter 3 uses the 2011 Busan Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which states that foreign 
aid should be given in line with the priorities of recipients, as a springboard to asking a question 
of broad relevance to many contexts involving donor funding of NGO activity. Should donors, as 
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the Busan Declaration suggests, limit their activity to providing funding, and allow recipients to 
decide on the uses to which these funds are put? Or are there circumstances under which it is 
socially desirable for donors to seek to shape the type of mission that is undertaken by recipient 
organisations?  
 
In studying these questions, this chapter examines a setting in which there is a potential 
drawback of staffing public organisations with highly intrinsically motivated individuals. When 
intrinsic motivation is understood to only have a ‘vertical’ dimension – that is, an agent can be 
more or less motivated – then it is normally seen as a positive characteristic, as it can inspire 
agents to exert more effort, or provide higher output or quality, than otherwise.2  
 
In contrast, we examine a setting in which agents may differ ‘horizontally’ in their 
preferences concerning the mission that an NGO adopts. In such settings, high intrinsic 
motivation may lead to inefficiency, if principals and agents disagree over the mission that an 
NGO should adopt. We show that, when donors and charitable entrepreneurs are exogenously 
matched and have different preferences over the mission, donors may inefficiently enforce their 
preferred mission. In such circumstances, social welfare is maximised when charities are run by 
‘ideologues’ – people who care a lot about implementing a particular mission – as they raise the 
costs, to donors, of enforcing their preferred mission.  
 
We then embed our model of donor-entrepreneur interactions in a model of the market for 
charitable donations, in which agents are have a free choice of occupational roles, donors can 
choose whether or not to give, and donors and entrepreneurs are paired together in a stable 
matching equilibrium. We find that, when choice of occupational role is endogenous, it can still 
be optimal to enforce the Busan Declaration so long as doing so does not lead prospective donors 
to exit the charitable sector altogether.  
 
As well as analysing the role of ideologues – or ‘do-gooders’ – in the charitable sector, 
Chapter 3 also offers an answer to a question posed by the economic literature on the mission 
choice problem (e.g. Besley & Ghatak 2005) – namely, when occupational choice is endogenous 
and donors and entrepreneurs can match assortatively in a stable matching, why should we 
expect mission conflict to arise in the first place?  
 
                                               
2 There is also a literature on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by monetary incentives (e.g. Titmuss 1970; 
Bénabou and Tirole 2006). However, even in this literature, intrinsic motivation remains a positive characteristic – 
it is the provision of monetary incentives that is the problem, not the presence of intrinsic motivation per se.  
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We show that mission mismatch can arise in such a setting if (i) mission preferences are 
correlated with income earning ability in the private sector, and (ii) there are private costs of 
running an NGO. In such a world, rich philanthropists may have difficulty finding NGO 
entrepreneurs who share their preferences, and charitable entrepreneurs may be willing to 
compromise on the mission in order to access the larger donation budgets that come from being 
paired with a rich philanthropist. These two factors combine to create a charitable sector with a 
systematic tendency towards donor-entrepreneur pairings that involve disagreement over the 
mission. In this way, we offer an insight into how rich philanthropists can exert a decisive 
influence over the charitable sector, but we also suggest that this influence comes at the cost of a 
charitable sector riven with mission conflict. When coupled with large income inequalities, this 
mission conflict can lead to socially inefficient missions being chosen, thus creating a potential 
role for policy. 
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Chapter 1: Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres in the English NHS: Effects on 
neighbouring NHS hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of hospital competition on hospital performance by 
exploiting variation in competition intensity that resulted from the establishment of a 
number of Independent Sector Treatment Centres in the English NHS during the 2000s. 
The main challenge to identifying a causal effect from the ISTC programme is that 
ISTCs were placed where nearby NHS hospitals were thought to be underperforming. 
For many outcome variables of interest, however, we argue that standard difference-in-
differences methods are sufficient to estimate the causal effect of ISTC placement, 
because pre-treatment trends are parallel for NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed 
nearby and NHS hospitals that did not have an ISTC placed nearby. Using pre-surgical 
length of stay for hip and knee replacement surgery as an indicator of hospital efficiency, 
we find that the increase in competition brought about by ISTC establishment led to 
leaner production at NHS hospitals with an ISTC in their immediate vicinity, without 
any concomitant deterioration in clinical quality. We also find that these NHS hospitals 
received sicker patients on average, a finding that we ascribe to the fact that ISTCs were 
allowed to decline to treat the more complex and severely ill cases. We conclude that the 
net effect of ISTC proximity on NHS hospital performance was negative, in the sense 
that the increase in cost per patient due to worsened patient casemix outweighed the 
raw efficiency gains due to increased competitive pressure. 
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1  Introduction1 
This paper studies the competitive effects of a drive by the British government in the mid-to-
late 2000s to establish, within the English National Health Service (NHS), a series of privately-
owned, privately-run Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) for the provision of high-
volume elective surgical procedures to NHS patients. Our interest is not in the performance of 
ISTCs per se, or in a comparison of ISTC performance with that of NHS (public) hospitals. 
Rather, we use ISTCs as sources of variation in competitive pressure, and compare the evolution 
of outcomes at NHS hospitals exposed to the ISTC programme with those at NHS hospitals not 
exposed to the ISTC programme. 
 
We look for impacts of ISTC exposure on NHS hospital outcomes in four areas: (i) quality 
and (ii) efficiency, as ISTCs acted as competitors to existing NHS hospitals, and may therefore 
have spurred improved performance by incumbents; (iii) casemix, as ISTCs could decline to treat 
the sickest patients, and may therefore have imposed negative externalities on nearby NHS 
hospitals by leaving them with the most complex cases; and (iv) waiting times, as a major 
objective of the ISTC programme was to increase capacity in areas with particularly long waits. 
 
We estimate the impact of ISTC exposure by allocating NHS hospitals to a High Treatment 
Group (containing NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed in their immediate vicinity), a Low 
Treatment Group (containing NHS hospitals that had an ISTC as a competitor, but no ISTC in 
their immediate vicinity), and an Untreated Group (containing NHS hospitals that were 
unaffected by the ISTC programme). We use difference-in-differences methods to compare the 
change in hospitals’ efficiency (as captured by various length of stay measures), casemix, and 
quality (as captured by mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction, or AMI) after the 
introduction of the ISTC programme across these treated and control groups. Our main measure 
of hospitals’ raw efficiency is pre-surgical length of stay, which we argue should not be affected 
by casemix in the same way that total length of stay is. Other than Cooper et al. (2012), pre-
surgical length of stay has been little used to study hospital efficiency – our focus on this outcome 
measure is one of this paper’s contributions to the literature at the methodological level. 
 
ISTC locations were decided by central government, which sought bids from the private 
sector for the creation of ISTCs in areas where waiting lists were particularly long, hospital 
capacity was particularly insufficient, local hospitals were thought to be under-performing, or a 
                                               
1 We acknowledge excellent technical and coding contributions from Simon Jones and Stuart Craig, and are 
extremely grateful to Henrik Kleven, Maitreesh Ghatak, Mohammad Vesal, Sarah Sandford, and Tom O’Keeffe for 
helpful suggestions. 
  21 
combination of all three of these factors existed. These drivers of ISTC placement imply that 
NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed nearby may be systematically different to those that did 
not. Systematic differences of this kind could confound attempts to establish a comparable 
control group for hospitals ‘treated’ by the establishment of a nearby ISTC.  
 
We examine the extent of this endogeneity problem by graphing the evolution of outcome 
variables for our treated and control groups. For our efficiency and quality measures, and for 
some casemix measures, pre-reform outcomes follow parallel trends across treated and control 
groups. We therefore argue that standard difference-in-differences estimates plausibly identify a 
causal effect of the ISTC programme for these outcome variables, in spite of the a priori reasons 
to suspect that NHS hospitals will differ systematically with ISTC proximity. This situation, we 
argue, reflects the fact that, while average waiting times at nearby NHS hospitals did influence 
ISTC placement decisions, NHS hospital performance in relation to our efficiency and quality 
measures did not influence these decisions, nor were they correlated with outcome measures that 
did influence these decisions. As far as our efficiency and quality measures are concerned, ISTC 
placement decisions are therefore, we argue, as good as random, conditional on the controls used 
in our regressions. 
 
We find that the competitive pressure brought about by ISTC exposure improved the 
efficiency (as measured by pre-surgical length of stay) of hospitals in the High Treatment Group 
by around 66 per cent – a large improvement. We also find that ISTC exposure worsened NHS 
hospitals’ average patient health status, as captured by the Charlson score, by around 40 per cent. 
Although our graphical evidence suggests treatment effects for the Low Treatment Group that 
are identically signed but smaller in magnitude, our regressions mostly have insufficient power to 
generate estimates of these effects that are  statistically distinguishable from zero. 
 
Using post-surgical length of stay (which will be influenced both by hospitals’ efficiency and 
by average patient health status) as an indicator of the net effect of ISTC exposure, we conclude 
that ISTC exposure had a net negative effect on hospitals in the High Treatment Group, in the 
sense that the raw efficiency improvements brought about by greater competitive pressure were 
swamped by the increase in average costs per patient resulting from worsened patient casemix. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the historical context 
within which ISTCs were introduced, and discusses criticisms that were made of the ISTC 
programme. Section 3 outlines the conceptual framework that we have used to generate our 
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hypotheses in relation to different dimensions of hospital performance; for each dimension, we 
also summarise the relevant literature, and describe the outcome variable(s) that will be used to 
measure performance. Section 4 describes the data, treatment assignment methodology, and 
identification strategy. Section 5 presents graphical evidence of treatment effects, while Section 6 
reports baseline regressions results. Section 7 shows that our results are robust to a wide range of 
alternative specifications. Section 8 discusses our results and concludes. 
2 Institutional Setting 
The English NHS, founded in 1948, is funded by general taxation and, with small exceptions, 
offers health care that is free at the point of use. Patients must register with a single GP surgery 
for the provision of primary care; GPs then act as ‘gatekeepers’ to the secondary care system. 
While the NHS has always made use of private sector capacity in various minor ways, secondary 
care has, historically, overwhelmingly been provided via government-owned NHS hospitals. Until 
1991, NHS hospitals were run directly by geographically-based Health Authorities, which in turn 
were funded directly by the Department of Health. In 1992, a major reform by the Conservative 
government separated Health Authorities’ purchasing and provision functions, creating an NHS 
‘internal market’ within which Health Authorities and GP ‘fund holders’ negotiated bulk 
contracts for the provision of care with newly independent NHS hospitals or ‘trusts’. Bulk 
purchasers of care were expected to negotiate with providers on price and quality on behalf of 
their patients; patients themselves had little influence over where they were sent for treatment, 
and were generally sent to the hospital with which their local purchasing body maintained a 
contract. 
 
In 1997, the new Labour government rhetorically discouraged hospital competition in favour 
of ‘cooperation’, but retained the purchaser-provider split that was the foundation of the NHS 
‘internal market’. Thus, in the period from 1997 until 2006, the potential for hospital competition 
existed, but the extent to which hospitals did actually compete with each other, as opposed to 
cooperating (or colluding), is not clear. In 2000, The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health 
2000) established a commitment to cut maximum waiting times for elective surgery from 18 
months to 6 months by the end of 2005; this target was later reduced to 18 weeks, to be achieved 
by the end of 2008. 
 
In 2002, the government changed its attitude to competition within the English NHS and 
introduced a range of market-based reforms designed to encourage ‘contestability’; improve 
health care quality and efficiency; and reduce waiting times. As part of this reform programme, 
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the government announced in April 2002 that a series of privately owned, privately run ISTCs 
would be established to deliver routine or high-volume diagnostic and elective 2  surgical 
procedures to English NHS patients.3 A major rationale for the ISTC programme was to increase 
capacity in order to enable the government’s ambitious waiting time targets to be met. The ISTC 
programme represented a new way of utilising private sector capacity in two ways – firstly, 
ISTCs were created as a deliberate policy of central government, rather than reflecting ad hoc 
decisions by local purchasers of care; and secondly, ISTCs were to only provide services to NHS 
patients.  
 
In December 2002, the Department of Health invited expressions of interest to run the first 
Wave of ISTCs. These invitations indicated the broad geographical regions within which ISTCs 
were to be placed, but left securing a specific site to bidders. Preferred bidders for these schemes 
were announced from September 2003; many NHS hospitals would therefore have known from 
this date whether they were likely to have an ISTC placed near them. The first ISTC contracts 
were signed, and schemes commenced, in the same month. In all, there were 27 Wave 1 ISTCs; 
most opened in 2005 or 2006, and most operated from a single site, often in newly built premises, 
and often co-located with an existing NHS hospital. In March 2005, a second Phase of ISTCs was 
announced, of which 9 were eventually implemented. Most Phase 2 ISTCs opened in 2007 or 2008. 
Unlike Wave 1 ISTCs, Phase 2 ISTCs generally operated over numerous sites, and were 
frequently co-located with existing private hospitals. 
 
In addition to encouraging the entry of new care providers such as ISTCs, the market-based 
reforms to the English NHS initiated in the early 2000s had two main planks. Firstly, from 2003 
onwards, a new prospective reimbursement regime known as Payment By Results (PBR), 
modelled on that of Medicare in the USA, was introduced. PBR provides a fixed tariff for each 
procedure, with some degree of adjustment for patient severity, local wage rates, and hospital 
characteristics, by bundling together treatments that are clinically similar, and that use a similar 
level of resources, into Healthcare Resource Groups or HRGs (DH 2011). PBR sought to 
encourage efficiency improvements by reimbursing on the basis of outputs (defined in terms of 
procedures performed, not in terms of ultimate outputs such as patient health) rather than inputs 
such as bed days. It also sought to encourage purchasers to focus more exclusively on care quality 
when contracting with providers, by taking pricing off the table in negotiations. 
                                               
2 Elective surgery is medically necessary surgery that is not an emergency, and is therefore scheduled in advance. 
3 DH 2002a. This section also draws on Naylor & Gregory 2009; Allen & Jones 2011; Anderson 2006; BSG 2005; 
and HCHC 2006. ISTCs were also established in Wales and Scotland, but are outside the scope of this paper, given 
the devolution of the NHS to the constituent countries of the United Kingdom during this period. 
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Secondly, from 2006, elective surgery patients were allowed to choose which hospital they 
attended for surgery. This reform inaugurated a period of full-blown hospital competition, as 
NHS hospitals could no longer be guaranteed a given patient load via bulk contracts, but rather 
were required to compete for market share via patient referrals. 
 
Ironically, given the market-based rationale for introducing private sector providers to the 
NHS, Wave 1 ISTCs were insulated from the effect of both Payment by Results and patient 
choice of hospital. These ISTCs were typically offered contracts which guaranteed a given income 
level irrespective of whether care purchasers or patients actually utilised the ISTC; they were also 
paid a per-procedure premium (averaging 11 per cent) relative to that offered to NHS hospitals 
via PBR (AC & HC 2008). The ‘take or pay’ income guarantees sat uncomfortably with the new 
patient choice regime, and there is evidence to suggest that some ISTCs suffered from poor 
utilisation rates after 2006 because patients were reluctant to choose an ISTC instead of the local 
established NHS hospital (Moore 2008; McLeod et al. 2014, p.17). Notwithstanding these aspects 
of ISTC contracts, both PBR and patient choice of hospital were important features of the 
institutional environment for the providers that are the focus of this paper – namely the NHS 
hospitals that had ISTCs placed near them. 
 
The ISTC programme had a major impact on the market for some elective surgical 
procedures. Table 1 provides information on the share of procedures performed by ISTCs for the 
two elective surgical procedures studied in this paper. As these tables were compiled using 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data, the actual share of procedures performed by ISTCs will 
be higher, given that ISTCs did not return complete records to HES before 2010/2011 (HC 2008). 
These tables show that ISTCs performed between 5 and 6 per cent of all hip and knee 
replacements on NHS patients between 2005/2006 and 2012/2013. As the ISTC programme’s 
impact was highly geographically differentiated, this means that the share of patients attending 
ISTCs for these procedures would have been much higher than 6 per cent in some areas.  
 
In spite of the substantial effects of ISTC establishment on some hospital markets, the ISTC 
programme is widely seen as not having met its potential, firstly because many Wave 1 ISTCs 
had utilisation rates well below capacity; secondly, because the government initially expected 
that ISTCs would deliver 15 per cent of total elective surgical procedures (not just for selected 
procedures); and thirdly, because more than half of the Phase 2 ISTCs originally planned were 
never implemented (Allen & Jones 2011). 
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The ISTC programme proved to be highly controversial. While a number of criticisms were 
made by commentators, one is particularly relevant to the present study – namely, concerns were 
raised that ISTCs may negatively affect the performance of neighbouring NHS hospitals, because 
ISTC contracts specified a range of ‘exclusion criteria’ – that is, acceptable grounds for refusing 
to treat a patient. Each ISTC had its own list of exclusion criteria; these criteria typically 
included demographic factors such as age, social factors such as availability of a carer at 
discharge, and clinical factors such as health status (Mason et al. 2008). In relation to the latter, 
a particularly important criterion for rejection was the patient’s American Society of 
Anesthesiologists (ASA) score – ISTCs were typically able to refuse to treat patients with a score 
of 3 or more.4 National Joint Registry data from 2010 indicates that, at NHS hospitals, 20 per 
cent of hip replacement patients and 19 per cent of knee replacement patients were given ASA 
scores of 3 or 4; the corresponding figures for ISTCs were only 6 and 8 per cent respectively (NJR 
2011). 
 
Critics argued that these exclusion criteria would leave NHS hospitals near ISTCs 
disproportionately burdened with the sickest patients. Further, they claimed that PBR 
reimbursement rates did not adjust adequately for patient severity, so that hospitals with a 
sicker-than-average patient case load would be made worse off. In addition to fears about higher 
costs associated with worsened casemix, critics were also concerned that NHS hospitals with 
ISTCs placed nearby would appear to be performing poorly in relation to widely used measures of 
hospital outcomes – such as mortality rates, readmission rates, and length of stay – because it is 
thought that these outcomes are not, and perhaps cannot ever be, fully adjusted for patient 
casemix.5 
 
In the mid 2000s, local and national media were awash with stories making dire predictions 
about the impact of ISTCs on nearby NHS hospitals. For example, on 12 December 2006, The 
Daily Telegraph published a story titled “World famous Nuffield faces closure”, detailing how 
                                               
4 ASA 1: Healthy patient with localized surgical pathology and no systemic disturbance; ASA 2: Patient with mild 
to moderate systemic disturbance (i.e. surgical pathology or other disease process); ASA 3: Patient with severe 
systemic disturbance from any cause; ASA 4: Patient with life threatening systemic disorder which severely limits 
activity; ASA 5: Gravely ill patient with little chance of survival. 
5 Other criticisms of the ISTC programme were, inter alia, that: (1) ISTCs may deliver an inferior quality of care, 
due to the employment of less qualified staff, and the absence of backup infrastructure possessed by many NHS 
trusts (such as Intensive Care Units) in the event of complications (HCHC 2006; Day 2010; Ellicott 2009); (2) Wave 
1 ISTCs did not provide value for money, due to the generous provisions in ISTC contracts, such as substantial 
income guarantees and per-procedure premia; and (3) the government’s failure to make ISTC contracts public 
precluded full evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the ISTC programme (Delamothe 2009; Pollock & Kirkwood 
2009). Although interesting, an examination of these criticisms lies outside the scope of this paper. 
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Oxford’s Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre faced “closure because a private treatment centre is taking 
work away and threatening its financial viability.” The article reported that the Horton ISTC, in 
nearby Banbury, was “taking large numbers of patients needing routine knee and hip 
replacements... leaving the Nuffield with a high proportion of expensive, complex specialist cases.” 
Lord Tebbit commented that “This is what happens when routine, simple surgery like hip 
replacements is put in the hands of often foreign-owned private hospitals, leaving the specialist 
centre to tackle the difficult stuff which is also more expensive.” Similar fears appeared in the 
media in relation to many other Wave 1 ISTCs. 
 
We examine evidence in support of this criticism, concerning the negative effects of ISTC 
placement on the casemix of nearby NHS hospitals, by comparing the evolution of average 
patient health status at NHS hospitals with an ISTC located nearby with that at NHS hospitals 
that did not have an ISTC placed nearby.  
3 Conceptual Framework, Literature, and Outcome 
Measures 
3.1 Hospital quality 
ISTCs acted as competitors to nearby NHS hospitals, and quite often were placed within 
markets that had previously been effective monopolies. As one commissioner within a Primary 
Care Trust commented when a large ISTC opened next to a dominant NHS hospital, “that’s the 
first time… we’ve ever had any competition [here]” (McLeod et al. 2014, p.15). Standard economic 
models of hospital competition (Gaynor 2006; Gaynor & Town 2012), in which hospitals offer a 
single type of good and set a single (vertical) quality level for that good in markets with prices 
set by a central authority, offer a clear prediction: increased hospital competition will lead to 
higher care quality so long as the regulated price is set above the marginal cost with respect to 
quantity. While some questions have been raised about the generality of this basic theoretical 
prediction,6 empirical evidence from the United Kingdom does provide support for the view that, 
in fixed-price markets, increased hospital competition leads to higher quality.7 Cooper et al. 
                                               
6 Brekke, Siciliani & Straume (2011) show that, if hospitals are semi-altruistic and costs are more convex than 
altruistic valuation of quality, the marginal patient may be loss-making, thus violating the requirement that prices 
exceed marginal costs and implying that increased competition may lead to lower care quality. Bevan & Skellern 
(2011) discuss the multi-product nature of the hospital, and, following Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), note that 
incentives to improve quality for one output may have a positive or negative impact on quality of other, 
unincentivised outputs, depending on whether there are cost complementarities or substitutabilities between 
outputs. 
7 Empirical evidence from the USA also largely supports the view that fixed-price hospital competition leads to 
higher care quality (Gaynor & Town 2012; Kessler & McClellan 2000; Kessler & Geppert 2005). One important 
piece of contrary evidence comes from Gowrisankaran & Town (2003), who find that fixed-price hospital 
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(2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) use difference-in-differences style estimators to examine the effect 
of introducing patient choice of hospital for elective surgery, concluding that higher competition 
led to lower hospital AMI death rates as well as lower all-cause death rates. 
 
Bloom et al. (2013) study the era immediately before the introduction of patient choice, and, 
using political marginality as an instrument for competition intensity, find that increased 
competition led to higher management quality and lower AMI mortality. Their findings suggest 
that selective contracting between purchasers and providers did lead to effective competition 
between hospitals in the era immediately before the introduction of patient choice, even though 
patients had little formal influence over where they were sent. This conclusion is important for 
the present study because we posit that NHS hospitals that had ISTCs placed near them 
experienced an increase in competitive pressure as a result of exposure to the ISTC, even before 
the introduction of patient choice. The findings of Bloom et al. (2013) provide support for our 
hypothesis that, in the era we study, ISTC exposure led to increased competitive pressure and 
therefore to changed behaviour.   
 
We measure the quality of care provided by NHS hospitals using AMI mortality rates, a very 
widely used measure of overall hospital quality (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013; Bloom et 
al. 2013; Propper et al. 2004; 2008a; Propper & Van Reenen 2010; Kessler & McClellan 2000; 
Kessler & Geppert 2005; Volpp et al. 2003).8 AMI mortality is an attractive measure of overall 
hospital quality for several reasons. First, death is a common outcome of AMI and rates of 
survival vary substantially between hospitals – hence AMI mortality provides substantial 
variation through which treatment effects might be identified. Second, there is a clear and well-
documented link between AMI survival rates and the quality and timeliness of care (Bradley et al. 
2006; Jha et al. 2007). And third, death is a clearly observable outcome and is not subject to 
gaming or data manipulation.  
3.2 Hospital efficiency 
We define a hospital as having higher ‘raw’ efficiency if their per-procedure costs are lower, 
conditional on a given level of quality and average patient health status. We use pre-surgical 
length of stay (LOS) for hip and knee replacement as our measure of raw hospital efficiency. The 
                                                                                                                                    
competition for Medicare patients led to lower quality. They conclude that this negative effect arose because 
Medicare prices per procedure were set at too low a level. 
8 We use 30-day in-hospital death rates from AMI as our measure of quality. We classify any emergency admissions 
with ICD10 diagnosis codes I21 or I22 as AMI patients. Following Cooper et al. (2011), we focus only on patients 
aged between 39 and 100, and, to avoid any risk of bias due to upcoding of diagnoses, exclude any patients who 
were discharged alive with a total length of stay of less than three days, on the grounds that genuine AMI patients 
would likely stay in hospital for at least three days. 
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reason for focusing on pre-surgical LOS is that there is rarely a clinical rationale for admitting a 
patient before the day of their operation; the extent to which hospitals are able to schedule 
patient admissions to ensure that they line up with the availability of surgeons, support staff, and 
operating theatres will therefore be a direct function of the efficiency with which the hospital is 
run. We focus on hip and knee replacement because orthopaedic surgery was a major focus of the 
ISTC programme, as it was recognised in the early 2000s that achieving the government’s 
ambitious waiting time targets was going to be more challenging in this surgical specialty area 
than in any other area (Harrison & Appleby 2005). 
 
We define a hospital as having higher ‘net’ efficiency if its per-procedure costs are lower, 
inclusive of the effect of patient health status. Thus a hospital’s ‘net’ efficiency will be influenced 
both by its raw efficiency, and by the health status of its patients. We look at hospitals’ post-
surgical LOS as an indicator of hospitals’ ‘net’ efficiency – a hospital with longer average post-
surgical LOS may be more efficient in raw terms, but may have sicker patients who require more 
care before being discharged.9,10 
 
We hypothesise that NHS hospitals with ISTCs placed nearby may be encouraged to increase 
their efficiency via two channels. Both rest on the prior assumption that the increased 
competition caused by ISTC establishment has a positive effect on the care quality of nearby 
NHS hospitals. We assume that hospital managers choose hospital quality and efficiency levels by 
maximising a utility function that is increasing in the hospital’s operating surplus (or profits) and 
perhaps some other arguments such as quality, and decreasing in managerial effort costs. We 
further assume that cost reductions can be achieved only via the costly exertion of management 
effort. 
 
The first channel is that, if care quality increases, per unit costs (inclusive of quality) also 
increase, implying that a higher level of cost-reducing effort on the part of managers is now 
utility-maximising.  
 
The second channel comes via a capacity constraint – in the short run, a hospital’s number 
of beds is fixed. This constraint gives hospitals in more competitive markets an additional 
                                               
9 When using total or post-surgical length of stay as a measure of performance, one should also ideally control for 
readmission rates, to confirm that hospitals are not achieving shorter LOS performance simply by discharging 
patients ‘sicker and quicker’ (a practice that might be picked up by higher rates of emergency readmissions). We 
intend to perform such checks as an extension to the present study. 
10 To prevent our results being driven by outliers, we drop all observations with pre-surgical LOS greater than 14 
days, and post-surgical LOS greater than 30 days. 
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incentive to increase their efficiency, namely that by doing so they are more able to accommodate 
any increases in demand that result from increased quality, and can therefore earn higher 
revenues. 11  There is some evidence to suggest that, when patient choice of hospital was 
introduced to the English NHS, hospitals in more competitive markets did increase their 
efficiency (as captured by various length of stay measures) more than hospitals in less 
competitive markets (Cooper et al. 2012, Gaynor et al. 2013). 
 
Prospective reimbursement regimes such as PBR should lead to higher hospital efficiency, as 
hospitals are being paid on the basis of outputs rather than inputs (Cutler 1995). In particular, 
prospective reimbursement should, ceteris paribus, lead to shorter patient length of stay, as a 
hospital’s net revenue declines with each additional day of care provided. Empirical studies of 
England (Farrar et al. 2009), the United States (Feder et al. 1987; Guterman & Dobson 1986; 
Feinglass & Holloway 1991; Kahn et al. 1990), Israel (Shmueli et al. 2002) and Italy (Louis et al. 
1999) provide evidence in support of this prediction. Given that PBR was implemented at the 
same time as the ISTC programme, an empirical challenge for this paper is to disentangle 
efficiency improvements resulting from the implementation of PBR with those resulting from 
ISTC placement. We seek to identify the effect of ISTC placement on efficiency using difference-
in-differences style estimators, which capture any additional efficiency improvements experienced 
by ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals above and beyond those experienced by NHS hospitals that were 
not exposed to the ISTC programme, yet were equally subject to the new prospective 
reimbursement regime. 
3.3 Cherry picking 
Previous studies have confirmed that ISTCs treated healthier and less complex patients than 
NHS hospitals (Street et al. 2010; Mason et al. 2008; 2010; Browne et al. 2008; Chard et al. 2011; 
Fagg et al. 2012).12 However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet compared the 
evolution of average patient severity at ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals with that at NHS hospitals 
unaffected by the ISTC programme, as this paper does, and shown that casemix deteriorated 
more rapidly at the former than at the latter. Providing evidence of such an effect of ISTC 
placement is important because casemix differences between ISTCs and nearby NHS hospitals 
                                               
11 For increased competition and increased quality to lead to increased efficiency via a capacity constraint, hospitals 
that increase their quality (in response to an increase in competition) must experience increased demand. Increased 
quality will only lead, on aggregate, to increased demand if total market demand is increasing in hospital quality. 
As Gaynor et al. (2011) point out, it seems reasonable to assume that total market demand is increasing in quality 
in developing country contexts, but it is less clear that such a relationship will exist in mature health care markets 
such as those in the United Kingdom. 
12 These differences in patient casemix were partly due to ISTCs applying their exclusion criteria, but it is also 
possible that they were partly due to healthier patients selecting into treatment by an ISTC. 
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may simply reflect the fact that ISTCs attract patients who would not otherwise have 
undertaken surgery.  
 
Recent research by Kelly and Stoye (2013) shows that, during the 2000s, the number of 
NHS-funded hip replacements increased more in areas where ISTCs were established than 
elsewhere. They explain this relative increase by arguing that the expansion in NHS-funded 
capacity brought about by the ISTC programme led patients who would not otherwise have 
undergone a hip replacement, or who would have had the procedure performed privately, to 
instead have their operation performed at an ISTC and funded by the NHS. These findings 
highlight that the mere existence of differences in average patient health status between an NHS 
hospital and a nearby ISTC should not, in itself, be taken as evidence that the ISTC imposed 
negative externalities on the NHS hospital’s casemix via patient selection. Rather, the presence of 
such a negative externality can only be demonstrated by comparing the evolution of average 
patient health status at NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed nearby, with the evolution of 
average patient health status at comparable NHS hospitals that did not have an ISTC placed 
nearby. 
 
It is important to note that some ISTC exclusion criteria have a valid clinical rationale – 
ISTCs do not have emergency wards, and most do not have the intensive care facilities that 
would be required to care for the sickest patients. Moreover, in principle, if reimbursement rates 
are appropriately adjusted for patient severity, NHS hospitals should not be negatively affected 
by the presence of a nearby ISTC that only caters for the fittest patients. The prevailing view, 
however, is that the HRG codes used for PBR until the late 2000s, namely HRG versions 3.1 and 
3.5, did not adequately adjust for patient severity, leaving providers with a sicker-than-average 
patient load worse off. While PBR adopted HRG version 4.0, which is thought to better adjust 
for patient severity, in April 2009, Mason et al. (2008, p.34) articulate a widespread scepticism 
that PBR will ever be able to completely adjust for patient casemix when they say that the 
“HRG system is unable (and probably never will be able) to finely differentiate between the types 
of patient treated in each setting.” 
 
We test for the presence of ISTC patient selection by examining two direct measures of 
patient health status, and two demographic variables correlated with health status. Firstly, we 
calculate a measure of patient severity known as the Charlson score, which predicts a patient’s 10 
year survival probability based on their health status in relation to 17 conditions likely to lead to 
death. The score varies from 0 to 6, with 0 denoting the absence of any predictors of mortality 
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(HSCIC 2013a). Secondly, following Street et al. (2010) and Mason et al. (2010), we look at a raw 
count of the number of diagnoses recorded for each patient on admission to hospital, on the basis 
that this will be negatively correlated with patient health status. Although this is a rather crude 
measure, we use it because it might pick up variation in patient health status at a lower 
threshold of illness than that with which the Charlson score is concerned (i.e. causes of death).  
 
Thirdly, we look at the income deprivation score from the 2004 Index of Multiple 
Deprivations (Noble et al. 2004), which measures the percentage of residents in the patient’s 
Super Output Area of residence that live in an income-deprived household. Poverty is associated 
with poor health, so a hospital with poorer patients is also likely to have sicker patients. Finally, 
we look at average patient age, which like poverty is also associated with poor health. We focus 
on these economic and demographic correlates of patient health status following Cooper et al. 
(2012), who find evidence that independent sector hospitals that treated NHS patients under the 
patient choice regime had wealthier, and younger, patients on average than did NHS hospitals.13 
 
Prospective reimbursement regimes such as PBR are known to encourage cherry-picking, as 
they create incentives for hospitals to avoid admitting patients whose cost of treatment is likely 
to exceed the regulated price (Allen & Gertler 1991; Ellis & McGuire 1986; Ellis 1998; Newhouse 
1989). We are interested in estimating the extent of any possible ISTC cherry picking resulting 
from their differential exclusion criteria, over and above any cherry picking undertaken by NHS 
hospitals as a result of the introduction of prospective reimbursement. We achieve this by 
comparing changes to patient casemix at ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals with changes to patient 
casemix at NHS hospitals that were not exposed to the ISTC programme, yet were equally 
exposed to the new prospective reimbursement regime.  
 
Finally, work by Ellis (1998) and Meltzer et al. (2002) suggests that prospective 
reimbursement regimes may have differential effects in low-competition and high-competition 
markets, with hospitals in more competitive markets facing greater pressure to engage in risk 
selection. To control for this possibility, we include in our regressions a control for the overall 
level of competition intensity faced by a hospital, to differentiate between effects that are specific 
to exposure to the ISTC programme, and effects that result from more general features of the 
competitive environment. 
                                               
13 In an extension to the present study, we intend to incorporate data from the National Joint Registry – which 
contains each hip and knee replacement patient’s ASA score – into our dataset, thus enabling us to estimate the 
possible external effects of ISTC risk selection on nearby NHS hospitals by looking directly at one of the variables 
on which selection is thought to have taken place. 
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3.4 Waiting times 
Waiting times for elective surgery dropped dramatically throughout the English NHS during 
the 2000s. Analysis of these reductions has focused on the waiting time targets regime discussed 
in Section Two. Early analyses (Alvarez-Rosete et al. 2005; Bevan 2006; Bevan & Hood 2006a; 
2006b; Bevan & Hamblin 2009) suggested that, while targets had been effective at reducing 
waiting times, that there was anecdotal evidence suggesting that hospitals employed a range of 
effort substitution and gaming responses to meet the targets.  
 
Econometric evidence (Propper et al. 2008b; 2010; Besley et al. 2009) confirmed that the 
targets regime was extremely effective at reducing maximum waits to the length of time specified 
by the target, but that patients at the lower end of the waiting time distribution were made to 
wait longer on average. Propper et al. (2010) also find that hospitals that were under more 
pressure to reduce waiting times suspended and removed patients from waiting lists more 
frequently than other hospitals. They argue that this is evidence of a gaming response to the 
targets regime, in which hospitals exploited loopholes in waiting time regulations to reduce their 
waiting lists. 
 
The present paper is interested in identifying any possible contribution by the ISTC 
programme to reducing average waiting times, over and above the reductions achieved by the 
targets regime. We do this by examining whether the reductions in average waiting times at 
ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals were larger than those at NHS hospitals not exposed to the ISTC 
programme, but equally subject to the national waiting time targets regime. 
3.5 Relationship to literature from the United States 
Our research is related to several literatures from the United States – on hospital entry, 
specialty hospitals, and the interaction between for-profit and non-profit hospitals – that cut 
across the dimensions of hospital performance reviewed above. 
 
Regarding hospital entry, Cutler et al. (2010) examine a reform in Pennsylvania that led to 
increased hospital entry for cardiac surgery; the higher competitive pressure that resulted led to 
improvements in clinical quality, by redistributing demand towards higher-quality surgeons.  
 
Barro et al. (2006) study specialty hospitals, which are similar to ISTCs in that they focus 
only on a limited range of conditions. Their conclusions are nuanced – they find that markets in 
which specialty hospitals entered had higher cost-adjusted quality (costs went down without any 
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change in clinical outcomes), but also that specialty hospitals engaged in patient risk selection, 
leaving the sickest patients to nearby general hospitals. This latter finding is echoed by Winter 
(2003) and Cram et al. (2005), who find that specialty hospitals cherry-pick the most profitable 
patients. Kessler & McClellan (2002) find that the presence of for-profit hospitals exerts a 
positive effect on nearby non-profit hospitals, by inducing them to become more efficient – non-
profits with a nearby for-profit hospital have lower expenditures than other non-profits, but their 
patient outcomes are no worse. On the other hand, Cutler & Horwitz (1998) and Silverman & 
Skinner (2001) show that non-profit hospitals may mimic the behaviour of neighbouring for-profit 
hospitals in more undesirable ways, such as by gaming reimbursement systems through upcoding. 
4 Treatment Assignment, Identification Strategy, 
and Data 
4.1 Data 
Our dataset is based on the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), which contains entries 
for the universe of hospital admissions by NHS patients in England. More precisely, HES is 
supposed to contain an entry for every NHS patient hospital stay in England, but an important 
caveat for the purpose of this paper is that ISTCs did not submit complete records to HES before 
2010/2011 (HC 2008). Our dataset incorporates all English elective admissions in HES between 
the 2002/2003 and 2012/2013 financial years for five high-volume elective surgical procedures 
that were frequently performed by ISTCs: hip replacement, knee replacement, knee arthroscopy, 
hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery.14 Although we only examine outcome variables in 
relation to hip and knee replacement surgery, we use all five of these procedures for the purpose 
of assigning hospitals to treated and control groups, and when constructing our competition 
intensity measures. Our dataset also includes all emergency admissions with a diagnosis of Acute 
Myocardial Infarction (AMI). In total, our dataset consists of 5.18 million finished consultant 
episodes.15 Table 2 reports summary statistics for all outcome variables examined in this paper, 
as well as for selected control variables. 
 
NHS hospital trusts often consist of multiple treatment sites which can be located up to 
100km from each other. Furthermore, individual sites within a given trust arguably often act as 
                                               
14 The OPCS4 procedure codes and ICD10 diagnosis codes used to define the procedures and conditions included in 
our dataset are provided in the Appendix. 
15 Each observation in HES consists of a consultant ‘episode’ – that is, an entry for a patient under a single doctor’s 
care. If a patient is under the care of more than one doctor during their spell in hospital, there will be one entry in 
HES for each episode. Our dataset uses episode-level observations, but links together all the episodes in a spell to 
ensure that critical variables such as admission and discharge dates are recorded correctly. 
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effective competitors.16 For these reasons, we conduct our analysis at site level rather than trust 
level. After cleaning (and imputing missing values for)17 the site code field, allocating a single site 
code to identical or substantively identical sites,18 and dropping any observations from sites that 
did not have at least 50 patients for at least one of our elective surgical procedures (or at least 50 
AMI patients) in at least one financial year, as well as dropping children’s hospitals, we were left 
with 510 sites, of which 340 are NHS sites and 170 are private providers (including 43 ISTCs). Of 
the 340 NHS sites, 291 had data from both before and after the introduction of the ISTC 
programme, and were therefore available for allocation to treated and control groups. 
4.2 Treatment assignment 
We assign treatments by comparing the distance from an NHS hospital to its nearest ISTC 
with the percentiles of distance travelled by that hospital’s patients. Our treatment assignment 
strategy is driven by the hypothesis that NHS hospitals that have ISTCs established in their 
immediate vicinity might be affected more by the ISTC programme, and might exhibit a larger 
change in behaviour, than NHS hospitals that had an ISTC placed within their catchment area 
but not right next door. For this reason, we allocate an NHS hospital to a High Treatment Group 
if it has an ISTC placed within its 25 per cent market radius (that is, within the 25th percentile 
of patient distance travelled). This group encompasses NHS hospitals that were co-located with 
an ISTC, or who had an ISTC placed within a few kilometres. Secondly, we allocate an NHS 
hospital to a Low Treatment Group if it has an ISTC within its 95 per cent market radius but 
not within its 25 per cent market radius. Hospitals that do not have an ISTC within their 95 per 
cent market radius are allocated to our control group, and are considered to have not been 
affected by the ISTC programme.  
 
Percentiles of patient distance travelled can be endogenous to hospital quality – for example, 
a high-quality hospital may attract patients from further afield, thus making it appear more 
competitive. To ameliorate concerns about potential endogeneity of our treatment assignment 
                                               
16 Our distance metric is the straight line distance between the hospital and the patient’s Lower Super Output Area 
of residence. What matters for patients is not straight line distance but travel time. However, cross-checking with 
Google Maps confirmed a very high correlation between our straight line distances and both distance by road (0.99) 
and travel time (0.93). 
17 Unlike the HES trust code field, which is always complete, the site code field is missing in approximately 10 per 
cent of cases, and contains invalid data in approximately 10 per cent more. In the vast majority of such cases, 
however, it is possible to impute the correct site codes with certainty – for example, because only one hospital site 
within a trust performs a given surgical procedure. In the small number of remaining cases – around 4.4 per cent – 
we randomise our imputation of site codes amongst all sites in a trust that perform the procedure in question. 
18 As it is vital for our analysis to establish continuity between sites, we allocate a single site code to identical sites 
(when two NHS trusts merge, component sites of the trusts are generally given a new site code) or substantively 
identical sites (for example, two sites of an NHS trust with the same postcode). This allocation was performed 
manually, but was informed by the spreadsheet of predecessors of current sites that is published by the 
Organisation Data Service of the HSCIC (ODS 2014). 
  35 
methodology, we use percentiles based on averages from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 – that is, before 
the implementation of either the ISTC programme or patient choice of hospital for elective 
surgery.19  
 
Of the 291 NHS sites available for allocation to the treated and control groups, 31 were 
assigned to the High Treatment Group, 111 to the Low Treatment Group, and 149 to the 
Untreated group.  
 
We allocate NHS hospitals to treatment categories based on percentiles of patient distance 
travelled, rather than on raw distance, in order to control for rural-urban differences – treatment 
assignment based on fixed distances will over- [under-] estimate the level of competition in urban 
[rural] areas.20 In our robustness checks, we examine whether our results change if we use a 
treatment assignment strategy based on fixed distances from NHS hospital to ISTC. 
 
In addition to assigning hospitals to two discrete treatment groups, we also construct a 
continuous measure of treatment intensity based directly on percentiles of patient distance 
travelled – treatment intensity is defined as 100 minus the percentile patient equivalent. That is, 
if an ISTC is located as far away as the 20th percentile of patient distance travelled, the hospital 
is assigned a treatment intensity of 80. We report estimates using such a continuous measure of 
treatment intensity in the robustness checks. 
 
We henceforth only analyse and refer to NHS hospitals exposed to Wave 1 ISTCs. Identical 
analysis to that which follows was performed for NHS hospitals exposed to Phase 2 ISTCs, but 
no evidence of any treatment effects was found. Figure 1 summarises the relationship between 
treatment intensity, treatment assignment, and percentiles of patient distance travelled. Table 3 
                                               
19 Only three ISTCs commenced operations before the start of the 2005/2006 financial year. The first was The 
Birkdale Clinic at Daventry, a small scheme that was only contracted to perform a few hundred procedures from 
amongst those studied in this paper. It does not appear in our dataset. The second was The Cataract Initiative, a 
large-scale scheme and the only multi-site Wave 1 ISTC. It does not appear in our dataset because we do not look 
at cataract surgery. The third was the Kidderminster ISTC, which opened in February 2005, only two months 
before the start of the 2005/2006 financial year. In addition to these three ISTCs, the Barlborough ISTC, whose 
contract started in April 2005, treated some patients before its contract start date via makeshift arrangements at 
Ilkeston and Bassetlaw hospitals. These mini-ISTCs at Ilkeston and Bassetlaw have been excluded from our 
analysis, as have their host NHS hospitals, for the avoidance of ambiguity about treatment assignment. Therefore, 
modulo concerns about possible anticipation effects, for the present analysis it seems safe to designate 2005/2006 as 
the first ‘treatment on’ year. 
20 Imagine, for example, that we assigned NHS hospitals to our High Treatment Group if they had an ISTC located 
within 20km. The population density in central London is such that a hospital entrant located 20km away will not 
be a competitor in any meaningful sense, as its catchment area will be almost entirely distinct from that of the 
established hospital. In sparsely populated rural areas, however, an entrant located 20km away will be directly 
competing for a large percentage of an established hospital’s patients. Basing treatment assignments on percentiles 
of patient distance travelled helps to adjust for these rural-urban differences. 
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reports key summary statistics concerning the treated and control groups. Table 4 lists the NHS 
hospitals allocated to the High Treatment Group. 
4.3 Treatment start and end dates 
We define the treatment start date for an NHS hospital as the contract start date of its 
nearest ISTC. Figure 2 shows the distribution of contract start dates for ‘treating’ Wave 1 ISTCs 
in our dataset. This graph highlights that the bulk of Wave 1 ISTCs opened between April 2005 
and December 2006. We focus on ISTCs that opened during these date periods, and disregard 
outliers.  
 
There is some ambiguity as to the appropriate way to assign treatment start dates, as there 
is evidence to indicate that some ISTCs began treating patients before their official contract start 
date, while others did not actually commence operations until some time after their contract start 
date. There is also some ambiguity as to the appropriate way to assign treatment end dates. 
ISTC contracts generally lasted for around five years. When their initial contract was completed, 
some ISTCs managed to secure further contracts, but many others were either shut down or 
absorbed into neighbouring NHS trusts. As the fate of the ISTC was generally announced in the 
last year of the contract, to avoid capturing any changes in behaviour due to anticipated contract 
completion, we assign a treatment end date equal to the contract start date plus four years. 
 
Given the ambiguities just described in relation to treatment start and end dates, estimates 
of treatment effects that make use of the full panel we have assembled would be subject to 
attenuation bias, as control periods around the treatment start and end dates would be assigned 
to treatment periods and vice versa. To eliminate any risk of such bias, we employ a long 
differences specification that makes use only of data from the 2004/2005 and 2008/2009 financial 
years. We motivate this approach using graphical evidence, to demonstrate that the parallel 
trends assumption appears to be satisfied for many outcome variables, and demonstrate in our 
robustness checks that our main results are robust to the choice of alternative pre- and post-
treatment periods. 
4.4 Identification strategy 
We run our regressions at the patient level and in logs, to capture the idea that ISTC 
exposure will have treatment effects that occur as percentage changes. We first run the most 
basic possible difference-in-differences (D-in-D) regression. With t ∈ {0,1} = {2004/2005, 
2008/2009}, yijt denoting the log of the outcome variable under consideration for patient i 
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attending hospital j, and highj and lowj denoting dummies for the High and Low Treatment 
Groups, the regression is: 
 
     yijt = β0 + β1 t + β2 highj + β3 lowj + β4 (highj⋅ t) + β5 (lowj⋅ t) + εijt  (1) 
 
Treatment effects are given by the coefficients on the interaction terms, β4 and β5. To 
account for serial correlation, we estimate the equation using OLS with standard errors clustered 
at the hospital (site) level. 
 
The regression specification just presented does not include any controls for hospital, regional 
and patient characteristics. In our second specification, we present estimates that include dummy 
variables for hospital type (specialist, teaching, university, standard acute, and above-median 
size21), and for the eight regions of England.  
 
This specification also includes a series of controls for patient characteristics. This paper 
examines the hypothesis that the characteristics of hip and knee replacements patients at NHS 
exposed may be influenced by ISTC proximity, as a result of ISTC patient selection practices. If 
this hypothesis is correct, it would imply that post-ISTC-programme patient characteristics are 
endogenous to treatment assignment. Therefore, instead of controlling for individual patient 
characteristics, we control for a hospital’s average pre-ISTC-programme patient characteristics in 
the period 2002/2003-2004/2005, so that all the controls just outlined are time-invariant. By 
controlling for pre-ISTC-programme average patient characteristics, rather than individual 
patient characteristics, our aim is to control for time-invariant patient characteristics in the 
hospital’s catchment area.  
 
By contrast, for our estimates of the effect of the ISTC programme on AMI mortality rates, 
we use current-period averages of patient characteristics, because we believe that the 
characteristics of AMI patients are not endogenous to ISTC programme exposure, for two reasons. 
First, ISTCs did not treat AMI patients. Secondly, as heart attack is a medical emergency, 
patients do not choose which hospital to attend, as they are simply taken by ambulance to the 
nearest appropriate hospital; thus, there is little scope for selection either by hospitals or by 
patients themselves. 
 
                                               
21 Our dummy variable for ‘above median size’ is based on all hospital admissions. As post-ISTC-programme 
admissions may be endogenous, we use pre-reform (2002/2003-2004/2005) admissions, so that our ‘above median 
size’ control is time-invariant. 
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Our patient characteristics controls include average pre-reform values for the procedure 
under consideration for the percentage of patients who are: aged between 0 and 60; aged 76 and 
over; female; urban dwellers; and of a particular ethnicity (mixed, Asian, black, other, and 
unknown). We include a control for the log of patients’ average IMD04 income deprivation score, 
proxied by its average pre-reform value. We also include a control for the log of finished 
consultant episodes for the procedure in question, which, like the other variables just described, is 
proxied by its average pre-reform value because of concerns that number of admissions may be 
endogenous to hospital performance in the post-reform period. 
 
In addition to the controls for hospital, region and patient characteristics just outlined, we 
include a control for the overall level of competition intensity faced by the hospital, in order to 
control for the introduction of patient choice of hospital for elective surgery concurrently with the 
rollout of the ISTC programme. We measure competition intensity by a hospital-specific, 
hospital-centred Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI (sum of squared market shares), where each 
hospital’s market is defined as the circle corresponding to the radius formed by the distance 
travelled for treatment by the hospital’s 95th percentile patient.22 To ameliorate concerns about 
the endogeneity of percentile-based measures of market size, when constructing our competition 
index, we only use data from the years 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 – that is, both before the ISTC 
programme commenced, and before the introduction of patient choice. Defining competition 
intensity using pre-reform data also ensures that our measure of overall competition intensity 
does not capture increased competition from resulting from the establishment of the ISTCs 
themselves. Our control for competition intensity consists of a post-reform dummy interacted 
with the negative log of pre-reform HHI.23  
 
Instead of using a dummy variable to indicate that an observation occurred in the post-
reform period, we now control flexibly for time trends and fixed effects by including a full set of 
month-year dummies. With t now denoting month and year, and postt ∈ {0,1} denoting whether 
an observation occurs in the post-reform period, our second regression specification is:24 
 
yijt = β0 + β1 t + β2 highj + β3 lowj + β4 (highj ⋅ postt) + β5 (lowj ⋅ postt)  (2) 
  + β6 (-logHHIj,2002-2004 ⋅ postt) + β7 site_ctrlsj + β8 region_dummiesj  
    + β9 patient_ctrlsj,2002-2004 + εijt 
                                               
22 This is the same definition of a hospital’s market size that we use when assigning NHS hospitals to treated and 
control groups. 
23 This is similar to the specification used by Gaynor et al. (2013), and in Column 1, Table 4 of Cooper et al. 
(2011). 
24 For our AMI regressions, the patient_ctrlsj,2002-2004 term should instead read patient_ctrlsijt. 
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Finally, we present estimates from our third, preferred specification, which includes hospital 
fixed effects in place of the time-invariant controls used in the previous specification. We include 
hospital fixed effects in our preferred specification because they can control for any time-invariant 
effects at the hospital level, whether observable or unobservable. We retain the control for overall 
competition intensity, as it is time-varying (it is only ‘turned on’ for the post-reform period). If µj 
denotes a hospital fixed effect, the regression is now:25 
 
    yijt = β0 + β1 t + β2 highj + β3 lowj + β4 (highj ⋅ postt) + β5 (lowj ⋅ postt)   (3) 
       + β6 (-logHHIj,2002-2004 ⋅ postt) + µj + εijt 
5 Graphical Evidence 
In this section, we present graphical evidence concerning the evolution of outcome variables 
in our High Treatment Group, our Low Treatment Group, and our control group. In each graph 
presented below, the x-axis denotes time while the y-axis denotes the outcome variable, 
normalised by its pre-treatment average in order to facilitate a comparison of pre-reform trends.26 
The solid line denotes the High Treatment Group, the dashed line the Low Treatment Group, 
and the dotted line the control group. 
 
The shaded area represents the range of treatment start dates for the Wave 1 ISTCs to 
which the treated groups were exposed. We expect that any treatment effects will arise either 
within the shaded region or, if behavioural responses take place with a lag, some time after the 
shaded region. The vertical line marks September 2003, when the first preferred bidders were 
announced; this is the earliest possible date for which an (anticipatory) treatment effect might be 
observed. Each data point represents a month; a moving average was employed to smooth the 
data.27 The graphs plot the evolution of outcomes until March 2009, the first treatment end date 
in our dataset. 
                                               
25 Although not included in the regression specification presented here, for our AMI mortality regressions, here and 
for all the results that follow, our estimates with hospital fixed effects retain controls for individual patient 
characteristics, as, unlike all our other regressions, these controls are time-varying, and are therefore not made 
redundant by the inclusion of hospital fixed effects. 
26 We normalise by subtracting the pre-treatment average from the current-period value, instead of dividing by the 
pre-treatment average, in order to facilitate comparison of pre-reform trends from the graphical evidence. 
27 For all outcome variables except age and AMI death rates, data was smoothed by taking the simple mean of the 
current period value plus the three previous quarters. For age and AMI death rates, the previous four quarters were 
used. Only lagged values of the outcome variable were used, as opposed to centring the moving average on the 
current period value, in order to ensure that treatment effects from future periods are not spuriously presented as 
anticipation effects. One consequence of employing this moving average is that sharp discontinuities in outcome 
variables will appear in the graphs as more gradual effects. The regressions presented in the next section were 
performed on unsmoothed data. 
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5.1 Raw efficiency 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of pre-surgical length of stay (LOS) for hip and knee 
replacement. Pre-reform trends are parallel across all treated and control groups. Like all LOS 
measures presented in Section Five, there is a downward trend for both treated groups as well as 
for the control group, reflecting the impact of the introduction of PBR from 2003 onwards. Over 
and above this secular downward trend, however, there is evidence of a treatment effect from 
ISTC placement. Around the middle of the ‘treatment on’ period, trends diverge, and by the end 
of the treatment period the reduction in pre-surgical LOS is notably larger for the High 
Treatment Group than for the control group. There also appears to be a smaller effect for the 
Low Treatment Group, providing support for our argument that the divergence in trends after 
the treatment start date can be attributed to the ISTC programme. 
 
To check whether the treatment effect presented in Figure 3 is driven by outliers (for 
example, by hospitals in the control group with unusually long pre-surgical LOS), in Figure 4 we 
graph the evolution of the percentage of hip and knee replacement patients with a pre-surgical 
LOS equal to zero. This transformation converts pre-surgical LOS into a binary variable equal to 
one if pre-surgical LOS is zero, and zero otherwise. Figure 4 tells an identical story to Figure 3 – 
hospitals in the High Treatment Group had a larger increase in percentage of patients with a pre-
surgical LOS of zero than did hospitals in the Low Treatment Group, which in turn had a larger 
increase than hospitals in the control group. We take this as further graphical evidence in 
support of our interpretation that having an ISTC placed nearby made NHS hospitals more 
efficient. 
5.2 Casemix measures 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of outcomes for the Charlson score. For hip patients, pre-reform 
trends are parallel across treated and control groups, and very close to being parallel for knee 
patients. Both graphs suggest a treatment effect, in which the High Treatment Group starts 
receiving sicker patients from near the beginning of the shaded area. To the extent pre-reform 
trends are not parallel for knee patients, the pre-reform trend seems to be flatter for the High 
Treatment Group, suggesting that difference-in-differences estimates will provide a lower bound 
on the treatment effect. For the Low Treatment Group, there seems to be a small treatment 
effect for hip patients, but there is little evidence of a treatment effect for knee patients. 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of outcomes for ‘severity’ (number of conditions a patient is 
diagnosed with). It is hard to draw firm conclusions from these graphs, as pre-reform trends do 
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not appear to be parallel. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the pre-ISTC-programme trend is 
flatter for the High Treatment Group, yet, by 2008, average severity is notably higher for the 
High Treatment Group than for the other groups. This suggests that a treatment effect exists, 
but the pre-reform trends are so divergent that difference-in-difference estimates would not be 
meaningful. For the Low Treatment Group, pre-reform trends are parallel, but there is little 
evidence of a treatment effect after the start of the ISTC programme. 
 
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the IMD04 income deprivation score (Noble et al. 2004). Pre-
reform trends are parallel across treated and control groups, and there is an upwards jump for 
the High Treatment Group in the period immediately after April 2005, suggesting a treatment 
effect. However, causal interpretation is impeded because, in April 2007, there is a dramatic 
discrete jump in the index of approximately equal magnitude for all groups.28 Understanding the 
source of this jump is an active area of investigation.  
 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of average patient age. Pre-reform trends are parallel for knee 
replacement, but there is little evidence of a treatment effect; they are far from being parallel for 
hip replacement. 
 
In summary, the graphical evidence indicates that NHS hospitals who had ISTCs placed 
nearby had larger decreases in average patient health status than did NHS hospitals without a 
nearby ISTC, and that difference-in-difference estimates for the Charlson score are likely, at 
worst, to provide a lower bound on the effect of ISTC placement. NHS hospitals with ISTCs 
placed nearby also appear to have received poorer patients on average, but the large secular jump 
in the IMD04 income score in 2007 precludes meaningful estimation of treatment effects. There is 
little evidence of a treatment effect in relation to average patient age. 
5.3 Net efficiency 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of post-surgical LOS for major surgery patients. As discussed in 
the previous section, we take post-surgical LOS to be a combined measure of ‘raw’ hospital 
efficiency and average patient severity – sicker patients will require a longer period of 
convalescence before being discharged. For both procedures, pre-reform trends are parallel, and 
post-surgical LOS decreases in the High Treatment Group less than for the control group. We 
take this as suggestive evidence that the positive effects of ISTC competition on the efficiency of 
                                               
28 Although Figure 7 suggests that the score gradually increases over the course of 2007, this is merely an artefact of 
the data smoothing process – in the raw data there is a discrete jump in the level of the score in April 2007. 
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nearby NHS hospitals were swamped, at least in relation to post-surgical LOS, by the negative 
impact of worsened casemix. For the Low Treatment Group, the picture is unclear. 
 
One interesting difference between Figure 3 and Figure 9 is that the High Treatment Group 
trend for post-surgical LOS appears to diverge almost immediately after the start of the 
treatment on period; by contrast, for pre-surgical LOS, it only begins to diverge some time after 
the treatment on period. This difference in timing is consistent with our explanation of treatment 
effects in terms of efficiency improvements and negative externalities via worsened casemix. If an 
ISTC that accepts only the healthiest patients opens near an NHS hospital, the negative effects 
on the casemix of the NHS hospital will be immediate. By contrast, any positive efficiency 
response to increased competitive pressure requires a behavioural change on the part of the NHS 
hospital, which may only happen with a lag. This explanation is further supported by the fact 
that treatment effects in relation to our casemix variables can be observed immediately after the 
start of the treatment on period. 
 
To get a sense of the net effect of the changes in pre-surgical and post-surgical LOS brought 
about by ISTC placement, Figure 10 shows the evolution of total LOS for major surgery patients. 
Pre-reform trends are again parallel, but after the reform the downward trend slows markedly for 
the High Treatment Group, so that by the end of the treatment period the total reduction for 
NHS hospitals with ISTCs placed near them is considerably smaller than that for the other 
groups. We conclude that the effect of ISTC exposure on the ‘net’ efficiency of nearby NHS 
hospitals (that is, combining ‘raw’ efficiency as measured by pre-surgical LOS with changes in 
LOS due to worsened casemix) was negative. 
 
Given that the reductions in total LOS for hip and knee replacement patients are lower for 
the High Treatment Group than for the control group, it could be argued that the apparent 
efficiency improvements in High Treatment Group hospitals, as measured by shorter pre-surgical 
LOS, are illusory. For example, perhaps these apparent relative improvements arose from shifting 
forward surgery in a clinically inappropriate way, or from gaming responses (e.g. mis-recording of 
the surgery date, in order to decrease pre-surgical LOS while increasing post-surgical LOS). 
 
We think it is unlikely that this is the explanation for the improvements in pre-surgical LOS 
documented in this paper, for three reasons. First, there has been little attention paid to pre-
surgical LOS as a measure of hospital efficiency. A Google Scholar search for the terms “pre 
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surgical LOS” or “pre surgical length of stay” returns only 13 papers.29 We therefore think it is 
unlikely to have been a target for manipulation by hospital managements. Secondly, there is no 
evidence suggesting that hospitals manipulated their pre-surgical LOS in order to appear more 
efficient. This may be contrasted with the vast anecdotal evidence – along with substantial 
rigorous empirical evidence (Propper et al. 2008b; 2010; Besley et al. 2009) – that English 
hospitals gamed and manipulated their waiting lists in order to meet the government’s waiting 
time targets during the 2000s. Thirdly, even if NHS hospitals did have an incentive to manipulate 
their pre-surgical LOS data, this could only explain the treatment effect identified in this paper if 
hospitals in the High Treatment Group had a bigger incentive to manipulate their data than 
other hospitals. There is no reason to believe that they had such a differential incentive. 
5.4 Waiting times 
Figure 11 shows the evolution of average waiting times for hip and knee replacement surgery. 
Unlike all other graphs of the evolution of outcomes presented in this paper, we do not normalise 
waiting times by the pre-treatment group average, because a major driver of decreases in waiting 
times during this period was the imposition of uniform national waiting time targets. Normalising 
by the pre-treatment average would conceal the fact that differences in the evolution of waiting 
times between treatment and control groups appear, to a very large extent, to be driven by the 
fact that the High Treatment Group started with higher pre-treatment average waiting times, 
but was required to meet the same waiting time targets as were other hospitals. All groups 
converge to very similar average waiting times. 
 
As the parallel trends assumption is clearly violated for waiting times, we do not present 
difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of ISTC placement on this outcome measure, as 
they would spuriously indicate a positive treatment effect (a larger decrease in waiting times in 
treated hospitals than in control hospitals) from the ISTC programme, when in fact the 
differential post-treatment trends are most likely being driven by the targets regime. 
5.5 Quality measures 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of AMI mortality rates. Pre-reform trends are approximately 
parallel across treated and control groups, and in the last year of data the AMI mortality rate for 
the High Treatment Group appears to dip below that of the Low Treatment Group, which in 
turn appears to dip below that of the control group. However, the nature of the trends up until 
                                               
29 Indeed, one of these 13 papers (Nuti et al. 2008) is about gaming responses in the Tuscan health system, and only 
mentions pre-surgical LOS as an example of a hospital outcome measure that is not subject to gaming. 
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that point suggest a need for caution in offering a causal interpretation of this relationship 
between final outcomes for the three groups. There is little evidence of a change in trend for the 
High Treatment Group after the treatment start date, and, for much of the period after the 
treatment start date, the AMI mortality rate for the High Treatment Group is above that of the 
other groups; it only dips below that of the other groups in the final year of the treatment period 
– well after the last Wave 1 ISTC had opened – due to an upward movement in AMI mortality 
for the control group. We conclude that, for AMI mortality, it will be particularly important to 
examine the robustness of our estimates to alternative specifications. 
5.6 Conclusions regarding graphical evidence 
The fact that pre-reform trends seem to be the same across treated and control groups for all 
our LOS measures, as well as for several other outcome measures, may seem surprising, in light of 
the fact that the process by which ISTC locations were decided makes it highly likely that NHS 
hospitals that had ISTCs placed near them were systematically different to those that did not. In 
particular, we expect that hospitals in the High Treatment Group will have been tagged as ‘poor 
performers’.  
 
However, what our finding in relation to pre-reform trends highlights is that NHS hospitals 
were not marked as ‘poor performers’, and therefore liable to have an ISTC placed nearby, on the 
basis of performance in relation to length of stay, but rather on the basis of other performance 
measures – most notably waiting times. In this regard, it is instructive that average waiting times 
at High Treatment Group hospitals were much higher before the commencement of the ISTC 
programme, and were trending downwards more steeply, than those at other hospitals. So long as 
hospital performance in relation to waiting times (and other determinants of ISTC placement) is 
not correlated with performance in relation to length of stay, allocation to treatments will 
(conditional on the control variables included in our regressions) be as good as random as far as 
our LOS measures are concerned. 
 
The correlation between waiting times and total LOS in 2002/2003, the year that the ISTC 
programme was announced, is -0.05 for hip replacement surgery, and 0.03 for knee replacement. 
Regressions of total LOS on waiting time also confirm little statistically significant relationship. 
In simple bivariate regressions of the log of total LOS on the log of waiting time using 2002/2003 
data, a statistically significant relationship was found for knee replacement but not for hip 
replacement. However, the coefficient for knee replacement patients is barely economically 
significant: a 1 per cent increase in waiting times is associated with a 0.03 per cent increase in 
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total LOS. Overall, we conclude that the relationship between these two dimensions of hospital 
performance during the period when ISTC placement decisions were being made is weak or non-
existent.  
 
Table 5 provides further evidence that average patient length of stay was unrelated to ISTC 
placement decisions in Table 5. Table 5 presents the average total LOS – the main LOS measure 
that is widely used to assess hospital performance – for hip and knee replacement surgery in each 
treatment and control group in 2002/2003 (these cannot be inferred from the graphs due to our 
normalisation by the pre-reform average). All groups have very similar average total LOS, and 
there is no systematic relationship between groups. Thus, not only do ISTC placement decisions 
appear to be unrelated to the trend of LOS (as established by our graphical evidence), but they 
also appear to be unrelated to the average level of LOS. We take this as further evidence that 
selection for ISTC placement on the basis of the average waiting times of nearby NHS hospitals 
does not imply selection, via correlation, on the basis of hospitals’ average LOS. 
 
The parallel trends assumption underlying difference-in-differences estimation requires not 
only that pre-reform trends be parallel, but also that we believe they would have remained 
parallel in the absence of the reform. One reason to doubt that trends would have remained 
parallel is if there were policy changes or shocks that occurred contemporaneously with the 
reform, and affected treatment and control groups differentially. One important policy change 
that occurred contemporaneously with the ISTC programme was the introduction of patient 
choice of hospital. To address this possible confounder, as already outlined, we include a control 
in our regressions for overall competition intensity faced by each hospital. (To preview our 
findings, it does not affect the basic story suggested by the graphs presented in this section.) In 
our robustness checks, we also examine whether other factors may have led post-reform trends to 
be non-parallel in the absence of the reform. 
 
A second reason to doubt that trends would have remained parallel is mean reversion. For 
example, even if pre-reform trends for pre-surgical LOS were parallel, if the level of pre-surgical 
LOS were higher for treated groups, we might suspect that there were process improvements 
available to these hospitals that they had not yet undertaken, and that they perhaps would have 
undertaken even if they had not been exposed to the ISTC programme. For this reason, Table 5 
also presents pre-reform average values of pre-surgical and post-surgical LOS for each treatment 
and control group. It shows that there is little difference between the group averages and that, in 
some cases, the average for the High Treatment Group is between that for the Low Treatment 
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Group and the control group. We therefore conclude that there is little reason to suspect that the 
divergent trends shown in our graphs after 2005 are driven by mean reversion. 
 
In this section we have shown graphical evidence that pre-reform trends were parallel across 
treatment and control groups for the Charlson score, various LOS measures, and AMI mortality. 
We have also argued that there is little reason to believe that, if the ISTC programme had not 
existed, these trends would have diverged after 2005 for reasons unrelated to the ISTC 
programme. We therefore conclude that the divergence in trends for these variables after 2005, as 
shown in our graphs, was driven by exposure to the ISTC programme, and that a valid estimate 
of the size of these causal effects can be captured by difference-in-differences estimation. We 
present these estimates in the next section. 
6 Difference-in-differences regressions 
In this section, we present our baseline difference-in-differences (D-in-D) estimates. For our 
efficiency measures, we present estimates of treatment effects for pre- and post-surgical LOS. For 
our casemix measures, we present estimates for the Charlson score. In relation to quality, we 
present estimates for AMI mortality.  
 
The results of our simple D-in-D regression, equation (1), are reported in Table 6. They are 
in line with the graphs presented in the previous section. For High Treatment Group hospitals, 
ISTC exposure led to increased efficiency as measured by pre-surgical LOS (one significant at 5 
per cent level, the other significant at 10 per cent level), and worsened casemix as measured by 
average Charlson scores (both significant at 5 per cent level). The net effect of ISTC exposure on 
performance of hospitals in the High Treatment Group, as captured by post-surgical LOS for 
knee replacement – which will reflect the influence of both ‘raw’ efficiency and average patient 
health status – is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. The corresponding coefficient 
for hip replacement is not significant. Clinical quality, as measured by AMI mortality, increases 
for the High Treatment Group, though the estimate is only significant at the 10 per cent level. 
No estimates are significant for the Low Treatment Group.  
 
The results from our regressions of equation (2) – which includes controls for site, region and 
patient characteristics (proxied by pre-reform values where appropriate to address endogeneity 
concerns) – are reported in Table 7. They are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 6 
– the only differences being that our coefficient on the knee replacement Charlson score for the 
High Treatment Group is now only significant at the 10 per cent level, while for hip replacement 
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Charlson score, there is now a positive effect on the Low Treatment Group significant at the 10 
per cent level. Also, the positive effect of ISTC exposure on clinical quality as captured by AMI 
mortality is no longer significant. 
 
Finally, in Table 8, we present the results from our preferred specification with hospital fixed 
effects, equation (3). For the High Treatment Group, ISTC exposure now has a positive effect 
(increased efficiency) on pre-surgical LOS significant at the 5 per cent level for both surgical 
procedures, and a negative effect on casemix (worse average patient health status), with one 
estimate significant at the 5 per cent level and the other at 10 per cent. In terms of magnitudes, 
the addition of an ISTC to a hospital’s immediate vicinity improves efficiency by around 66 per 
cent, but worsens casemix by around 40 per cent.30  
 
The net effect of ISTC exposure on average cost per patient for the High Treatment Group is 
negative, but only significant for our knee replacement estimates, for which post-surgical LOS 
increases by around 12 per cent. There does not appear to be any effect of ISTC exposure on care 
quality at nearby NHS hospitals, as captured by AMI mortality rates. We take this latter finding 
as evidence that, as a result of the increased competition brought about by ISTC exposure, 
hospitals in the High Treatment Group were spurred to achieve higher efficiency without any 
deterioration of clinical quality.  
 
For the Low Treatment Group, our only significant (at 10 per cent level) estimate indicates 
that ISTC exposure worsens casemix for hip replacement by 18 per cent. 
 
In summary, our results suggest that ISTC exposure increased competitive pressure on NHS 
hospitals in the immediate vicinity, and thus improved their ‘raw’ efficiency as captured by pre-
surgical LOS, but at the same time reduced their ‘net’ efficiency (as measured by post-surgical 
LOS) by imposing negative externalities in the form of worsened casemix. For the Low 
Treatment Group, most of our estimates are not significant. This could be because the 
competitive impacts of ISTC establishment were quite localised. An alternative interpretation, 
which is suggested by inspection of the insignificant estimates for the Low Treatment Group 
(which are generally of the same sign as those for the High Treatment Group, but smaller in 
magnitude), is that treatment effects do exist for this group of hospitals, but that our estimates 
lack sufficient power to provide statistically significant estimates of these effects. 
                                               
30 All percentage changes reported in the text of this paper do not use the log approximation, but are calculated 
exactly by applying the formula 100(𝑒!-1). 
  48 
7 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we show that our main results are robust to a range of alternative 
specifications. Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates of interest from our robustness checks, all 
of which are performed using our preferred specification outlined in equation (3), with hospital 
fixed effects and a control for overall competition intensity. 
 
Row (1) includes a simple dummy indicating whether an observation is from a post-reform 
period in place of our full set of month-year dummies. Our results are virtually unchanged. Row 
(2) omits our control for overall hospital competition intensity. Our results are, again, virtually 
unchanged. 
 
Row (3) uses binary transformations of the Charlson score and pre-surgical LOS outcome 
variables. Our use of the Charlson score as an outcome variable might be questioned on the 
grounds that it is simply an index with little cardinal meaning. We therefore construct a dummy 
variable equal to one if the patient has a Charlson score of three or more, and zero otherwise.31 
Likewise, we might be concerned that our pre-surgical LOS estimates are skewed by outliers (for 
example, hospitals in the control group with very long pre-surgical lengths of stay). For this 
reason, we construct a dummy variable equal to one if the patient has surgery on the same day 
they are admitted, and zero otherwise. Reassuringly, our results are qualitatively unaffected when 
these binary indicators of outcomes are used.  
 
Studies of hospital competition in the English NHS have been criticised on the grounds that 
they simply pick up systematic differences between hospitals in London and elsewhere. Our 
inclusion of hospital fixed effects should control for level effects due to location in London, but 
one might also be concerned about possible bias due to differential trends between London and 
elsewhere. Row (4) shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of a London differential 
trend term. Row (5) shows that our results are also robust to simply dropping all London 
hospitals from our sample, although there is a small loss of statistical significance in some cases. 
 
                                               
31 We use a Charlson score of three as our cutoff because only 0.04 per cent of the hip and knee replacement 
patients in our dataset have Charlson scores of one or two. Thus a Charlson score of zero indicates no mortality risk 
factors, while a Charlson score of three or more indicates significant mortality risk factors. 
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Row (6) shows that our Charlson and pre-surgical LOS estimates are robust to using the 
level of our outcome variable rather than logs. Our post-surgical LOS estimates are, however, 
insignificant.32  
 
Row (7) reports estimates when we assign treatments based on fixed distances from NHS 
hospital to ISTC – a hospital is assigned to the High Treatment Group if it has an ISTC within 
5km, to the Low Treatment Group if it has an ISTC within 30km but not within 5km, and to the 
Untreated group if it does not have an ISTC within 30km. Under this specification, both our 
Charlson estimates are now significant at the 5 per cent level, but none of our LOS estimates are 
any longer significant. We do not think that this calls into question our headline estimates, as we 
believe that there are good reasons for assigning treatments based on percentiles of patient 
distance travelled rather than on fixed distances (in particular, the ability of the former to 
control for systematic differences between rural and urban areas) – the estimates in Row (7) 
confirm that a treatment assignment strategy based on fixed distances is unsatisfactory. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to reproduce our baseline estimates using a fixed-distance-based 
treatment assignment strategy with different distance cut-offs. 
 
Row (8) reports estimates when our regressions are run on four years of data rather than two 
– 2003/2004-2004/2005 are used as pre-treatment periods, and 2007/2008-2008/2009 are used as 
post-treatment periods. All four of our LOS estimates are now significant at the 5 per cent level 
(one at 1 per cent level), and one of our post-surgical LOS estimates for the Low Treatment 
Group is also now significant at the 5 per cent level. Conversely, none of our Charlson estimates 
are any longer significant. In future work, we hope to clarify the reasons for the differences 
between these estimates and our baseline estimates. 
 
Finally, Row (9) reports estimates using our continuous measure of treatment intensity (100 
minus the percentile patient equivalent of distance from hospital to nearest ISTC).33 Our results 
are not robust to this alternative specification. This lack of robustness is consistent with the fact 
that our baseline estimates indicate significant treatment effects for the High Treatment Group 
but not the Low Treatment Group. Essentially, our data is only able to identify quite localised 
                                               
32 We do not present estimates for AMI mortality in Row (6) because our original outcome variable is binary and 
therefore not logged. 
33 For our regressions, we modify slightly the definition of continuous treatment intensity presented in Section 4.2, 
to incorporate our assumption that hospitals with no ISTC in their 95 per cent market radius are completely 
untreated (which implies that all such hospitals should have the same treatment intensity). We do this by 
subtracting 3 from this continuous measure of treatment intensity, and setting a minimum value of 1, so that a 
treatment intensity of 1 corresponds to ‘Untreated’, while a treatment intensity of 2 corresponds to a hospital with 
an ISTC in its 95 per cent market radius but not its 94 per cent market radius, and so on. 
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treatment effects, and so attempts to estimate ISTC impacts using the full range of variation in 
treatment intensity – most of which comes from hospitals not in the High Treatment Group – 
yield insignificant results. 
8 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have used the introduction of a series of Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres within the English NHS during the 2000s to examine the effect of increased competition 
on hospital efficiency, care quality and casemix. Although ISTC placement was influenced by the 
performance of nearby NHS hospitals, we present graphical evidence suggesting that the pre-
reform trends for key casemix and outcome variables – including Charlson scores, AMI mortality, 
and various length of stay measures – were the same for NHS hospitals that had ISTCs placed 
nearby as for those that did not. We therefore argue that difference-in-differences estimates for 
these outcome variables validly identify a causal effect of the ISTC programme. 
 
We explain the presence of parallel pre-reform trends, in spite of the a priori reasons to 
suspect that NHS hospitals that had ISTCs placed nearby will be systematically different to 
those that did not, by the fact that average hospital waiting times for surgery, which were a key 
input into ISTC placement decisions, do not appear to be correlated with the outcome variables 
for which parallel trends appear to exist. We therefore argue that, in relation to these variables, 
treatment assignment is as good as random, conditional on the control variables included in our 
regressions. 
 
We find that NHS hospitals that had a Wave 1 ISTC placed in their immediate vicinity 
experienced substantial improvements in hospital efficiency as measured by pre-surgical length of 
stay for hip and knee replacement surgery. The addition of an ISTC to an NHS hospital’s 
immediate neighbourhood leads to efficiency increases of around 66 per cent. This finding is very 
robust to alternative specifications.  
 
As well as investigating possible positive effects of ISTC competition on NHS hospital 
efficiency, we looked for evidence of possible negative effects in the form of worsened casemix, 
resulting from ISTCs avoiding treating the sickest and most complex patients. We find evidence 
that NHS hospitals with ISTCs in their immediate vicinity had a 40 per cent increase average 
patient severity, as captured by the Charlson score, compared with NHS hospitals not exposed to 
the ISTC programme. Our finding of a negative casemix effect of ISTC placement is largely 
robust to alternative specifications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that it has 
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been shown that ISTC exposure led to worsened NHS hospital casemix as compared with NHS 
hospitals not exposed to the ISTC programme, not just as compared with ISTCs themselves. We 
believe that this provides more robust evidence of ISTC patient selection than that offered by the 
existing literature. 
 
We find that, during the period studied, post-surgical LOS reduces less for NHS hospitals in 
the High Treatment Group than for unexposed NHS hospitals – although our baseline estimates 
for this variable are only significant for one of the two surgical procedures we examine. Our 
significant estimate in relation to post-surgical LOS suggests that any raw efficiency 
improvements made by High Treatment Group hospitals due to increased competition from 
ISTCs were swamped by a deterioration in net efficiency due to worsened casemix. However, two 
caveats should be noted in relation to this conclusion.  
 
Firstly, we have not controlled for PBR reimbursement rates in our regressions; since these 
reimbursement rates do involve some degree of adjustment for patient severity, it is possible that 
NHS hospitals were not made worse off by the deterioration in casemix that resulted from having 
an ISTC placed nearby. Our understanding, however, is that the versions of HRG used to 
calculate PBR reimbursement rates during the period under consideration were unlikely to have 
fully compensated NHS hospitals for the cost increases resulting from worsened casemix. 
 
Secondly, although LOS is itself an important component of overall hospital efficiency, we 
study pre- and post-surgical LOS above all as indicators of efficiency. That is, our finding that 
pre-surgical LOS decreased as a result of increased competitive pressure resulting from the ISTC 
programme suggests that ISTC-exposed NHS hospitals may well have improved their efficiency in 
other dimensions, not studied in this paper; it is possible that any other such efficiency 
improvements were not swamped by negative casemix externalities. 
 
We find almost no evidence that ISTC exposure increased the overall quality of NHS 
hospitals, as measured by decreased AMI mortality. Our insignificant estimates in relation to this 
outcome variable do allow us to conclude, however, that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
efficiency improvements achieved by High Treatment Group hospitals as a result of ISTC 
exposure came at the expense of clinical quality. 
 
We find little evidence of treatment effects for Low Treatment Group hospitals that had an 
ISTC as a competitor, but not in their immediate vicinity. From the graphical evidence, as well 
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as from the signs and magnitudes of our insignificant estimates, we speculate that smaller 
treatment effects do exist for this group of hospitals, but that our data and estimation strategy 
has insufficient power to provide statistically significant estimates of these effects. 
 
A question that naturally arises from our findings is: is it possible to reap the positive effects 
of increased competition resulting from expanded independent sector provision within the NHS 
(via increased efficiency), without the negative effects (via risk selection and consequent negative 
casemix externalities)? For example, could the negative effects of ISTC exposure on the casemix 
of NHS hospitals be eliminated by requiring ISTCs to apply the same exclusion criteria as those 
applied by NHS hospitals?  
 
We think that the solution is unlikely to be as simple as this, for three reasons. Firstly, one 
of the main rationales put forward for the ISTC programme was that care quality and efficiency 
could be improved by establishing specialist centres focused solely on the provision of routine, 
high-volume diagnostic and elective surgical procedures. Any such gains from specialisation would 
likely be reduced if ISTCs were required to possess all the facilities needed to treat the sickest 
patients, such as intensive care units.  
 
Secondly, more comprehensive casemix adjustment of reimbursement rates is not a panacea 
either, as there is widespread scepticism that a prospective reimbursement regime can ever be 
designed to fully compensate care providers that have sicker-than-average patient case loads. 
Conceptually, ever-increasing granularity in reimbursement rates with respect to patient health 
status will eventually push up against the original spirit of such a regime – namely to establish a 
uniform national rate per procedure which allows efficient hospitals to reap the monetary rewards 
from lean production. 
 
Thirdly, at a deeper level, the positive and negative effects of ISTC exposure are arguably 
two sides of the same coin. Most ISTCs were run on a for-profit basis. As compared with their 
non-profit counterparts, for-profit providers have sharper incentives to produce more efficiently, 
and these sharper incentives can have a positive effect on the efficiency of the non-profit hospitals 
with whom they compete; but they also have sharper incentives to engage in risk selection, or 
cherry-picking. As our literature review highlighted, this trade-off – increased competition by 
specialised or for-profit entrants leading to increased efficiency on the part of incumbents, but 
also to negative effects on these incumbents via risk selection – is well known from the literature 
on US health care markets. These are inherent features of the for-profit organisational form in 
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any market where imperfectly observed consumer characteristics influence profitability. They are 
unlikely, therefore, to be eliminated – though they may be ameliorated – by a legal requirement 
that independent providers accept patients on the same basis as NHS hospitals.  
 
If providers have a sufficiently strong incentive, they are likely to find ways to engage in 
cherry picking, whatever exclusion criteria exist on paper. Hence, we speculate that negative 
external effects of ISTC placement on nearby NHS hospitals may have arisen even in the absence 
of differential exclusion criteria. We offer this analysis not as an argument for or against an 
expanded role for independent sector providers within the NHS, but rather simply as an 
argument in favour of a clear-headed analysis of the different incentives faced by independent 
providers, whether for-profit or non-profit. 
 
Overall, our research adds to the substantial existing literature arguing that increasing the 
role for independent providers within the NHS should be done in a manner that takes seriously 
the possible negative and positive effects of independent sector entry on nearby NHS hospitals, 
and thinks seriously about the incentive structures within which both independent and NHS 
providers operate – including possible perverse incentives. It also highlights the need for ongoing 
work to ensure that NHS reimbursement regimes, and outcome measures used to assess 
performance, adjust as best they can for patient characteristics. 
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Appendix Procedure and diagnosis definitions 
We use the following OPCS4 procedure codes to identify the procedures included in our dataset. 
HES provides allows up to 24 surgical procedures to be listed in an episode; matching was 
conducted on all 24 fields. 
 
• Hip replacement: 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with W37, W38, W39, W46, W47, W48, 
W93, W94 or W95. 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with W52, W53, W54, or W58, as well as 
any other procedure field beginning with Z761, Z756, or Z843. 
 
•  Knee replacement: 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with O18, W40, W41, or W42 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with W52, W53, or W54, as well as any 
other procedure field beginning with Z765, Z771, Z774, Z844, Z845, or Z846. 
 
• Varicose veins: 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with L84, L85, L86, L87, L88, or L93. 
 
• Hernia: 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with T19 through to T27. 
 
• Knee arthroscopy: 
• Any patient with a procedure field beginning with W82 through to W89. 
 
Any patients with ICD10 diagnosis codes beginning with I21 and I22 are identified as having 
experienced an acute myocardial infarction. In addition, to ameliorate concerns about possible 
upcoding of diagnoses, we exclude patients with these diagnosis codes that were discharged alive 
with a total length of stay of less than three days. Following Cooper et al. (2011), in our analysis 
of AMI mortality, to ensure that we are comparing like with like, we also restrict attention to 
patients that are aged 39 to 100.  
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Chapter 1: Figures 
Figure 1 Treatment Assignment and Hospital 
Catchments 
 
Figure 1 graphically represents our treatment assignment strategy. We assign NHS hospitals to discrete treated and 
control groups by first constructing a continuous measure of ‘treatment intensity’, measured on the x-axis, which is 
equal to 100 minus the distance to the nearest ISTC, measured in terms of percentiles of patient distance travelled. 
Thus, an NHS hospital whose nearest ISTC was the same distance away as the distance travelled by its 20th 
percentile patient would have a treatment intensity of 80.34 
• An NHS hospital with a treatment intensity of 75 or above, corresponding to having an ISTC within its 25 per 
cent market radius, is allocated to the High Treatment Group. These hospitals are represented in black in the 
histogram of NHS hospitals by treatment intensity. 
• An NHS hospital with a treatment intensity between 5 and 75, corresponding to having an ISTC inside its 95 
per cent market radius but not inside one’s 25 per cent market radius, is allocated to the Low Treatment 
Group. These hospitals are represented in grey in the histogram. 
• An NHS hospital with a treatment intensity of less than 5, corresponding to not having an ISTC within its 95 
per cent market radius, is allocated to the Untreated group. These hospitals are represented in white in the 
histogram. Over half of the hospitals in our dataset (149 out of 291) are initially allocated to the Untreated 
group.  
                                               
34 A hospital that has an ISTC inside the distance travelled by its 1st percentile patient has a treatment intensity of 
99, while a hospital that has an ISTC co-located with it has a treatment intensity of 100. 
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Figure 2 Contract start dates of ‘treating’ Wave 1 ISTCs 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of contract start dates for ‘treating’ Wave 1 ISTCs in our dataset. There are 84 
data points in this distribution, one for each NHS hospital that is (i) ‘treated’ by a Wave 1 ISTC, and (ii) assigned 
to either the High or the Low Treatment Group. If a Wave 1 ISTC is the closest ISTC to more than one NHS 
hospital in our dataset, it is represented more than once on this graph. If an ISTC is in our dataset but is not the 
closest ISTC to any NHS hospital, then it is not represented at all on this graph. This graph highlights that the 
bulk of Wave 1 ISTCs that are relevant to our analysis opened between April 2005 and December 2006. We focus 
on Wave ISTCs that opened during this period, and disregard those with unusual contract start dates. 
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Figure 3 Pre-Surgical Length of Stay 
Figure 3.1 Evolution of average pre-surgical length of stay for hip 
replacement patients 
 
Pre-surgical length of stay (LOS) measures the number of days between admission and surgery. A pre-surgical LOS 
of zero means that surgery occurred on the day the patient was admitted. Observations with a pre-surgical LOS of 
less than zero (reflecting coding errors) are dropped, as are observations with a pre-surgical LOS greater than 14 
days (to reduce the impact of both coding errors and outliers).  
 
The High Treatment Group includes hospitals with a Wave 1 ISTC within their 25 per cent market radius. The 
Low Treatment Group includes hospitals with a Wave 1 ISTC within their 95 per cent market radius, but not 
within their 25 per cent market radius. The Untreated group includes all hospitals that did not have an ISTC 
within their 95 per cent market radius, or within 30km. The two treated groups include all hospitals whose nearest 
ISTC was a Wave 1 ISTC that opened between April 2005 and December 2006. Hospitals whose closest ISTC 
opened outside this date range, including all hospitals whose closest ISTC was a Phase 2 ISTC, are excluded – 
irrespective of whether they had a Phase 1 ISTC that opened within the above date range within their 95 per cent 
market radius. The graph only includes hospitals that had data for all months between January 2003 and March 
2009. The outcome variable is normalised by the pre-treatment (2002/2003-2004/2005) average for each group. 
Monthly average observations are plotted, but a lagged moving average is imposed to smooth the data. The shaded 
area marks the range of hospital-specific treatment start dates, from April 2005 to December 2006. The vertical line 
marks September 2003, when the first preferred bidders for ISTC contracts were announced. Hospital averages are 
weighted by number of patients in constructing group-level averages.  
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Figure 3.2 Evolution of average pre-surgical length of stay for knee 
replacement patients 
 
See Figure 3.1 for explanation.   
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Figure 4 Zero Pre-Surgical Length of Stay 
Figure 4.1 Evolution of percentage of hip replacement patients with 
pre-surgical length of stay equal to zero 
 
Zero pre-surgical length of stay converts length of stay into a binary variable equal to one if pre-surgical length of 
stay is zero, and zero otherwise.  See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
Figure 4.2 Evolution of percentage of knee replacement patients with 
pre-surgical length of stay equal to zero 
 
See Figures 4.1 and 3.1 for explanation. 
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Figure 5 Charlson scores 
Figure 5.1 Evolution of average Charlson score for hip replacement 
patients 
 
The Charlson index gives a score between 0 and 6 which captures the patient’s 10 year survival probability. It is 
based on the presence of 17 medical conditions that are likely to lead to death (HSCIC 2013a). A score of 0 denotes 
the absence of any symptoms indicating death, while a score of 6 denotes a high likelihood of death. It is calculated 
at spell (not episode) level for all observations in our sample. See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
Figure 5.2 Evolution of average Charlson score for knee replacement 
patients 
 
See Figures 5.1 and 3.1 for explanation. 
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Figure 6 Number of comorbidities 
Figure 6.1 Evolution of average number of comorbidities for hip 
replacement patients 
 
For Figure 6, the number of comorbidities is defined as a simple count of the number of medical conditions 
(diagnoses) that are recorded for the patient, up to a maximum of 20. See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
Figure 6.2 Evolution of average number of comorbidities for knee 
replacement patients 
 
See Figures 6.1 and 3.1 for explanation. 
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Figure 7 Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (IMD04) 
Income Deprivation Domain score 
Figure 7.1 Evolution of average IMD04 Income score for hip 
replacement patients 
 
The 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD04) Income Deprivation Domain score (Noble et al. 2004) captures the 
proportion of the population experiencing income deprivation at the patient’s small area of residence. See Figure 3.1 
for further explanation. 
Figure 7.2 Evolution of average IMD04 Income score for knee 
replacement patients 
 
See Figures 7.1 and 3.1 for explanation. 
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Figure 8 Age 
Figure 8.1 Evolution of average age for hip replacement patients 
 
See Figure 3.1 for explanation. 
Figure 8.2 Evolution of average age for knee replacement patients 
 
See Figure 3.1 for explanation. 
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Figure 9 Post-Surgical Length of Stay 
Figure 9.1 Evolution of average post-surgical length of stay for hip 
replacement patients 
 
Post-surgical length of stay (LOS) measures the number of days between surgery and discharge. A zero post-
surgical LOS indicates that the patient was discharged on the day of surgery. Observations with a post-surgical 
LOS less than zero (reflecting coding errors) are dropped, as are observations with a post-surgical LOS greater than 
30 days (to reduce the impact of both coding errors and outliers).  See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
Figure 9.2 Evolution of average post-surgical length of stay for knee 
replacement patients 
 
See Figures 9.1 and 3.1 for explanation.   
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Figure 10 Total Length of Stay 
Figure 10.1 Evolution of average total length of stay for hip replacement 
patients 
 
Total length of stay (LOS) measures the number of days between admission and discharge. Observations with total 
LOS less than zero (reflecting coding errors) are dropped, as are observations with total LOS greater than 44 days 
(to reduce the impact of both coding errors and outliers). See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
Figure 10.2 Evolution of average total length of stay for knee 
replacement patients 
 
See Figures 10.1 and 3.1 for explanation.   
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Figure 11 Waiting Times 
Figure 11.1 Evolution of average waiting times for hip replacement 
patients 
 
Figure 11 graphs the average ‘official’ waiting time (HES variable elecdur), which adjusts for delays outside the 
control of the hospital such as patient cancellations or deferrals. Graphs of the true waiting time (date of admission 
minus date of referral) do not differ in any meaningful way from those presented here. 
 
See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. Also, unlike all other graphs of the evolution of outcomes presented in this 
paper, we do not normalise waiting times by the pre-treatment group average. This is because a major driver of 
decreases in waiting times during this period was the imposition of uniform national waiting time targets. 
Normalising by the pre-treatment average would conceal the fact that differences in the evolution of waiting times 
between treated and control groups appear, to a very large extent, to be driven by the fact that some groups 
started with a higher pre-treatment average waiting time, but all groups were required to meet the uniform national 
waiting time targets. This can be seen in Figure 11 from the fact that all groups converge to very similar average 
waiting times. 
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Figure 11.2 Evolution of average waiting time for knee replacement 
patients 
 
See Figures 11.1 and 3.1 for explanation. 
Figure 12 Mortality 
Figure 12.1 Evolution of mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction 
 
Figure 12 graphs the evolution of the 30-day in-hospital mortality rate for patients aged between 39 and 100, and 
admitted on a non-elective basis for acute myocardial infarction (heart attack). Patients with a total length of stay 
of less than 3 days are omitted, unless they died. See Figure 3.1 for further explanation. 
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Chapter 1: Tables 
Table 1 ISTC activity by financial year and procedure 
Financial 
year 
Number of 
procedures
- Hip 
% of all NHS 
procedures- 
Hip 
Number of 
procedures
- Knee 
% of all NHS 
procedures- 
Knee 
Number of 
procedures- 
Combined 
% of all NHS 
procedures- 
Combined 
2005/2006 397 0.75 492 0.84 889 0.80 
2006/2007 1771 3.11 2009 3.20 3780 3.15 
2007/2008 4038 6.58 4956 7.01 8994 6.81 
2008/2009 4954 7.52 5970 7.83 10924 7.68 
2009/2010 3321 5.19 4051 5.77 7372 5.50 
2010/2011 5088 7.48 5756 7.86 10844 7.68 
2011/2012 4981 7.00 5567 7.32 10548 7.17 
2012/2013 4731 6.64 5164 6.87 9895 6.76 
Total 29281 5.72 33965 6.03 63246 5.88 
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics. The actual share of patients attending ISTCs will be somewhat higher due to 
incomplete submission of HES data by ISTCs before 2010/2011 (HC 2008). 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Procedure Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Number of 
observations 
charlson hip 0.954 1.898 0 6 70565 
charlson knr 1.078 1.955 0 6 78924 
severity (#(diagnoses)) hip 2.816 1.934 1 17 70565 
severity (#(diagnoses)) knr 2.853 1.910 1 19 78924 
imd04i (%) hip 0.123 0.095 0 0.79 70379 
imd04i (%) knr 0.134 0.103 0 0.8 78709 
age hip 68.337 11.667 0 103 70498 
age knr 69.680 9.602 5 99 78845 
pre_los (days) hip 0.604 0.844 0 14 70399 
pre_los (days) knr 0.563 0.796 0 14 78775 
post_los (days) hip 6.863 4.125 0 30 69511 
post_los (days) knr 6.533 3.950 0 30 78210 
tot_los (days) hip 8.116 7.490 0 191 70565 
tot_los (days) knr 7.495 6.596 0 250 78924 
wait_time (days) hip 131.451 104.150 1 994 68387 
wait_time (days) knr 139.325 110.919 1 1000 76350 
death30 (%) ami 0.106 0.308 0 1 105512 
hospital_big (%) hip 0.629 0.483 0 1 70130 
hospital_big (%) knr 0.629 0.483 0 1 78539 
hospital_big (%) ami 0.586 0.493 0 1 105022 
hospital_specialist (%) hip 0.014 0.119 0 1 69360 
hospital_specialist (%) knr 0.014 0.116 0 1 77325 
hospital_specialist (%) ami 0.022 0.148 0 1 103023 
hospital_standardacute (%) hip 0.633 0.482 0 1 70565 
hospital_standardacute (%) knr 0.634 0.482 0 1 78924 
hospital_standardacute (%) ami 0.593 0.491 0 1 105512 
hospital_teaching (%) hip 0.166 0.372 0 1 70565 
hospital_teaching (%) knr 0.164 0.370 0 1 78924 
hospital_teaching (%) ami 0.204 0.403 0 1 105512 
hospital_uninoteach (%) hip 0.181 0.385 0 1 70565 
hospital_uninoteach (%) knr 0.181 0.385 0 1 78924 
hospital_uninoteach (%) ami 0.197 0.398 0 1 105512 
negative_log_hhi (%) hip 1.168 0.989 0 4.215 70565 
negative_log_hhi (%) knr 1.202 1.003 0 4.215 78924 
negative_log_hhi (%) ami 1.163 0.896 0 4.328 105510 
finished_consultant_episodes hip 379.226 246.963 1 1217 70565 
finished_consultant_episodes knr 411.586 260.109 1 1441 78924 
finished_consultant_episodes ami 497.279 296.848 1 1652 105512 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for all outcome variables, and key control variables. The hospital type dummies 
denote: a specialist hospital, a teaching hospital, a non-teaching university hospital (all teaching hospitals are also 
university hospitals), a standard acute hospital (that is, an acute hospital that is not a teaching, university, or 
specialist hospital) (AUKUH 2014; MSC 2014; Mathieson 2011), and a hospital that is larger than the median. The 
negative_log_hhi variable controls for overall competition intensity after the introduction of patient choice of 
hospital, and reports the negative log of HHI with market size defined by the 95th percentile of patient distance 
travelled, averaged across all elective procedures and financial years 2002/2003 through to 2004/2005 (the pre-
reform period). Number of patients per hospital site and year is measured by finished consultant episodes. 
  77 
Table 3 Treatment and control groups – summary 
statistics 
  N Avg km to ISTC Avg HHI % London 
High Treatment Group (0-25%) 15 1.31 0.38 6.67 
Low Treatment Group (26-95%) 69 20.26 0.16 24.64 
Untreated (96%+) 149 46.32 0.40 11.63 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on all NHS hospitals in our dataset, after applying the restrictions and 
treatment assignment strategy outlined in section 4.2, and dropping all NHS hospitals in the High and Low 
Treatment Groups whose nearest ISTC was a Phase 2 ISTC.  
Table 4 High Treatment Group hospitals 
Name of NHS hospital City/County Nearby ISTC name Km to ISTC  
York Hospital York Clifton Park NHS TC 2.21 
King George Hospital London North East London NHS TC 0.00 
St Mary's Hospital Portsmouth, Hampshire St Mary's NHS TC 0.18 
Royal Berkshire Hospital Reading, Berkshire Reading NHS TC 2.20 
Queen's Hospital Burton upon Trent, Staffordshire The Midlands NHS TC 0.00 
Derriford Hospital Plymouth, Devonshire Peninsula NHS TC 0.56 
Salisbury District Hospital Salisbury, Wiltshire New Hall NHS TC 2.34 
Medway Maritime 
Hospital Medway, Kent Will Adams NHS TC 2.41 
Horton General Hospital Banbury, Oxfordshire Horton NHS TC 0.15 
Trafford General Hospital Greater Manchester Greater Manchester Surgical Centre 0.00 
Pilgrim Hospital Boston, Lincolnshire Boston NHS TC 2.35 
Halton Hospital Runcorn, Cheshire Cheshire & Merseyside NHS TC 0.17 
Queen's Medical Centre Nottingham Nottingham NHS TC 0.32 
Princess Royal Hospital Haywards Heath, Sussex Sussex Orthopaedic NHS TC 0.00 
Table 4 lists the NHS hospitals assigned to our High Treatment Group, along with the Wave 1 ISTCs they were 
exposed to, and the distance from the NHS hospital to the ISTC. A distance of less than 1km generally refers to an 
NHS hospital that has a co-located ISTC; the distance in such cases is not 0, however, because the ISTC postcode 
differs very slightly from that of the NHS hospital. 
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Table 5 Average lengths of stay for treated and control 
groups, 2002/2003 
  
High Treatment 
Group 
Low Treatment 
Group 
Untreated 
 
Total LOS, hip replacement 10.539 11.120 10.639 
Total LOS, knee replacement 9.905 9.766 10.004 
Pre-surgical LOS, hip replacement 0.861 0.923 0.927 
Pre-surgical LOS, knee replacement 0.789 0.852 0.931 
Post-surgical LOS, hip replacement 8.987 8.771 8.525 
Post-surgical LOS, knee replacement 8.448 8.416 8.666 
Table 5 reports average values of LOS variables in 2002/2003 for treatment and control groups. 
 
Table 6 Difference-in-differences estimates with group 
fixed effects and no control variables 
Group FEs  charlson charlson pre_los pre_los post_los post_los death30 
NoCtrls-Post hip knr hip knr hip knr ami 
                
i_high 0.315** 0.362** -0.995** -0.922* 0.0795 0.143*** -0.0203* 
  (0.149) (0.179) (0.461) (0.487) (0.0545) (0.0524) (0.0106) 
i_low 0.124 0.0221 -0.271 -0.0451 -0.0478 -0.0198 -0.00717 
  (0.0949) (0.113) (0.365) (0.404) (0.0442) (0.0555) (0.00745) 
i_comp -0.0316 -0.0324 -0.264 -0.289* 0.0221 0.0189 -0.00449 
  (0.0414) (0.0494) (0.173) (0.172) (0.0163) (0.0204) (0.00364) 
high 0.0669 0.00381 -0.0833 -0.00593 0.0486 0.0419 0.0115 
  (0.147) (0.169) (0.431) (0.414) (0.0576) (0.0638) (0.0134) 
low -0.0538 -0.0496 0.165 0.151 0.00645 0.00388 -0.00733 
  (0.101) (0.116) (0.280) (0.308) (0.0314) (0.0410) (0.00745) 
post 0.337*** 0.424*** -1.524*** -1.621*** -0.290*** -0.315*** -0.0224*** 
  (0.0748) (0.0947) (0.248) (0.262) (0.0280) (0.0318) (0.00577) 
  
      
  
Observations 70,565 78,924 70,399 78,775 69,511 78,210 105,511 
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.198 0.204 0.034 0.028 0.003 
Table 6 reports initial estimates with group fixed effects, a simple pre-post dummy, and no control variables, except 
for the i_comp term which reports the effect of overall competition intensity.  The coefficients on i_high and i_low 
give the effect of being assigned to the High Treatment Group and Low Treatment Group respectively, measured in 
terms of (approximate) percentage change in the outcome variable. Standard errors clustered at the hospital level 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
  79 
Table 7 Difference-in-differences estimates with group 
fixed effects and control variables 
Group FEs  charlson charlson pre_los pre_los post_los post_los death30 
Ctrls - Time hip knr hip knr hip knr ami 
                
i_high 0.302** 0.331* -1.027** -0.898* 0.0663 0.136** -0.00993 
 
(0.147) (0.175) (0.480) (0.496) (0.0535) (0.0528) (0.00999) 
i_low 0.155* 0.0893 -0.307 -0.0558 -0.0307 0.0372 -0.00118 
 
(0.0930) (0.113) (0.371) (0.396) (0.0405) (0.0440) (0.00667) 
i_comp -0.0610 -0.113** -0.258* -0.254 0.00950 0.00302 0.00264 
 
(0.0399) (0.0488) (0.150) (0.157) (0.0201) (0.0210) (0.00301) 
high 0.122 0.119 0.197 0.165 0.0848 0.0682 0.0140 
 
(0.158) (0.180) (0.369) (0.356) (0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0106) 
low -0.0584 -0.0833 0.0671 0.101 0.0403 0.0186 -0.00515 
 
(0.118) (0.123) (0.270) (0.273) (0.0390) (0.0365) (0.00621) 
hosp_special 0.331* 0.293 1.897*** 1.515*** 0.0621 0.0144 -0.0344*** 
 
(0.191) (0.228) (0.521) (0.465) (0.0620) (0.0696) (0.0123) 
hosp_teach -0.0261 -0.0625 0.353 0.135 0.102** 0.0315 0.322*** 
 
(0.0945) (0.102) (0.244) (0.261) (0.0405) (0.0496) (0.0245) 
hosp_uninot 0.0528 -0.00229 -0.240 -0.183 -0.0240 -0.0116 0.325*** 
 
(0.121) (0.131) (0.307) (0.287) (0.0299) (0.0340) (0.0251) 
hosp_acute 
      
0.323*** 
       
(0.0235) 
hosp_big -0.0552 -0.0312 -0.242 -0.201 -0.00285 0.0237 -0.000453 
 
(0.0715) (0.0771) (0.197) (0.198) (0.0216) (0.0258) (0.00491) 
region_ne 0.532** 0.699*** 0.281 0.119 -0.137 -0.189 0.0137 
 
(0.243) (0.223) (0.519) (0.610) (0.142) (0.124) (0.0140) 
region_nw 0.366 0.489** -0.0614 -0.0234 0.103 -0.0117 -0.00207 
 
(0.263) (0.207) (0.463) (0.500) (0.104) (0.0711) (0.0152) 
region_yh -0.0177 0.0477 -0.370 -0.539 0.0446 -0.0852* 0.0235** 
 
(0.141) (0.153) (0.371) (0.359) (0.0473) (0.0494) (0.0102) 
region_emidl 0.128 0.103 -1.628*** -1.434*** 0.00661 -0.0386 0.0144 
 
(0.159) (0.178) (0.394) (0.383) (0.0648) (0.0671) (0.0104) 
region_wmidl 0.0315 0.185 -0.700 -0.757* 0.0128 -0.147** 0.0212* 
 
(0.150) (0.172) (0.461) (0.429) (0.0529) (0.0607) (0.0108) 
region_east 0.192 0.190 0.115 0.184 0.0271 -0.111** 0.00716 
 
(0.146) (0.161) (0.338) (0.328) (0.0455) (0.0500) (0.0105) 
region_lon 0.0149 0.0997 -0.876* -0.673 0.0461 -0.0676 0.0140 
 
(0.170) (0.207) (0.517) (0.439) (0.0561) (0.0572) (0.0102) 
region_se 0.119 0.144 -0.205 -0.104 0.0200 -0.0675 0.0232*** 
 
(0.161) (0.160) (0.335) (0.312) (0.0496) (0.0440) (0.00845) 
age0_60 1.345 1.237 -0.0723 1.322 -0.212 -2.008*** -0.0491*** 
 
(0.993) (1.229) (2.452) (2.752) (0.344) (0.426) (0.00262) 
age76plus 3.376*** 2.222** -0.444 1.807 0.733** -0.890** 0.0873*** 
 
(1.026) (1.101) (2.713) (2.768) (0.325) (0.434) (0.00345) 
female -1.323* 0.637 2.164 -5.253* 0.479** 0.508 0.0161*** 
 
(0.683) (1.072) (2.202) (3.009) (0.237) (0.454) (0.00214) 
urban 0.0995 -0.173 -0.373 -0.0447 0.0244 0.106 0.00255 
 
(0.207) (0.248) (0.677) (0.690) (0.0817) (0.0945) (0.00317) 
ethnos_mix -3.363 12.50 -117.0* -44.11 -11.92** 1.389 0.00606 
 
(20.82) (12.27) (64.39) (30.74) (5.147) (3.105) (0.0178) 
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ethnos_asian 3.190 1.258 -12.30 -0.557 1.068 0.0687 -0.0126*** 
 
(3.535) (0.846) (7.841) (1.872) (0.989) (0.248) (0.00455) 
ethnos_black 2.928 0.937 21.10*** 13.71*** 1.209 0.817 -0.0127 
 
(2.734) (1.751) (7.173) (4.309) (0.786) (0.569) (0.00918) 
ethnos_other 3.437** 5.829* -9.214* -15.10 0.541 0.195 -0.0120 
 
(1.493) (3.174) (4.852) (9.365) (0.443) (0.753) (0.00818) 
ethnos_unkn -0.00175 -0.0125 -0.926** -0.787* -0.108* -0.0849 0.0305*** 
 
(0.198) (0.205) (0.460) (0.467) (0.0633) (0.0720) (0.00460) 
logimd04i 0.196 0.291 1.154*** 0.685 0.140** 0.0795 0.00770*** 
 
(0.160) (0.201) (0.426) (0.420) (0.0670) (0.0634) (0.00188) 
logfces 0.105** 0.106* 0.0418 0.0530 0.00301 -0.00102 -0.0260*** 
 
(0.0489) (0.0593) (0.159) (0.169) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.00328) 
        Observations 68,925 76,941 68,764 76,797 67,916 76,256 102,179 
R-squared 0.012 0.015 0.281 0.281 0.046 0.041 0.046 
Table 7 reports estimates with group fixed effects, control variables, and a full set of month-year dummies in place 
of a simple pre-post dummy. The coefficients on i_high and i_low give the effect of being assigned to the High 
Treatment Group and Low Treatment Group respectively, measured in terms of (approximate) percentage change 
in the outcome variable. Standard errors clustered at the hospital level are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummies are included for hospital types: 
specialist, teaching, university non-teaching, standard acute, and bigger than the median (defined using total 2002 
admissions). Dummies are included for the region of England in which the hospital is located: North East, North 
West, Yorkshire & the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, and South 
West. Perfect multicollinearity is avoided because some hospitals have an “Unknown” region. Patient controls 
include the percentage of patients who are: aged between 0 and 60; aged 76 and over; female; and urban dwellers. 
Controls are also included for the percentage of patients of different ethnicities: mixed; Asian; black; other; and 
unknown. The percentage of white patients is omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Controls for the log of 
average patient IMD04 income deprivation score, and for the log of finished consultant episodes for the procedure in 
question, are also included. All patient controls are averages, or logged averages, for the procedure in question. For 
all elective surgical procedures, pre-reform (2002/2003-2004/2005) averages are used, so that these controls are 
time-invariant. For the AMI mortality regressions, the corresponding individual patient controls are used. The 
i_comp term reports the effect of overall competition intensity. A missing coefficient implies that the variable was 
dropped due to multicollinearity. 
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Table 8 Difference-in-differences estimates with hospital 
fixed effects (headline estimates) 
Site FEs  charlson charlson pre_los pre_los post_los post_los death30 
Time hip knr hip knr hip knr ami 
                
i_high 0.337** 0.342* -1.099** -1.064** 0.0631 0.117** -0.0110 
  (0.158) (0.183) (0.480) (0.497) (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0103) 
i_low 0.163* 0.0600 -0.428 -0.402 -0.0107 0.0483 -0.00766 
  (0.0929) (0.114) (0.362) (0.381) (0.0421) (0.0434) (0.00664) 
interact_comp -0.0392 -0.0799 -0.146 -0.133 -0.00799 -0.0199 0.00671* 
  (0.0418) (0.0497) (0.146) (0.156) (0.0221) (0.0241) (0.00374) 
  
      
  
Observations 70,565 78,924 70,399 78,775 69,511 78,210 105,119 
R-squared 0.032 0.038 0.427 0.435 0.073 0.066 0.055 
Table 8 reports our ‘headline’ estimates with hospital fixed effects and a full set of month-year time dummies. The 
coefficients on i_high and i_low give the effect of being assigned to the High Treatment Group and Low Treatment 
Group respectively, measured in terms of (approximate) percentage change in the outcome variable. Standard errors 
clustered at the hospital level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For all regressions on elective surgery outcome variables, only the control for overall 
competition intensity (i_comp) is included, as all other control variables are time-invariant and therefore made 
redundant by the inclusion of hospital fixed effects. For the regression of AMI mortality on treatment assignment, a 
full set of time-varying patient controls is included; however, these estimates are not reported.  
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Table 9 Robustness tests 
    charlson charlson pre_los pre_los post_los post_los death30 
    hip knee hip knee hip knee ami 
                  
(1) Post i_h 0.340** 0.343* -1.100** -1.066** 0.0618 0.116** -0.0108 
dummy 
 
(0.158) (0.183) (0.480) (0.497) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0104) 
  i_l 0.164* 0.0586 -0.429 -0.402 -0.0108 0.0498 -0.00763 
  
 
(0.0929) (0.114) (0.363) (0.382) (0.0424) (0.0438) (0.00661) 
(2) No i_h 0.339** 0.348* -1.090** -1.054** 0.0636 0.119** -0.0135 
comp  (0.158) (0.185) (0.479) (0.497) (0.0551) (0.0555) (0.0101) 
  i_l 0.129 -0.0106 -0.557* -0.520 -0.0178 0.0308 -0.00328 
   (0.0918) (0.112) (0.314) (0.330) (0.0460) (0.0501) (0.00646) 
(3) Binary i_l 0.0547** 0.0556* 0.238** 0.229** 
  
  
outcomes  (0.0254) (0.0297) (0.103) (0.107)   
  
  i_c 0.0266* 0.0107 0.0950 0.0876 
  
  
   (0.0153) (0.0187) (0.0787) (0.0826)   
  
(4) London i_h 0.337** 0.342* -1.099** -1.064** 0.0631 0.117** -0.0110 
differential 
 
(0.158) (0.183) (0.480) (0.497) (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0103) 
trend i_l 0.163* 0.0600 -0.428 -0.402 -0.0107 0.0483 -0.00766 
  
 
(0.0929) (0.114) (0.362) (0.381) (0.0421) (0.0434) (0.00664) 
(5) No  i_h 0.328* 0.339* -1.069** -1.020* 0.0682 0.121** -0.0109 
London 
 
(0.166) (0.190) (0.504) (0.521) (0.0587) (0.0593) (0.0111) 
  i_l 0.174* 0.0600 -0.342 -0.299 -0.00890 0.0613 -0.00830 
  
 
(0.104) (0.125) (0.402) (0.431) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.00696) 
(6) Levels i_h 0.287** 0.256* -0.239** -0.243** 0.375 0.262   
   (0.125) (0.145) (0.111) (0.121) (0.404) (0.346)   
  i_l 0.129* 0.0305 -0.0929 -0.0931 0.158 0.317   
   (0.0686) (0.0852) (0.0778) (0.0835) (0.222) (0.233)   
(7) Fixed i_h 0.336** 0.370** -0.816 -0.715 0.0283 0.0657 -0.0154 
distance  (0.156) (0.181) (0.511) (0.539) (0.0564) (0.0585) (0.00976) 
treatment i_l 0.101 0.109 -0.0257 0.0335 -0.0605 -0.0367 -0.0156** 
assign  (0.0942) (0.118) (0.309) (0.323) (0.0407) (0.0467) (0.00674) 
(8) 2 years i_h 0.249 0.231 -1.019** -0.947** 0.111** 0.162*** 0.00277 
pre and post  (0.176) (0.180) (0.454) (0.465) (0.0526) (0.0552) (0.00865) 
(03,04,07,08) i_l 0.115 0.0329 -0.506 -0.443 0.0132 0.0835** -0.00287 
   (0.0708) (0.0913) (0.372) (0.388) (0.0417) (0.0401) (0.00677) 
(9) Cts i_c -0.0167 -0.0795* -0.197 -0.179 -0.0125 -0.0140 0.00600* 
treatment   (0.0414) (0.0473) (0.128) (0.132) (0.0234) (0.0266) (0.00353) 
Table 9 reports robustness tests based on the regression specification in Equation (3) with hospital fixed effects. See 
Table 8 for further explanation. Row (1) includes a pre/post dummy in place of a full set of month-year dummies. 
Row (2) omits our control for overall competition intensity. Row (3) uses dummy variables for Charlson score 
(patient has a Charlson score of 3 or greater) and pre-surgical LOS (patient has a pre-surgical LOS equal to zero). 
Row (4) includes a London differential trend term. Row (5) drops all London hospitals from the sample. Row (6) 
runs our regression on levels of the outcome variable rather than logs (for our AMI regression, levels of any non-
dummy control variables are also used in placed of their log equivalents). Row (7) assigns treatments using fixed 
distances (High Treatment Group = ISTC within 5km; Low Treatment Group = nearest ISTC is between 5km and 
30km; Untreated group = no ISTC within 30km). Row (8) uses four years of data rather than two – 2003/2004-
2004/2005 for the pre-reform period, and 2007/2008-2008/2009 for the post-reform period. Row (9) uses a 
continuous measure of treatment intensity (defined in the Treatment Assignment section) in place of the interaction 
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terms i_h and i_l. The variable i_c interacts a post-reform dummy with the log of our continuous measure of 
treatment intensity, so its coefficient reports the effect of a one per cent increase in treatment intensity on the 
outcome variable of interest. 
  
Chapter 2: The hospital as a multi-product
rm: Measuring the e¤ect of hospital
competition on quality using Patient-Reported
Outcome Measures
Abstract
Many econometric studies of the e¤ect of hospital competition on clinical quality use
mortality-based indicators of hospital performance yet in the spheres of hospital activity
in which competition for patients does occur, such as elective surgery, mortality is a
relatively uncommon outcome. The increasing use of Patient Reported Outcome Measures
(PROMs) of health gain from medical interventions o¤ers a new type of outcome measure
that might be used to measure the impact of hospital competition on clinical quality in
areas directly a¤ected by competition. This paper uses PROMs to examine the impact
of a major competition-promoting reform to the English NHS in 2006, in which patients
were allowed to choose which hospital they attended for elective surgery. I estimate the
e¤ect of the resulting hospital competition on elective surgery quality as captured by
PROMs health gains from hip and knee replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein
surgery. Although the estimates are sensitive to specication, and therefore provisional,
the best reading is that competition led to lower varicose vein surgery quality, and had no
e¤ect on the quality of groin hernia repair surgery. For orthopaedic surgery quality, the
results are contradictory, but the evidence in support of a negative e¤ect of competition
outweighs the evidence in the other direction. I put forward a theoretical framework for
thinking about why these results might have arisen, and conclude by arguing for further
research that examines the impacts of competition by explicitly modelling the hospital as
a multi-product rm.
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1 Introduction1
Hospitals are multi-product rms that employ widely varying technologies to produce di¤erent
outputs yet standard economic models of hospital competition remain grounded in the notion
that hospitals produce a single type of output, and choose a single, hospital-wide quality level.
In keeping with this theoretical inheritance, many econometric studies of the e¤ect of hospital
competition on clinical quality use mortality-based indicators of hospital performance as a
proxy for hospital-wide quality yet in the spheres of hospital activity in which competition
does occur, such as for elective surgery patients,2 mortality is a relatively uncommon outcome.
This paper contributes to the development of a theory of hospital competition in which
the hospital is conceptualised as a multi-product rm by studying the impact of a major
competition-promoting reform within the English NHS in 2006, in which patients were allowed
to choose which hospital they attend for elective surgery. As a result of this reform, instead of
being guaranteed a given patient load via bulk contracts with care purchasers, as had previously
been the case, hospitals were forced to compete for patient referrals. This paper studies the
impact of the competition engendered by these patient choice reforms using Patient Reported
Outcome Measures (PROMs) of health gain from four high-volume elective surgical procedures
(hip and knee replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery), which were collected
within the English NHS from April 2009. These PROMs data are merged with the NHS Hospital
Episode Statistics (HES), which includes an observation for every NHS patient admitted to a
hospital on an inpatient basis, to construct a rich patient-level dataset.
Patient choice of hospital in the English NHS was introduced alongside a prospective
reimbursement regime in which hospitals received a xed tari¤(or price) for each procedure
performed. Standard single-output-type economic models of hospital competition (Gaynor
2006; Gaynor & Town 2012) predict that, when prices are xed by a central authority in such
a manner, competition will lead to higher quality so long as the regulated price exceeds the
marginal cost with respect to quantity. The intuition for the result is straightforward as prices
are xed, hospitals only have one choice variable, quality, and therefore compete for market
share on this basis. Two previous studies of the 2006 patient choice reforms (Cooper et al. 2011;
1The author acknowledges invaluable support, guidance and oversight from Zack Cooper, as well as the
invaluable input of Gwyn Bevan during the planning stages of this project. In addition, I am very grateful
to the following people for their wisdom, suggestions and/or assistance: Tim Besley, Michael Best, Alessandro
Gavazza, Maitreesh Ghatak, Stephen Gibbons, Howard Glennerster, Andrew Hutchings, Simon Jones, Henrik
Kleven, Alistair McGuire, Tom OKee¤e, Carol Propper, Steve Pischke, Rosa Sanchis, Sarah Sandford, Johannes
Spinnewijn, Mohammad Vesal, and Nic Warner. Site code cleaning was performed using a modied version of
code kindly provided by Stuart Craig and Zack Cooper. Coding of predicted patient ow competition measures
was informed by code published by Martin Gaynor, Carol Propper and Rodrigo Moreno-Serra (Gaynor et al.
2013). All of the deciencies in the resulting work are the authors responsibility alone.
2Elective surgery encompasses any surgical procedure that is not considered urgent or an emergency, and
which can therefore be scheduled in advance.
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Gaynor et al. 2013) assessed their impact on care quality by using various mortality-based
outcome measures as indicators of hospital-wide quality. Using di¤erence-in-di¤erence-style
estimators, these studies obtained results consistent with the basic theoretical prediction just
outlined hospitals in more competitive markets experienced larger improvements in quality
in response to the introduction of patient choice than hospitals in less competitive markets.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature on hospital competition and clinical
quality. First, it presents evidence suggesting that there is little correlation between a hospitals
performance in relation to various mortality-based outcome measures, and its elective surgery
quality as captured by PROMs health gains. This nding suggests that analysing the impact
of hospital competition on quality by focusing exclusively on mortality rates potentially fails
to take account of important dimensions of hospital performance, quality and productivity 
and it provides a compelling motivation for looking again at the impact of the introduction of
patient choice of hospital for elective surgery using elective-surgery-specic outcome measures.
Secondly, the paper extends existing theoretical models of hospital competition to a multi-
product setting, and suggests two mechanisms by which competition might have a more
ambiguous e¤ect on quality than is suggested by standard one-output-type models. Both
mechanisms are based on the idea that incentivising one dimension of an organisations
performance might have a positive or negative e¤ect on other, unincentivised dimensions of
performance, depending on whether there are complementarities or substitutabilities between
the di¤erent dimensions of performance. The rst mechanism considers what happens when
elective surgery quality is unobservable (or poorly observable) and patients (rightly or wrongly)
take emergency care quality as a signal of elective surgery quality. The second hypothesises that
hospital responses to elective surgery might vary between di¤erent elective surgical procedures,
and shows that, in such a situation, hospitals may respond to the introduction of patient choice
of hospital for elective surgery by prioritising quality improvements in major surgery, where
the quality elasticity of demand is high, to the detriment of quality in minor surgery, where
the quality elasticity of demand is low.
Thirdly, the paper presents estimates of the e¤ect of the hospital competition brought
about by the patient choice reforms on elective surgery quality as captured by PROMs health
gains. In contrast to the existing literature, when elective-surgery-specic outcome measures
are used, I nd evidence that the hospital competition brought about by patient choice led to
lower clinical quality. Although the estimates reported here are sensitive to specication, and
therefore provisional, the best reading is that competition led to lower varicose vein surgery
quality, and had no e¤ect on the quality of groin hernia repair surgery. For orthopaedic
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surgery quality, the results are contradictory, but the evidence in support of a negative e¤ect
of competition outweighs the evidence in the other direction. These ndings are provisional,
and point to the need for follow-up work that studies the impact of hospital competition on
elective-surgery-specic outcome measures in di¤erent policy contexts.
PROMs surveys have only been collected within the English NHS since April 2009 after
patient choice of hospital for elective surgery had been introduced. The lack of pre-reform
PROMs data means that it is not possible to employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences style estimation
strategy of the kind used by Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013). Cross-sectional
variation in treatment intensity does exist, however, because the strength of competition to
which a hospital is exposed varies geographically the reform had a greater impact on hospitals
that had many competitors in their nearby vicinity than on hospitals with few competitors in
their nearby vicinity, because it is easier for patients of the former to switch to an alternative
hospital.
The challenge facing this geographically-based identication strategy is that there are a
range of correlates of geography which also inuence outcomes, creating a risk of omitted
variable bias. The most serious potential source of omitted variable bias is that arising from
unobserved aspects of patient health status (or casemix). This paper employs two strategies to
address the problem of bias due to unobserved casemix. First, by using health gain (that is,
change in health status) from elective surgery as its outcome variable, it di¤ers fundamentally
from conventional research designs (such as those using mortality-based performance indicators)
which use the level of post-surgical health status as the outcome variable. This di¤erence means
that the classicalform of casemix bias is eliminated, and is instead replaced with a more subtle
potential form of casemix bias, which, I argue, is unlikely to be empirically signicant. Secondly,
this paper uses a much more extensive set of patient-level control variables than previous
UK studies, because the PROMs surveys are a rich source of patient-level data that has not
previously been accessible. This new data source is used to casemix-adjust PROMs scores,
controlling for a range of patient characteristics including, most importantly, pre-operative
health status.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two provides historical
background to the patient choice reforms within the English NHS and summarises relevant
literature concerning hospital competition and clinical quality. It also provides a brief overview
of the increasing use of Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) for policy evaluation and
performance measurement, both generally and within the English NHS in particular. Section
Three presents evidence on the relationship between di¤erent dimensions of quality within
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a hospital. Section Four presents a model of hospital competition in which the hospital is
conceptualised as a multi-product rm, and the quality of di¤erent output types is chosen
separately. Section Five outlines the papers identication strategy and measures of competition
intensity, while Section Six presents the data. Section Seven presents the headline results,
Section Eight presents robustness tests, Section Nine discusses the ndings, and Section Ten
concludes.
2 Policy background and literature review
2.1 Market-based reforms to the English NHS
The English NHS is funded by general taxation and o¤ers health care that is largely free at
the point of use. Before 1991, the Department of Health paid geographically-dened Health
Authorities to directly manage hospitals. In 1991, the Conservative government made hospitals
and other care providers into independent trusts, thus creating an NHS Internal Marketin
which Health Authorities and GP fund holderspurchased care by entering into bulk contracts
with providers. While the Internal Market was justied using the rhetoric of choice and
competition, patients had little say over where they were sent for care.
The predominant view of the 1990s Internal Market is that it was not successful at providing
hospitals with incentives to improve clinical quality (Le Grand et al. 1998). A key reason for
this failure was that hospitals were encouraged to compete on price as well as on quality,
yet there was virtually no publicly available information during this era about the quality
of care. This situation gave hospitals an incentive to compete on price at the expense of
quality. In the late 1990s, after the end of the Internal Market, the Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES), containing clinical information on individual patient hospital stays, was made available
to researchers, opening up the possibility of assessing the impact of the Internal Market on
care quality. Propper et al. (2004), using a cross-sectional estimation strategy, found that
competition in the Internal Market led to higher AMI mortality rates. Propper et al. (2008)
used a di¤erence-in-di¤erences style estimator with hospital xed e¤ects to identify the e¤ect of
competition using the change in hospitalsAMI mortality rates resulting from the introduction
of the Internal Market. They found that, in the Internal Market, hospitals in the treated group
(those in the most competitive markets) experienced smaller decreases in AMI mortality rates,
as well as larger decreases in elective surgery waiting times, than other hospitals.
The ndings of Propper et al. (2004; 2008), combined with earlier research showing that
competition in the Internal Market also led to lower costs and prices (Propper 1996; Propper
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et al. 1998; Söderlund et al. 1997), suggest that competition during this period led hospitals
to focus on observable dimensions of performance (prices and waiting lists) at the expense of
unobservable dimensions (care quality, as measured by mortality rates). This interpretation is
consistent with predictions from the theoretical literature (Dranove & Satterthwaite 1992; 2000)
that, when prices are exible and signals of quality are poor, the e¤ect of competition on hospital
quality is likely to be negative. It can also be seen as an application of Holmstrom & Milgroms
(1991) multi-tasking result, in which incentivising observable dimensions of performance can
lead to better or worse performance in unobservable dimensions, depending on whether there
are cost complementarities or substitutabilities between outputs.
When Labour was elected to government in 1997, it declared the end of the Internal
Market and announced that health policy would henceforth promote cooperation rather than
competition. However, it did not abolish the distinction between providers and purchasers,
thus retaining scope for competition even while discouraging it at the rhetorical level. In 2002,
the Labour government changed its position on markets within the NHS, and progressively
reintroduced competition, with structures carefully designed to encourage improvements in
performance.
There were four key elements to these reforms. First, the prevailing regime of price
negotiation between providers and purchasers was replaced with a prospective reimbursement
regime, Payment by Results (PBR), that paid hospitals a xed price per procedure, with some
adjustment for patient severity, local wage rates, and hospital characteristics.
Secondly, a range of new providers (such as NHS Foundation Trusts, and Independent Sector
Treatment Centres) were introduced alongside standard NHS trusts, with clearer incentives to
increase their market shares.
Thirdly, and at the centre of the reform programme, from January 2006 patients requiring
elective surgery were entitled to a choice of four or ve hospitals, including one private hospital,
at the time of booking their rst outpatient appointment. From April 2008, patients were
entitled to choose to receive treatment at any hospital in England, whether NHS or private,
provided they were qualied to provide the procedure and accepted the standard NHS price.
Fourthly, alongside the introduction of patient choice, improved signals of quality were
introduced via the establishment in 2007 of the NHS Choices website (http://www.nhs.uk),
which provided users with a range of quantitative and qualitative information about alternative
providers, in order that informed choices might be made.
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Compared with the Internal Market of the 1990s, the hospital market established under
Labour was a major improvement, with many aspects of its design reecting an awareness
of the factors that led the Internal Market to fail poor producer and purchaser incentives,
quality-reducing price competition, and poor information about quality. Existing econometric
evidence, mostly using mortality-based outcome measures, suggests that the competitive reforms
of the 2000s did lead to higher hospital quality. Bloom et al. (2013) study the period after
the introduction of prospective reimbursement but before the introduction of patient choice,
during which time competition took the form of selective contractingbetween providers and
care purchasers. The authors use the percentage of parliamentary constituencies in a hospitals
market as an instrument for competition intensity  the idea being that hospitals serving
marginal constituencies are less likely to be closed, and therefore that markets with many
marginal constituencies will possess more hospitals, and hence be more competitive, than other
markets. The authors nd that the competition engendered by selective contracting led to
lower AMI mortality, and also higher management quality.
Cooper et al. (2011) use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy to estimate the e¤ect of the
competition generated by the patient choice reforms by using mortality from Acute Myocardial
Infarction (AMI, or heart attack) as an outcome variable. By comparing changes in AMI
mortality in low and high competition areas, they nd that hospital competition led to signicant
reductions in 30-day in-hospital AMI mortality. Gaynor et al. (2013) use a similar di¤erence-in-
di¤erences-style estimation strategy, nding that the patient choice reforms led to larger reductions
in hospital mortality from all causes (whether in-hospital or after discharge) in high-competition
areas than elsewhere.
Notwithstanding these important ndings, questions remain about the extent to which
the preconditions of an e¤ective hospital market existed in England after the introduction of
patient choice. Early assessments of the patient choice regime suggested that implementation
and awareness of the policy were poor. Surveys indicated that only 30 percent of elective surgery
patients recalled being o¤ered choice in 2006, rising to only 47 percent in 2009. Similarly, in
2006, 29 percent of patients were aware they were entitled to a choice of hospital before visiting
their GP, rising to only 50 percent in 2009 (Dixon et al. 2010).
Moreover, it is not clear that patients were or are provided with meaningful, comprehensible
information about the quality of alternative providers at the time of choosing a hospital,
either via the NHS Choices website or via other means. For most of the four-year period
studied in this paper, patients needing one of the four PROMs surgical procedures who visited
the NHS Choices website to obtain help in choosing a hospital would have been presented
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with an overwhelming and confusing list of dozens of di¤erent dimensions of comparison.
For example, a visitor in October 2012 would have found information about a limited set of
relevant and procedure-specic variables (number of operations performed, rate of unplanned
readmissions, average waiting times, and average time spent in hospital), interspersed with
numerous hospital-wide clinical outcome measures (such as MRSA cases3 and 30-day mortality
rates), as well as a thicket of clinically irrelevant variables (such as availability of car parking
and quality of food). Arguably, the presence of these clinically irrelevant details was harmful
for two reasons. First, it distracted prospective patientsattention away from clinically relevant
information. Secondly, it potentially encouraged hospitals to seek to attract patients by
improving the quality of their food, or their number of parking spaces, rather than by improving
(and possibly at the expense of) quality of care.
By October 2013, the NHS Choices website had been updated to provide a much more
limited range of clinically relevant information. Nevertheless, four and a half years after the
introduction of PROMs, NHS Choices still did not publish each hospitals average PROMs
scores in its hospital comparisons for PROMs procedures, and therefore arguably did not
provide prospective patients with a meaningful indicator of clinical quality for the procedure
they were about to undertake.
That said, patients may have access to information about hospital quality via other channels.
Choice of hospital is generally made jointly by the patient and their GP. GPs often possess
knowledge about the quality of care o¤ered by di¤erent hospitals and often di¤erent individual
surgeons within a given hospital in a given surgical specialty, both through their professional
networks and through hearing the experiences of other patients who have undergone a procedure
in that specialty area. The patient choice reforms may have enabled patients and GPs to act
on this information when making referral decisions even in the absence of meaningful data on
the NHS Choices website about elective surgery quality, thus generating competition between
hospitals and leading to higher clinical quality.
Moreover, the mere threat of losing market share as a consequence of the patient choice
reforms may have spurred hospitals to improve clinical quality, even if few patients did actively
choose which hospital to attend. Whether the patient choice reforms did indeed lead to
higher elective surgery quality by generating competition between hospitals for market share is
ultimately an empirical question this is the question that this paper aims to shed some light
on.
3Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) is a bacterial infection that is resistant to commonly
used antibiotics. MRSA infection rates are used as an indicator of hospital cleanliness.
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2.2 Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs)
PROMs are measures of health status or health-related quality of life, as reported by patients.
They capture health status at a single point in time, the idea being to capture the outcome
of a health intervention by surveying patients twice: before the intervention, and after the
intervention. The change in health status is then taken as a measure of health gain from
the intervention. While PROMs have long been used by clinicians to complement objective
measures of health status (such as blood pressure or limb mobility) to improve their treatment
of individual ailments, only recently have policymakers recognised their potential for use in
policy evaluation and performance measurement.
Despite it being long-understood that health care is only an intermediate good, whose
ultimate purpose is to produce a non-market good known as health (Grossman 1972; Becker
1964), health care providers around the world have until recently tended to measure their output
in terms of the amount of health care produced (e.g. number of surgical procedures performed),
rather than the amount of health produced (Appleby and Devlin 2010). Initial attempts in the
1980s and 1990s to measure health outcomes rather than outputs tended to equate health with
the absence of sickness that is, they tended to be measures of failure (e.g. mortality rates,
readmission rates, and complication rates), because these measures could often be derived from
administrative data sets.4 More recently, however, it has been recognised that failure-based
outcome measures of this kind convey only limited information, because, in most spheres of
health care, events such as death and readmissions are relatively rare, and therefore shed
little light on the great majority of health service interventions for most patients (Appleby
and Devlin 2010, p.2; see also Shojania & Forster 2008). Table 1 presents average mortality
rates for the elective surgical procedures studied in this paper, with mortality rates for AMI as
comparator. All four elective procedures have mortality rates of close to zero (or zero); thus,
mortality-based measures of hospital performance do not measure at least not directly the
quality of care provided in relation to these interventions.
In April 2009, the NHS, after conducting a review (Smith et al. 2005) and pilot programme
(Browne et al. 2007), started collecting PROMs for four surgical procedures hip replacement,
knee replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein treatment. Patients undergoing any of
the four procedures are asked to ll out the generic EQ-5D survey of health-related quality of life
4E¤orts to more e¤ectively measure health outcomes or a health care systems production of health  are
often spoken about in the policy literature in terms of attempts to develop improved measures of the quality
of health care provided. The di¤erence is that, while health outcomes can (at least in theory) be directly
measured, measuring the quality of health care requires an understanding of the production process whereby
health care of a certain quality is combined with other inputs (such as time and human capital) to produce
health outcomes. Backing out health care quality from health outcomes therefore requires one to control for
the many other factors that inuence health outcomes this is part of the challenge of casemix adjustment.
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both before surgery (either at their pre-surgical assessment, or on admission for surgery), and
after surgery (three or six months post-operatively, depending on the procedure undertaken).
At the same time, patients for all but one of the procedures (groin hernia repair) are asked to
complete a procedure-specic survey either the Oxford Hip Score (OHS), the Oxford Knee
Score (OKS), or the Aberdeen Varicose Veins Questionnaire (AVVQ). Further information
about the EQ-5D and the procedure-specic PROMs is provided in Section 6.2.
The fact that patients are asked an identical set of questions before and after surgery is a
fundamental methodological advance on previous methods of measuring the impact of a health
care intervention, as the pre-surgical questionnaire provides a baseline measure of the patients
health status, thus greatly ameliorating one of the most challenging problems in the literature
on hospital competition and quality namely, disentangling the contribution of the hospital
to the patients post-surgical health status from aspects of pre-surgical health status, or other
patient characteristics, that also a¤ect the patients post-intervention health status, but that
are often not observable, or imperfectly observed.
PROMs are sometimes criticised on the grounds that, unlike objectivemeasures of health
status, they are based on subjectiveassessments by patients of how they are feeling. These
assessments, it is sometimes argued, are not reliable, as they are subject to a range of psychological
and cognitive biases. However, the incorporation of subjective health states into PROMs is
not an undesirable epiphenomenon but is rather intrinsic to their very purpose, as PROMs are
premised on the recognition that many individual symptoms of illness (e.g. amount of pain)
are best assessed by the patient.
3 Evidence on within-hospital correlation in quality levels
If average health gain from elective surgery were correlated with hospital mortality rates, then
there would be little reason to re-examine the patient choice reforms using elective-surgery-specic
outcome measures, as, by measuring hospital performance using mortality-based indicators,
the existing literature would have e¤ectively also been capturing elective surgery quality. If,
on the other hand, these two dimensions of hospital performance are uncorrelated or weakly
correlated, there is a strong case for looking again at the introduction of patient choice using
outcome measures specic to the area of the hospital that was directly a¤ected by this reform
namely elective surgery.
To this end, this section presents evidence on the relationship between elective surgery
quality, as measured by health gain for the EQ-5D index score PROM, and various mortality-based
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indicators of hospital performance. Consistent with ndings from earlier work (Bevan &
Skellern 2011), it will be seen that there is little evidence of correlation between these two
dimensions of performance. The absence of such a relationship provides support for a re-examination
of the patient choice reforms using elective-surgery-specic measures of hospital quality.
3.1 Cross-sectional relationship between dimensions of hospital quality
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between hospital trusts5 casemix-adjusted
mortality ratios and average risk-adjusted health gain from elective surgery, as measured by
the EQ-5D PROM.6 There does not appear to be any relationship between these two variables.
Table 2 reports the corresponding correlations. If anything, there appears to be a small positive
correlation between hospital trustsstandardised mortality rates and unadjusted PROMs health
gains for orthopaedic surgery.
When casemix-adjusted PROMs health gains are used, health gains for several elective
procedures appear to be correlated, but there continues to be essentially no correlation between
PROMs health gains and standardised mortality. Bivariate regressions of the log of trusts
standardised mortality ratio on the log of average adjusted PROMs health gain show no
statistically signicant relationship between these variables.
I next present data on the relationship between PROMs health gains and AMI mortality
at the hospital site level.7 This data is presented because, whereas there are questions about
the capacity of standardised mortality indicators to meaningfully capture di¤erences in care
quality (Black 2010; Lilford & Pronovost 2010), there is a clear and well-documented link
between AMI survival rates and the quality and timeliness of care (Bradley et al. 2006; Jha et
al. 2007). Thus, if the quality of di¤erent treatments within a given hospital are correlated with
each other, there should be a correlation between AMI mortality and adjusted PROMs health
5 In the English NHS, hospital trusts are administrative and nancial entities that may include a number of
di¤erent hospital sites. Most of the analysis in this paper is conducted at the level of individual hospital sites.
However, standardised mortality rates are reported at the trust level, because this is the level at which these
data are published.
6From 2010/2011 onwards, my measure of risk-adjusted hospital mortality is the o¢ cial NHS Standardised
Hospital Mortality Indicator or SHMI (HSCIC 2013b). For 2009/2010, before the SHMI was created, I use the
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratios (HSMR) published by Dr Foster (Dr Foster 2011), divided by 100 to
make its scale comparable with the SHMI. Although the HSMR and SHMI are calculated in di¤erent ways,
they both produce similar outputs, namely a number, generally ranging between 0.7 and 1.2 (or between 70 and
120), which reports the ratio of actual to expected deaths, with a value lower than one indicating fewer deaths
than expected, and a value greater than one indicating more deaths than expected. When reporting correlations
with trust -level Standardised Mortality Rates, I use o¢ cial NHS average (adjusted and unadjusted) trust-level
PROMs health gains. By contrast, average adjusted and unadjusted PROMs health gains at the hospital site
level are calculated by the author from patient-level data. The patient-level casemix adjustment strategy is
outlined in Appendix 1.
7To maximise comparability between hospitals, when calculating AMI mortality rates the sample population
is restricted to include only patients aged between 39 and 100. To avoid possible bias due to upcoding, any
patients who were discharged alive with a total length of stay of less than three days are discarded. Only
patients who were admitted to hospital on an emergency basis from their permanent or temporary place of
residence (as opposed to, for example, from another hospital) are included. These sample restrictions are very
similar to those imposed by Cooper et al. (2011).
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gains. Figure 2 presents scatter plots of AMI mortality and adjusted PROMs health gain at
the hospital site level.8 Table 3 reports the corresponding correlations. Again, there appears
to be no relationship between these dimensions of hospital performance. Simple bivariate
regressions of the log of hospitalsAMI mortality on the log of average EQ-5D health gain
show no signicant relationship at 5 per cent level for three procedures, and a marginally
signicant relationship (p-value 4.9%) for the fourth.9 Thus, there appears to be little or no
relationship between the quality of a hospitals elective surgery and its AMI mortality rate.
3.2 Relationship between dimensions of hospital quality in rst di¤erences
The previous sub-section presented evidence suggesting that there is little or no cross-sectional
relationship between a hospitals elective surgical quality, as captured by PROMs health gains,
and mortality- based indicators of performance. Even if no such relationship exists at the
cross-sectional level, such a relationship may exist in rst di¤erences  for example, it may
be that quality improvements in one section of the hospital are transmitted to other sections
of the hospital, even if some sections o¤er high quality care while others o¤er low quality
care. This sub-section presents evidence on the relationship between year-on-year changes in
hospitalsaverage PROMs health gains, and year-on-year changes in hospital mortality rates.10
Table 4 presents correlations between change in adjusted PROMs health gain and change
in standardised mortality rates at the trust level. There does not appear to be a statistically
signicant relationship between these variables, and simple bivariate regressions in logs conrm
no statistically signicant relationships at the 5 per cent level.
Table 5 presents correlations between change in adjusted PROMs health gain and change
in AMI mortality at the hospital site level. Again, there does not appear to be a statistically
signicant relationship between these variables in rst di¤erences. Simple bivariate regressions
show no statistically signicant relationship between log of change in AMI mortality and log
of change in adjusted health gain for any of the PROMs procedures.
8This paper conducts its analysis at the nancial year level. The UK nancial year runs from 5 April until
4 April. For the purpose of this paper, we dene a nancial year as running from 1 April until 31 March. All
references to years in this paper refer to nancial years.
9A 1 per cent increase in adjusted PROMs health gain for knee replacement surgery is associated with a 0.21
per cent decrease in logged AMI mortality. However, given that this relationship is only marginally signicant
at the 5 per cent level (t-statistic = 1.97), and given also that this is the only one of the 16 bivariate regressions
reported in Section Three that shows a signicant relationship between mortality and PROMs health gain, a
fairly low weight should arguably be given to this nding of signicance.
10For brevity, in this sub-section no graphs are presented, nor are correlations involving unadjusted PROMs
health gains reported. The graphs show a similar picture to those presented in the previous sub-section, while
the unadjusted correlations show a qualitatively similar picture to the adjusted correlations presented in this
sub-section.
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3.3 Overview relationship between dimensions of hospital quality
This section has presented a range of evidence suggesting that there is little relationship,
either cross-sectionally or in rst di¤erences, between a hospitals average adjusted PROMs
health gain and its performance in relation to mortality-based outcome measures. The lack
of relationship between these dimensions of hospital performance highlights the importance of
moving beyond an exclusive focus on mortality-based outcome measures when assessing the
impact of changes to hospital incentive structures on hospital productivity and clinical quality.
Of course, preventing patient death will always be a key indicator of hospital performance but
this sections ndings suggest that mortality rates capture just one dimension of quality, and
that focusing on them to the exclusion of other dimensions can provide an incomplete picture,
especially when the changes being studied target a section of the hospital where mortality is a
rare event.
In response to the evidence presented in this section, it might be argued that the failure to
detect any signicant relationship is simply due to the fact that the PROMs data is of poor
quality. However, Section 6.2 presents evidence that the PROMs data does capture meaningful
variation in health gain from surgery, and should therefore be able to capture any di¤erences
in elective care quality that are correlated with hospital performance in other dimensions. The
evidence presented in this section cannot, therefore, be dismissed so easily.
The evidence presented in this section is consistent with the ndings of inspections of
clinical governance in the English NHS in the early 2000s by the Commission for Health
Improvement, a predecessor of the Care Quality Commission, which found that no large
acute hospital performed well across the board. The hospitals that performed best were
single-specialty hospitals, whereas large acute hospitals typically had a mix of good and poor
services, often with a dysfunctional clinical team (Bevan & Cornwell 2006, p.359). This
evidence is also consistent with the ndings of the New York Cardiac Surgery Reporting System,
which showed, in relation to cardiac surgery, that there were substantial di¤erences in mortality
rates between individual surgeons at the same hospital (Chassin 2002). If outcomes can vary
so substantially within a given hospital department, then it seems clear that outcomes between
hospital departments cannot necessarily be assumed to be correlated.
The evidence presented in this section highlights a need to develop a better understanding of
the way in which changes to incentive structures in one area of a hospital might not only a¤ect
performance in that area, but might also have knock-on a¤ects in other areas of hospital activity.
As Propper (2012) writes, in the literature on hospital competition and quality there is a black
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boxin our understanding of exactly what purchasers, managers, and clinical practitioners do
in response to competition that a¤ects outcomes. This paper aims to shed some light on this
black box by examining the e¤ect of introducing patient choice of hospital for elective surgery
using elective-surgery-specic outcome measures; in so doing, it also aims to shed some light
on the way in which changes in elective surgery quality are (or are not) transmitted to other
parts of the hospital.11
4 Multi-good models of hospital competition with xed
prices
This section presents a theoretical framework to motivate this papers examination of the
English patient choice reforms using elective-surgery-specic outcome measures. It rst presents
a model in which hospitals produce two output types (elective surgery and emergency care),
and set separate quality levels for each output type. If quality is observable in emergency
care but not in elective surgery, and competition is introduced for elective surgery but not for
emergency care, competition would most likely have no e¤ect on care quality. If, in addition,
the two output types are cost substitutes and patients erroneously take emergency care quality
as a signal of elective surgery quality, introducing competition for elective surgery could lead
to higher emergency care quality but lower elective surgery quality. Separately, an alternative
model is presented, which abstracts from the existence of emergency care, and instead assumes
that hospitals produce two output types major elective surgery, and minor elective surgery.
It is shown that, if the elasticities of demand with respect to quality are very di¤erent for the
two types of surgery, then increasing competition for both output types may lead to higher
quality for one, but lower quality for the other.
4.1 Two output types with separate quality levels
Standard economic models of hospital competition with xed prices (Gaynor 2006; Gaynor &
Town 2012) assume that hospitals produce a single type of output and choose a single, vertical
quality level. These models o¤er a clear prediction  so long as the regulated price exceeds
11An alternative and complementary approach to that adopted in this paper would be to examine the impact
of the patient choice reforms by continuing to use mortality as an outcome measure, but focusing on the small
number of elective surgical procedures that have high mortality rates. For example, Aylin et al. (2013) study ve
elective surgical procedures (excision of oesophagus and/or stomach, excision of colon and/or rectum, coronary
artery bypass graft, repair of abdominal aortic aneurysm, and excision of lung) that each have mortality rates
of between 2 per cent and 3.6 per cent. Mortality rates from these procedures could perhaps be used to study
the impact of the patient choice reforms on elective surgery quality. However, one impediment to such a study
is that many elective surgical procedures with high mortality rates are performed at only a small number of
specialised hospitals. Moreover, even if such a research project were feasible, there would still be a strong case
for examining the impact of hospital competition on elective surgery quality using alternative outcome measures
that capture clinical quality in relation to the large majority of elective surgical procedures for which death is
an extremely rare occurrence.
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the marginal cost with respect to quantity, increased competition intensity will lead to higher
hospital quality. This section extends this standard model to a setting where a given hospital
j produces two types of output: elective surgery (x = 1) and emergency care (x = 2), with
associated quality levels zj1 and zj2, which are assumed for the time being to be perfectly
observable.12
Prices for each output type, p1 and p2, are xed and paid by the government. The demand
experienced by hospital j for output x, qjx, is equal to market share sjx multiplied by overall
market demand Dx: qjx = sjxDx. As NHS patients do not face any of the costs associated with
hospitalisation, market shares, as well as overall market demand for each good, are independent
of prices; overall market demand is a function only of exogenous demand shifters x (e.g.
illness): Dx = Dx (x).
For elective surgery, market share sj1(zj1; z j1; N) is a function of the number of hospitals
in the market N , own electives quality zj1, and the vector of electives quality of all other
hospitals z j1, with
@sj1
@zj1
> 0, @sj1@zk1  0 8k 6= j, and
@sj1
@N < 0. That is, electives market share is
increasing in own electives quality, weakly decreasing in electives quality of all other hospitals,
and decreasing in the number of competitors. Increased hospital competition is represented in
the model as an increase in N .13 Crucially, it is also assumed that @
2sj1
@zj1@N
> 0 the sensitivity
of market share to own quality is increasing in the number of competitors. Emergency patients
are assumed to simply attend the nearest appropriate hospital, so demand is not a function of
emergency care quality: qj2 = sj2D2(2).
The two output types interact via the cost structure: the cost of producing each output
type is dependent not only on the quality of that output type, but also on the quality of the
other output type. In this way, the model aims to capture possible complementarities and
substitutabilities between output types in production. For output type x, cjx =
cx(qjx; zjx; zj; x;Wx) + Fx, where Wx denotes exogenous cost shifters and Fx denotes xed
costs. If @cx@z x < 0 and
@2cx
@zx@z x
< 0, the output types are cost complements; if @cx@z x > 0 and
@2cx
@zx@z x
> 0, they are cost substitutes.14
12The model presented here is an extension of that presented in Gaynor et al. (2011), which includes two
output types but assumes that the hospital chooses a single level of quality that is common to both output
types.
13Two arguments can be made for representing the increase in competition resulting from the patient choice
reforms as an increase in N . First, moving from selective contracting, in which a patients choices are restricted
to the limited number of hospitals with whom their care purchaser maintains a bulk contract, to a situation of
free patient choice of hospital, involves an e¤ective expansion in the number of market participants, even if no
new providers actually enter the market. Secondly, entry did occur alongside the patient choice reforms, as a
consequence of the establishment of privately owned and managed ISTCs for the provision of routine diagnostic
procedures and treatments.
14For example, consider c1 = q1(z21 + z1z2), so
@c1
@z2
= q1z1 and
@2c1
@z1@z2
= q1. If  is positive, the output
types are cost substitutes; if  is negative, they are cost complements. There does not seem to be any reason,
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NHS hospitals are not prot-maximisers, but do have an incentive to generate operating
surpluses (that is, prots), or at least not to run decits.15 In addition, hospital managers are
assumed to value the provision of quality in its own right, whether for altruistic or other (e.g.
reputational) reasons, and are therefore assumed to maximise some combination of prots and
quality Uj = u(j ; zj1;zj2). For simplicity, managerial utility is assumed to be additively
separable in all arguments, so Uj = j + v1(zj1) + v2(zj2). The hospitals problem is therefore:
max
zj1;zj2
Uj = p1 [sj1(zj1; z j1; N)D1(1)]+p2 [sj2D2(2)]+
2X
x=1
[vx(zjx)  c(qjx; zjx; zj; x;W )  Fx]
Dropping the j subscripts, the hospitals two rst order conditions (FOC) are:
z1:
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In the rst FOC, the left hand side denotes the marginal benet of providing elective
surgery quality  the rst term is the marginal monetary benet, which is proportional to
the gap between the regulated price and marginal cost, while the second term is the marginal
altruistic benet. The right hand side denotes the marginal cost of providing elective surgery
quality. The rst FOC implies that, subject to p1 greater than marginal cost, an increase in
competition leads to unambiguously higher elective surgery quality by increasing the sensitivity
of market share to electives quality (@
2s1(z

1 )
@z1@N
> 0).
The e¤ect of increased competition on emergency care quality, however, is not so clear-cut.
The second FOC, for emergency care quality, shows that, if the two types of output are cost
complements ( @
2c1
@z1@z2
< 0), the increase in elective surgery quality reduces marginal costs, and
the FOC optimum is re-established by increasing z2. If, on the other hand, the two output
types are cost substitutes ( @
2c1
@z1@z2
> 0), the increase in z1 leads to higher marginal costs, and
the FOC optimum is re-established by decreasing z2. Thus, increased competition leads to
higher emergency care quality if the two outputs are cost complements, but lower emergency
care quality if the two outputs are cost substitutes.
This result can be understood as an application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) multi-
tasking model. Instead of z2 being unobservable, as in the Holmstrom-Milgrom model, the
ex ante, to assume that hospital outputs are more likely to be cost substitutes or cost complements one can
easily think of reasons why both types of relationship might arise. For example, hospital outputs might be cost
complements because innovations in one part of the hospital can be translated to other parts of the hospital.
Alternatively, hospital outputs might be cost substitutes because of limited managerial attention, so that quality
increases in one part of the hospital can only come at the expense of quality in other parts of the hospital.
15Hospitals with Foundation Trust (FT) status may retain any surplus generated within a nancial year
for investment in whatever they see t; operating surpluses therefore enable them to nance whatever other
objectives they may have. Hospitals without FT status cannot retain surpluses, but are assessed for FT status
in part on their nancial performance, so they too have an incentive to run surpluses, or at least to avoid decits.
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problem is that it is not possible to incentivise improvements in z2 because demand for
emergency care is inelastic (patients are simply sent to the closest appropriate hospital). As in
the Holmstrom-Milgrom setting, the inability to incentivise z2 means that only incentivising
z1 will have a negative e¤ect on z2 if the two activities are cost substitutes. The essential
message of this model, for the purpose of empirical studies of hospital competition of quality,
is that assuming ex ante that the quality of emergency care  which can reasonably be
captured by a hospitals total or AMI mortality rate  is either identical to, or a proxy for,
the quality of elective surgery elides potentially important issues concerning the interaction
between production of di¤erent hospital outputs.
4.2 Unobserved quality in the competitive sector
The previous sub-section presented a model in which competition in elective surgery has an
unambiguously positive e¤ect on elective surgery quality, but positive or negative e¤ects on
emergency care quality, depending on whether the two output types are cost complements or
cost substitutes. One way of interpreting the previous studies of the English patient choice
reforms (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013), which focus on mortality-based indicators
of hospital performance, is that the resulting increase in hospital competition led to higher
emergency care quality, as this is where a large percentage of hospital deaths occur. On
this interpretation, the previous sub-section implies that elective surgery and emergency care
are cost complements, as quality in elective surgery should have unambiguously increased.
However, this conclusion is premised on the assumption that the quality of both output types
is observable. If the quality of elective surgery is unobservable as is arguably the case, given
that PROMs health gains are still not published on the NHS Choices website then it cannot
inuence electives demand. This implies that the model presented in the previous sub-section
should be modied to assume that @sj1@zk1 = 0 8k. If this condition holds, then competition will
have no impact on the quality of either output, as it leads to rst order conditions in which
the quality of both outputs is set by simply equating the marginal altruistic benet of quality
with the marginal cost:
@vx(z
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If, in addition to elective surgery quality being unobservable, patients (rightly or wrongly)
take emergency care quality as a proxy for elective care quality for example, because when
they go to the NHS Choices website to learn about options for their elective surgery procedure,
hospital standardised mortality rates are listed as one of the bases for comparison then the
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model should be modied to assume that @sj1@zk1 = 0 8k,
@sj1
@zj2
> 0, @sj1@zk2  0 8k 6= j, and
@2sj1
@zj2@N
> 0. That is, electives market share is unresponsive to own elective surgery quality,
increasing in own emergency care quality, weakly decreasing in emergency care quality of all
other hospitals, and more responsive to own emergency care quality when competition intensity
(N) is higher. The rst order conditions for the hospitals optimisation problem are now:
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These rst order conditions imply that increasing competition in elective surgery leads to
higher emergency care quality but, perversely, to lower elective surgery quality if the two
types of hospital output are cost substitutes.16 This possibility provides a further argument in
support of looking at the e¤ect of the patient choice reforms on elective-surgery-specic quality
measures, rather than assuming ex ante that any changes to mortality-based performance
indicators resulting from competition will also have occurred in relation to elective surgery.
4.3 Di¤erential responses for major and minor surgery
The e¤ect of increased competition intensity on clinical quality may vary between elective
surgical procedures. This sub-section abstracts from the existence of emergency care and
assumes that hospitals produce two types of elective surgery output: major surgery (x = 1),
represented in the dataset by orthopaedic surgery (hip and knee replacement), and minor
surgery (x = 2), represented in the dataset by groin hernia repair and varicose vein surgery.
Hospitals compete for both major and minor surgery patients, and the two output types are
again assumed to interact via the cost structure. The hospital managers problem is now:
max
zj1;zj2
Uj =
2X
x=1
[pxsjx(zjx; z jx; N)Dx(x) + vx(zjx)  c(qjx; zjx; zj; x;Wx)  Fx]
Dropping the j subscripts, the rst order conditions are:
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If the two outputs are cost complements, then increased competition leads unambiguously to
higher quality for both outputs, as quality increases in the two markets are mutually reinforcing:
increased major surgery quality leads to lower minor surgery costs, which leads in turn to
16 It is important to be clear that this hypothesis of the model just presented is not consistent with rational
expectations, which imply that patients should not choose which hospital to attend for elective surgery on the
basis of emergency care quality if the latter has a negative relationship with elective surgery quality. Nonetheless,
the hypothesis is plausible given the range of information that has been available to elective surgery patients
on the NHS Choices website since the introduction of patient choice of hospital.
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higher minor surgery quality, and vice versa. If, on the other hand, the two output types
are cost substitutes, then the e¤ect of increased competition on quality is ambiguous. The
increased responsiveness of demand to quality gives the hospital an incentive to increase quality
of both outputs, but increasing the quality of one output type leads to higher marginal costs
of providing quality for the other output, thus providing an incentive to decrease quality. If
the quality elasticity of demand for the two output types is very di¤erent, then an increase
in competition may lead to higher quality for the high-elasticity output, but lower quality for
the low-elasticity output. This situation will arise if, for the low-elasticity output type, the
incentive to o¤er higher quality due to the increased responsiveness of demand to quality is
outweighed by the incentive to o¤er lower quality as a result of increased marginal costs due
to the cost substitution e¤ect.
Major surgery patients are, on average, sicker than minor surgery patients. In the dataset
used in this paper, patients undergoing hip and knee replacement surgery have an average
pre-operative health status, as captured by the EQ-5D index score, of 0.332 and 0.381 respectively.
By contrast, patients undergoing groin hernia repair and varicose vein surgery have average
pre-operative EQ-5D scores of 0.778 and 0.747 respectively. In an analysis of demand behaviour
by patients undergoing Coronary Artery Bypass Graft, Gaynor et al. (2012a) present evidence
that sicker patients have a higher quality elasticity of demand than healthier patients  the
authors suggest that this is because sicker patients have more at stake from surgery. If similar
di¤erences in quality elasticities exist between patients undergoing major and minor surgical
procedures, it is possible that the increased competition engendered by the patient choice
reforms may have led to higher major surgery quality, but lower minor surgery quality or
perhaps simply to a smaller increase in quality for minor surgery than for major surgery. I
therefore hypothesise that hospitalsresponses to the patient choice reforms may be di¤erentiated
by surgical procedure, and look for evidence of such di¤erential responses by running regressions
separately on health gain from orthopaedic surgery, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein
surgery.17
4.4 Hypotheses concerning hospital competition and quality
The theoretical framework presented in Section Four implies a number of hypotheses concerning
the relationship between hospital competition and care quality. These hypotheses will inform
the interpretation of the regression estimates presented later in the paper.
17Hip and knee replacement observations are analysed together because they are both performed by
a hospitals orthopaedic department. In all orthopaedic surgery regressions, a dummy variable for knee
replacement is included, to capture level di¤erences in health gains between the two surgical procedures.
Estimates from running regressions separately for hip and knee replacement are available on the authors website
at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/skellern.
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 Hypothesis (1): If quality of both elective surgery and emergency care are observable,
and:
 If elective surgery and emergency care are cost complements, then higher competition
will lead to higher quality for both output types.
 If elective surgery and emergency care are cost substitutes, then higher competition
will lead to higher elective surgery quality, but lower emergency care quality.
 Hypothesis (2): If quality of elective surgery is unobservable while quality of emergency
care is observable, and patients do not take the quality of emergency care as a signal of
elective surgery quality, then competition will have no e¤ect on the quality of either
elective surgery or emergency care.
 Hypothesis (3): If quality of elective surgery is unobservable while quality of emergency
care is observable, and patients (rightly or wrongly) take the quality of emergency care
as a signal of elective surgery quality, and:
 If elective surgery and emergency care are cost complements, then higher competition
will lead to higher quality for both output types.
 If elective surgery and emergency care are cost substitutes, then higher competition
will lead to higher emergency care quality, but lower elective surgery quality.
 Hypothesis (4): If hospitals responses to competition are di¤erentiated by elective
surgical procedure, and the quality of elective surgery can be observed at the individual
procedure level, and:
 If di¤erent elective surgical procedures are cost complements, then higher competition
will lead to higher quality across all types of elective surgery.
 If di¤erent elective surgical procedures are cost substitutes, then higher competition
will lead to increased quality for surgical procedures with a high quality elasticity of
demand (such as orthopaedic surgery), and to either a smaller increase in quality or
a decrease in quality for surgical procedures with a low quality elasticity of demand
(such as groin hernia repair and varicose vein surgery).
Hypothesis (1) assumes that overall elective surgery quality is observable, while Hypotheses
(2) and (3) assume that it is unobservable. Hypothesis (4) assumes that the quality of individual
elective surgical procedures is observable. Although this assumption is prima facie incompatible
with Hypotheses (2) and (3), I do not treat these hypotheses as mutually exclusive, because
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the true situation as regards observability of hospital quality is likely to be much murkier than
can be represented by the simple theoretical models presented in this section. In reality, no
dimension of hospital quality is either perfectly observable or completely unobserved, and so all
dimensions of quality should be thought of as poorly observableto a greater or lesser degree.
The criterion I will use in interpreting my ndings is therefore, simply, whether the models
presented in this section can be thought of as a tolerable, if imprecise, approximation of reality.
5 Identication strategy
5.1 Baseline regression specication
In this paper, the e¤ect of hospital competition on care quality is identied by running the
following regression for patient i undertaking procedure p at hospital site j and year t:
gainijpt = 0 + 1compjt + 2casesjpt + 3cases
2
jpt + 4admissionsjt + 5admissions
2
jt
+X0ijpt6 +Y
0
jt7 + Z
0
j8 + "ijpt
(5)
Xijpt denotes a vector of patient-level controls, Yjt denotes time-varying hospital-level
controls, and Zj denotes time-invariant hospital level controls, while "ijpt is an error term.
The left hand side variable is (casemix-adjusted) health gain from surgery as captured by
PROMs, while compjt is the competition intensity experienced by hospital j at time t, casesjpt
is the number of cases for that hospital site-procedure-year, and admissionsjt is total annual
admissions per trust.18 To account for serial correlation, all regressions cluster standard errors
at the hospital level.
The coe¢ cient of interest is 1, the e¤ect of competition intensity on health gain from
surgery.19 Three potential sources of endogeneity when running this regression are: reverse
causality arising from the way in which competition intensity is calculated; casemix (omitted
variable) bias due to unobserved correlates of geography; and casemix (omitted variable) bias
due to patient selection. This section discusses these three sources of bias, and explains what
is done to address them.
18Total and procedure-specic hospital admissions may be inuenced by hospital quality after the introduction
of patient choice; this issue is discussed in Section 6.3.
19The competition indices and hospital-level averages used in this paper are calculated using all observations
in the dataset. However, when running the regressions, any patients that attended a hospital that treated
fewer than 50 patients for the procedure and year in question are omitted. Also omitted are a small number
of additional observations that satised this restriction, but for whom there were fewer than 5 PROMs surveys
for the hospital and year in question.
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5.2 Reverse causality arising from method of dening competition
intensity
Actual competition intensity between hospitals cannot be measured; consequently, all measures
of competition intensity are measures of market structure, or of the potential for competition.
This paper measures competition using the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is equal
to the sum of squared market shares of each competitor in the market. Specically, treatment
intensity is dened as the negative log of HHI. Logs are taken to capture the idea that treatment
e¤ects will be constant with respect to percentage changes in competition intensity; the scale
is reversed so that a higher value of compjt denotes higher competition intensity.
The primary methodological challenge in constructing a measure of competition intensity
is how to dene the size of the market within which a given hospital operates. A commonly
used denition is that hospital js market includes all hospitals within the radius required to
encompass the home address of a certain percentage (such as 75% or 95%) of hospital js
patients. The di¢ culty with these variable radiusmethods of dening market size is that
a hospitals market radius, as dened by percentiles of patient distance travelled, may be
endogenous to hospital quality. For example, a high quality hospital may attract patients from
farther aeld, thus giving it a larger market radius, and making it appear more competitive.
This is an example of reverse causality, as the objective is to estimate the causal e¤ect
of competition intensity on hospital quality, but hospital quality is now inuencing (ones
denition of) competition intensity; estimates of the e¤ect of competition on quality using
standard regression methods will therefore be biased. This paper uses several di¤erent methods
of dening competition intensity to address this endogeneity problem.
Following Gaynor et al. (2013), this studys preferred measure of competition intensity
centres hospital markets on patients neighbourhood of residence, rather than on hospitals
themselves. A patients neighbourhood is dened as their Middle Super Output Area (MSOA),
a geographical statistical unit that usually contains between 6,000 and 9,000 residents.20 First,
year level HHIs are calculated for each of six high-volume elective surgical procedures the four
PROMs procedures, plus knee arthroscopy and cataract repair. For each procedure and year,
an HHI is calculated for each MSOA in England, which is equal to the sum of each providers
squared market shares in that MSOA. A procedure-specic hospital-year-level HHI is then
calculated as the weighted average of the HHIs of all the MSOAs that it serves, and a single
HHI for each hospital and year is then calculated as a weighted average of the procedure-specic
20As of 2011, England had 6,791 MSOAs, with populations ranging from 5,160 (1st percentile) to 10,979
(99th percentile). MSOA boundaries are kept as stable as possible, but are redened as required to keep MSOA
populations between 5,000 and 15,000.
105
HHIs.
Hospital markets are dened at the neighbourhood level in order to ameliorate concerns
about the endogeneity of competition intensity with respect to care quality when hospital
markets are centred on hospitals themselves. Nevertheless, concerns may remain that hospital
competition intensity is still partly a function of hospital quality, as any changes in competition
intensity at the hospital level after the introduction of patient choice will be an endogenous
function of the actions of market participants, and may therefore confound attempts to estimate
causal e¤ects. For this reason, this study also instruments current-period competition intensity
measure with the average values of competition intensity for the three years preceding the
reform, 2002/2003 to 2004/2005.
5.3 Casemix (omitted variable) bias due to unobserved correlates of
geography
The most worrisome potential source of omitted variable bias in the literature on hospital
competition and quality is casemix heterogeneity in patient characteristics between di¤erent
providers. A hospital with poor average health outcomes may be providing poor quality of care,
or it may simply have a patient case load that is, on average, sicker than that of other hospitals.
Unobserved aspects of patient health status can lead to bias via (at least) two channels: the
rst via correlation with ones treatment intensity variable (the focus of this sub-section), and
the second via selection e¤ects (the focus of the next sub-section).
The paper identies the causal e¤ect of hospital competition on care quality using cross-sectional
estimation, in which variation in competition intensity comes from the geographically-dened
nature of hospital markets  yet there are many correlates of geography, including, most
importantly, patient health status, that may also inuence outcomes.21 These correlates of
geography will lead to omitted variable bias if not adequately controlled for. For instance, in
England, inner-city residents tend to be poorer, and therefore also sicker, than their suburban
and rural counterparts. If competition intensity is also higher in inner-city areas, the resulting
correlation between competition intensity and health status may, unless controlled for, lead to
downward-biased estimates of the e¤ect of competition on quality, if quality is measured using
indicators of post-treatment health status.
21The dataset used in this paper incorporates observations from four years, and the competition indices as
well as any other hospital-level averages used are calculated at year level. This means that there is, strictly
speaking, some within-hospital variation in competition intensity. However, as time-invariant instruments for
competition are also employed, and hospital xed e¤ects are not included in the regressions, the e¤ect of hospital
competition on clinical quality is e¤ectively being identied using only cross-sectional variation (notwithstanding
that the tted values from the rst stage might vary slightly within a given hospital from year to year).
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One of the main rationales for dening markets using neighbourhoods with similar population
sizes (or, alternatively, using percentiles of patient distance travelled) is that unlike, for example,
xed distance denitions of market size, which produce measures of competition intensity that
are strongly correlated with urbanness, they control for systematic di¤erences between urban
and rural areas in relation to travel times (e.g. due to congestion) and willingness to travel
(rural dwellers are willing to travel for longer to obtain treatment). Nevertheless, one might
still be worried that unobservable correlates of geography (such as unobservable components of
patient health status) might produce biased estimates of the e¤ect of competition on quality.
One commonly used strategy to address any such residual concerns is to include hospital
xed e¤ects in ones regression, as they control for any time-invariant determinants of outcomes
at the hospital level, whether observable or unobservable. This option is not (with one
exception, discussed below) available in this study given the cross-sectional nature of its
identication strategy. However, two features of the PROMs dataset mean that one need
not be nearly so concerned about the possible inuence of unobservable dimensions of casemix
on outcomes as in previous research on competition and quality in England.
The rst reason is that PROMs surveys ask a range of clinically relevant questions  for
example, duration of symptoms, and whether the patient has had previous surgery on the body
part being operated on which give a much fuller picture of patient health status than the
administratively-focused data obtainable from the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES). I use this
information from the PROMs survey, along with information from HES, to replicate the casemix
adjustment strategy used by the NHS to risk-adjust hospital-level PROMs scores, and use
adjusted health gain from treatment at the individual patient level as the outcome variable in
all specications.22 Even more importantly, this casemix adjustment strategy controls directly
for pre-operative health status by including the patients pre-operative PROMs score as a right
hand side variable. This casemix adjustment methodology should therefore dramatically reduce
bias from unobserved patient characteristics that inuence outcomes.
The second, and related, reason to be less concerned about casemix bias is that health gain
from surgery as measured by PROMs is fundamentally di¤erent to outcome measures used by
the existing literature on hospital competition and quality, in that, whereas quality has hitherto
been measured using post-treatment health status, PROMs uses health gain from surgery that
22When publishing hospital-level PROMs scores, the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC)
provides casemix-adjusted health gains from surgery, in addition to unadjusted outcomes. The HSCIC
does not, however, perform the same adjustment on patient level data. I therefore replicate the NHSs
hospital-level casemix adjustment strategy, to generate patient-level risk-adjusted post-treatment health status,
and risk-adjusted health gain from surgery, for all survey respondents who could be linked to HES. Appendix
1 outlines this casemix adjustment methodology, discusses associated methodological questions, and provides a
list of the variables used.
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is, the change in health status rather than the level of health status as its metric of quality.
This di¤erence means that classicalcasemix bias, in which hospitals with unobservably sicker
patients appear to o¤er lower quality care than is the case in reality, is no longer a concern,
because if patientspoor health status is picked up in the post-treatment PROMs survey, it
should also be picked up in the pre-treatment PROMs survey, and thus should not enter into
ones measure of health gain from surgery.
Instead, when using PROMs health gains as an outcome variable, this classical form of
casemix bias is replaced with another, more subtle source of potential bias if unobserved health
status is correlated with health gain from surgery. For example, if unobservably sicker patients
have a higher average health gain from surgery, then hospitals with unobservably sicker patients
will appear to o¤er higher quality care than is the case in reality. While it is certainly the case
that observably sicker patients will have higher health gain from surgery as measured by PROMs
if for no other reason, this is guaranteed by ceiling e¤ects arising from the bounded nature of
PROMs scores there is no reason to believe that there are dimensions of health status that
are not captured by the pre-treatment PROMs survey (i.e. are unobservable) but that a¤ect
the magnitude of gains from surgery (and thus lead to biased estimates).
In summary: rst, PROMs eliminates the classical type of casemix bias in which unobservably
sicker patients lead to downward-biased estimates of hospital performance; secondly, when
using PROMs, classical casemix bias is replaced with a more subtle form of potential bias if
unobservable health status is correlated with gains from surgery; thirdly, this new form of
potential bias is unlikely to be an empirically signicant problem for the present study, given
that it is possible to control for pre-treatment health status directly.
5.4 Casemix (omitted variable) bias due to patient selection
When patients can choose which hospital they attend, their choices may be systematically
inuenced by patient-level characteristics that inuence outcomes. For example, if sicker
patients select into attending higher-quality hospitals because they have more at stake from
surgery, then the observed distribution of hospital quality will be distorted relative to the true
distribution. In classical settings, where post-treatment health status is the outcome variable,
this form of patient selection would lead to a compression or reversal of the distribution of
observed hospital qualities relative to the true distribution. For example, Great Ormond Street
Hospital has one of the highest child mortality rates of any hospital in England, but this is
because the sickest children are sent there, not because it is a poor quality hospital.
This selection problem can be understood as a form of omitted variable bias because, if all
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relevant patient characteristics were observable, the problem could be eliminated by controlling
for these patient characteristics in ones regressions. I therefore argue that this paper does
an excellent job of controlling for this source of omitted variable bias, just as it controls for
casemix bias driven by the unobservable correlates of geography, because of: rstly, the casemix
adjustment that is undertaken, and in particular the fact that pre-treatment health status is
controlled for directly; and secondly, the use of change in health status (rather than the level of
post-surgical health status) as the outcome variable. Instrumenting current-period competition
intensity by the average pre-reform level of competition intensity should comprehensively
eliminate any remaining selection e¤ects caused by the introduction of patient choice of hospital.
An alternative way of obtaining a measure of competition intensity, which is particularly
well-suited to addressing endogeneity caused by patient selection, is put forward by Kessler &
McClellan (2000), who use a conditional logit model to predict patient choice of hospital on
the basis of exogenous variables, thus eliminating any inuence of hospital quality on patient
decisions. HHIs are then calculated using these predicted patient choices, rather than actual
patient choices; the resulting competition measures are thus arguably, like the patient choices
they are based on, exogenous with respect to hospital quality.
HHIs based on predicted patient choices are essentially a complex form of instrumentation,
in which instead of instrumenting competition intensity itself, each patients choice of hospital
is instrumented, and the resulting predicted patient choices are then used as inputs into the
construction of competition indices.23 This study constructs a predicted patient choice model
similar to that used in Gaynor et al. (2013), calculates hospital HHIs based on neighbourhood-
centred markets using these predicted choices, and uses this HHI as one of its two preferred
competition indices.
Patient distance to hospital is a critical variable in predicted patient choice models for two
reasons. The rst is that, as patients generally bear some or all of the travel costs incurred when
obtaining treatment, a patients distance to a given hospital is the biggest predictor of whether
they will attend that hospital. This study species a choice model in which a patients utility
from attending a given hospital is not only a function of distance to that hospital, but is also
23Given the complex functional form of this instrument, it must be estimated in two separate stages. The
rst stage estimates patient choices on the basis of exogenous variables, and constructs competition indices on
the basis of these choices, while the second regresses hospital quality on our measure of competition intensity
constructed using predicted patient choices. Performing instrumental variables estimation in two separate stages
will lead to incorrect standard errors in the second stage, as the standard errors for the rst stage regression
are not taken into account. Gaynor et al. (2013) investigate the severity of this problem in relation to HHI
indices based on predicted patient choices by generating ten bootstrap samples of hospital admissions from their
dataset and constructing HHIs for each sample. They nd that the correlation between hospitals predicted
HHIs across samples was above 0.99, suggesting that there is little need to account for sampling variation in the
rst stage. They argue that this result arises from the large number of observations used to construct predicted
HHIs.
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a function of the di¤erence between distance to that hospital and distance to the next closest
alternative hospital, based on a number of hospital characteristics. Further details concerning
the predicted patient choice model used in this paper are provided in Appendix 2.
The second reason for this variables importance in predicted patient choice models is that it
is used to satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, it is assumed that distance to hospital does
not a¤ect outcomes except via its e¤ect on choice of hospital and therefore competition, and
therefore that patient distance to hospital (or any derivatives of this variable, such as di¤erence
between distance to the hospital and distance to the closest alternative hospital) do not need to
be included in the second-stage regressions of hospital quality on competition intensity. Given
that all the other predictors of patient choice included in the conditional logit model, such as
patient characteristics, are included in the second stage, distance to hospital, and derivatives
of this variable, are therefore the primary means by which regressions using predicted HHIs
identify the causal e¤ect of competition on clinical quality.
The exclusion restriction could be violated for two reasons. First, very sick patients could
move house in order to live close to a hospital, in which case distance to hospital would predict
health outcomes. While this phenomenon likely occurs to some limited extent, it is unlikely
to bias the measures of competition intensity based on predicted patient choices used in this
paper, rstly because relocation of this kind is quite rare, and secondly because patients who
move house in order to live near a hospital (for example, patients with terminal cancer, or
patients with kidney disease who require regular dialysis) are likely to be so sick that they are
ineligible to undergo the elective surgical procedures covered by the PROMs programme.
Secondly, and more problematically, patient distance to hospital will be correlated with
urbanness, so whether the exclusion restriction is satised will depend on whether the correlates
of urbanness which a¤ect outcomes (such as poverty and health status) are satisfactorily
controlled for by other means. In other words, HHIs based on predicted patient choices do
not solve the problem of omitted variable bias due to the unobserved correlates of geography.
Therefore, unless used in conjunction with hospital xed e¤ects, HHIs based on predicted
patient choices do not o¤er a silver bullet, but are rather simply one element of the set of
possible approaches to measuring competition intensity, each with their attendant strengths
and weaknesses.
The year-on-year variation in within-hospital predicted HHIs can, unlike equivalent variation
from HHIs based on actual patient choices, theoretically be used to identify the causal e¤ect
of competition on quality in a model with hospital xed e¤ects. Whereas any such variation
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using HHIs calculated from actual patient choices will be an endogenous outcome of market
participants behaviour, an HHI calculated using predicted patient choices is based only on
exogenous determinants of patient choice, and should, therefore, be able to identify a causal
e¤ect using only within-hospital variation in competition intensity. That said, my prior is
that the four years covered by the PROMs data is unlikely to have provided su¢ cient time
for any exogenous drivers of changes in competition intensity at the hospital level (such as
demographic changes driven by migration, or changes in preferences concerning willingness to
travel) to have much of an e¤ect on competition intensity. I report and discuss the estimates
from such a regression in the robustness tests.
5.5 Robustness tests: GP-centred markets and historical location
instrument
This paper centres hospital markets on patientsneighbourhoods of residence, rather than on
hospitals themselves, in order to ameliorate concerns about the possible inuence of hospital
quality on (its measures of) competition intensity. An alternative method of addressing this
concern, employed by Cooper et al. (2011), is to centre hospital markets on GP surgeries
rather than hospitals. In the UK, patients are required, in the vast majority of cases, to
register with a GP that is close to their home. The address of the GP surgery thus provides
a good proxy for the patients home address. As a check on the results obtained using
neighbourhood-centred markets, yearly GP-centred HHIs are also calculated. For each elective
surgery observation, the straight line distance from GP surgery to hospital is calculated, and the
GP surgerys market for each year and surgical procedure is dened as the GP-centred circle
that encompasses 95 per cent of the treatment locations of the GP surgerys patients. Any
hospital that lies within this circle is considered to be in the GP surgerys market, irrespective
of whether the GP surgery refers any patients to the hospital.24 An HHI is calculated for each
GP-procedure-year combination, and an overall GP-year HHI is then calculated as a weighted
average of procedure-level HHIs.
In addition to the GP-level HHI just described, a second alternative measure of competition
intensity is constructed by performing a nal stage of aggregation not undertaken by Cooper
et al. (2011), calculating a hospital-level HHI that is equal to the weighted sum of the
GP-level HHIs of its patientsGP surgeries. While both the GP-level, GP-centred HHI and the
hospital-level, GP-centred HHI are valid ways of measuring competition intensity, the latter
24Each GPs market includes all patients that attend hospitals within the GP surgerys 95 per cent market
radius, irrespective of the GP surgery at which they are registered. This may be contrasted with the
neighbourhood-centred HHIs, in which the market is dened to include only those residents who live in the
MSOA.
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has the intuitively appealing property that treatment intensity is the same for each patient
attending a given hospital in a given year.
It was argued earlier in this section that using casemix-adjusted change in health status as
the outcome variable (rather than the level of post-surgical health status) greatly ameliorates
any possible concerns about bias caused by unobservable aspects of casemix. However, as
a robustness check, and following Cooper et al. (2011), I construct another instrument for
competition intensity that is based on the historically determined location of English NHS
hospitals. While NHS hospital trusts have often been subject to mergers and reorganisations
(see e.g. Fulop et al. 2005; Gaynor et al. 2012b), there has been little change in hospital
locations at the site level since the NHS was formed in 1948 (Klein 2006). The historically
determined nature of hospital locations provides a potentially exogenous source of variation
in hospital competition intensity based on higher moments of the distance from hospital to
patient. The idea is that, while there will be a negative correlation between distance from
hospital to patient and urbanness (along with the correlates of urbanness, such as poverty and
sickness), the variance of the distance to the patients nearest four hospitals, conditional on
distance to hospital, will not be correlated with urbanness, but will be negatively correlated
with competition intensity.
Consider, for example, two hospital markets centred on two di¤erent MSOAs.25 In market
A, the distances from the centre of the MSOA to the nearest four hospitals are 5km, 10km,
10km and 10km. In market B, the distances to the nearest four hospitals are 5km, 10km,
15km, and 20km. Market A clearly seems more competitive, as the third and fourth closest
hospitals are better substitutes for the closest hospital. This di¤erence in competition intensity
is captured by taking the standard deviation of the distance to the closest four hospitals a
lower standard deviation implies a more competitive market. However, now consider market
C with closest hospitals located 5km, 10km, 10km and 25km away, and market D, with closest
hospitals located 5km, 20km, 20km, and 25km away. Markets C and D have the same standard
deviation of distance from MSOA to the nearest four hospitals, but market C is clearly more
competitive, as the closest hospital has less market power than in market D. For this reason,
average distance to the closest four hospitals is included in both the rst and second stage of
the IV regression a higher average distance, conditional on standard deviation, implies a less
competitive market.
This instrument is plausibly exogenous for three reasons. First, reverse causality (the
outcome variable determining the instrument) is avoided because the instrument is based on
25This example is adapted from Cooper et al. (2011), p.F242.
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historically determined hospital locations. Secondly, omitted variable bias (the instrument
being correlated with factors that inuence outcomes) is avoided because there is little correlation
between urbanness and the higher moments of the hospital distribution. Although a simple
bivariate regression indicates that there is a small negative relationship between urbanness
and standard deviation of distance to nearest four hospitals (correlation -0.15), when average
distance to the closest four hospitals is included as a control, the relationship between urbanness
and standard deviation to the closest four hospitals is now positive. I take this as suggestive
evidence that, conditional on average distance to hospital, the standard deviation of distance to
the closest four hospitals instruments for competition intensity while avoiding any correlation
with correlates of geography that a¤ect outcomes. Thirdly, and nally, the exclusion restriction
is satised because there is no reason to believe that the standard deviation of distance to the
closest four hospitals a¤ects outcomes in any way except via competition. Further evidence
concerning the exogeneity of this instrument is presented in the robustness checks.
Estimates using GP-centred competition indices, and using the above-described historical
location instrument, are reported mainly because they are of inherent interest as a check on
the robustness of this papers headline results. However, a second reason for reporting these
results is that these alternative methods are used in the existing literature. Given that this
paper uses a new set of outcome measures to estimate the impact of hospital competition on
clinical quality, I would like to replicate the methods employed by the existing literature as
much as possible in other respects, in order to be able to distinguish between di¤erences in
results that are driven by the use of new outcome measures, and di¤erences that are driven by
other factors.
5.6 Correlation between competition intensity measures used in this
paper
Table 6 reports the correlation between this papers two main competition measures (hospital-
level, neighbourhood-centred HHIs based either on actual patient choices or on predicted
patient choices) with a range of other competition measures: GP-level and hospital-level HHIs
calculated using GP-centred markets; hospital-level HHIs calculated using hospital-centred
markets; and a simple xed distance measure in which a hospitals competition intensity is
dened as the number of competitors within 30km.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 6. First, the level to which a competition
measure is aggregated matters a lot. The hospital-level, GP-centred 95 per cent market radius
HHI is just a weighted average of the GP-level, GP-centred 95 per cent market radius HHIs of
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its patientsGP surgeries, yet the correlation between these two indices is only 0.448. Secondly,
there is generally a high correlation above 0.5 between all the hospital-level HHIs based on
actual patient choices. The correlation between this papers preferred neighbourhood-centred
(hospital-level) HHI based on actual patient choices and the main GP-centred, hospital-level
HHI (i.e. that based on the 95th percentile of distance from GP to hospital) is above 0.8. This
high correlation suggests that these two competition indices are capturing a similar underlying
concept, even though they are constructed in very di¤erent ways. Thirdly, and in keeping with
the existing literature (e.g. Cooper et al. 2011), the HHIs based on predicted patient choices
have a correlation of around 0.4 with the hospital-level HHIs based on actual patient choices.
Fourthly, the HHIs based on actual patient choices all have a moderate correlation (0.2 to
0.45) with the simple xed-distance measure of hospital competition, but their correlation with
a patients urban status is close to zero. The lack of correlation with urban status suggests
that neighbourhood-centred or variable-radius HHIs based on actual patient choices do a good
job of controlling for urban-rural di¤erences. Urban status is, as expected, correlated with the
xed-distance competition measure. Most interestingly, however, urban status is also correlated
with the predicted patient choice HHIs, reecting the use of distance-to-hospital-based variables
as the main means of satisfying the exclusion restriction. The fact that predicted patient ow
HHIs are correlated with urbanness in a way that actual patient ow HHIs are not suggests,
however, that caution is needed when interpreting estimates of the e¤ect of competition on
quality that use cross-sectional identication methods and predicted patient choice HHIs 
they may do a better job of controlling for reverse causality and patient selection than their
actual patient ow counterparts, but may do a worse job of controlling for omitted variable
bias arising from the unobserved correlates of urbanness.
6 The data
6.1 Data sources
This paper is based on two NHS datasets  the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), which
contains a record for every hospital visit by an NHS patient in England (approximately 125
million observations per year), and the PROMs survey responses by individual patients. NHS
patients can be treated either in NHS (public) hospitals, or in private hospitals that are
registered to accept NHS patients.26 No distinction is made between NHS and private providers
when calculating competition indices or when running regressions, except to include a dummy
26HES does not include private (e.g. privately insured) patients treated at private hospitals. However, private
patients comprise only a small percentage (less than 10 per cent) of the total hospital market in England.
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variable in the latter indicating whether a hospital is privately run. The HES dataset covers
used in this study encompasses eleven full years, from 2002/2003 to 2012/2013. In addition
to containing all elective admissions for the four PROMs procedures, the dataset includes all
admissions for two additional elective procedures, knee arthroscopy and cataract repair, which
are used to construct the competition measures.27 Finally, the dataset includes all non-elective
AMI admissions. In total there are 8.6 million observations in the dataset.
NHS hospital trusts often consist of multiple hospital sites which can be located up to 100km
from each other. Individual hospital sites within a hospital trust are for many purposes run
independently, although their nances are managed at the trust level. As individual hospital
sites within a given trust can act as e¤ective competitors with other sites within the trust,
analysis is conducted at the hospital site level rather than trust level.28
The main part of the dataset consists of all admissions for PROMs procedures from 2009/2010,
the rst year in which PROMs surveys were collected, through to the end of 2012/2013. There
are 1,261,134 observations in this main part of the dataset, although not all of these patients
will have been eligible to receive a PROMs survey, as a broader denition of each procedure is
used than that employed by the PROMs programme, in order to dene the marketfor each
procedure in a meaningful and intuitive way. Appendix 3 provides the procedure and diagnosis
codes used in constructing the dataset.
The PROMs dataset contains 673,584 survey responses, of which 485,711 or 72.1 per cent
contain the epikey eld which allows the record to be linked to HES.29 Of these, 468,578 
or 96.5 per cent were successfully matched to the HES dataset. When calculating measures
of competition intensity, this paper makes use of the full HES dataset. However, the casemix
adjustment and main regressions use only the PROMs records that could be linked to HES.
Table 7 breaks down the number of survey responses by procedure and linkage status.
6.2 Outcome variables PROMs
The generic EQ-5D survey (EuroQol Group 1990), which forms the centrepiece of the NHS
PROMs programme, has two components. The rst, the EQ-5D Visual Analogue Score
(henceforth the EQ-VAS), asks patients how good or bad [their] health is today, on a scale of 0
27The elective surgical procedures used to construct the competition indices in this paper follow Cooper et
al. (2011). Varicose vein stripping is added to the ve elective surgical procedures used in that paper. This
ensures that all the PROMs procedures are used as inputs to the competition indices used here.
28Unlike the HES trust code eld, which is always complete, the site code eld is missing in approximately
10 percent of cases, and contains invalid data in approximately 10 percent more. In the vast majority of such
cases, however, it is possible to impute the correct site codes with certainty, for example when only one site
within a trust performs a given procedure. In the small number of remaining cases around 4.4 percent site
codes are randomly imputed from a list of all sites in a trust that perform the procedure in question.
29This number also omits around 4,000 observations that appear to be duplicates.
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(worst) to 100 (best). The second, the EQ-5D prole index score (henceforth the EQ-5D), asks
patients to indicate their current health status in ve dimensions mobility, ability to undertake
self-care, ability to undertake usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. In each
dimension, patients are asked to choose from one of three options 1 (no problems), 2 (some
problems), or 3 (extreme problems) giving 35 = 243 possible permutations of response. These
243 possible response proles are then aggregated with weights, generating a utility metric of
health states, with 1 representing perfect health and 0 representing death. Values below zero
are possible, implying a health prole worse than death.
While the weights in this utility function could theoretically be produced in a number of
di¤erent ways, the NHS uses weights based on the Measuring and Valuing Health (MVH)
study (Dolan 1997), a population-level survey of individualspreferences concerning di¤erent
dimensions of health (HSCIC 2013a, p.30).30 The result is a utility measure that can be
interpreted cardinally for example, the UK value for health state 12331 is 0.07, meaning that
1 year lived in that state is equivalent to 0.07 of a year in perfect health.
Three condition-specic PROMs are also collected  the Oxford Hip Score (OHS), the
Oxford Knee Score (OKS), and the Aberdeen Varicose Veins Questionnaire (AVVQ) which,
like the EQ-5D, ask a series of multiple choice questions, and use these responses to generate
an overall score. They generally have a greater capacity than the EQ-5D to detect changes
in health status resulting from surgery, as they ask condition-specic questions. The weights
for each question are determined by clinicians rather than by surveying patients or citizens
concerning their valuation of di¤erent health states. Consequently, the OHS, OKS and AVVQ
are best thought of not as measures of patient utility, but rather as clinically relevant measures
of health gain from surgery.
The OHS and OKS both consist of 12 questions. Each question has ve possible answers
which each confer between 0 and 4 points, resulting in an overall score between 0 (worst possible
health) and 48 (best possible health).31 The AVVQ consists of 13 multiple-choice questions
where each response confers a certain number of points, resulting in an overall score between 0
(best possible health) and 100 (worst possible health).32 In this paper, the scale of the AVVQ is
30The MVH study surveyed 3,395 representative citizens of England, Wales and Scotland to obtain valuations
of 42 representative health proles using the time trade-o¤ method that is, respondents were asked how many
years of life in the state of perfect health (11111) they considered equivalent to the prole in question. Valuations
for the other 201 health proles were then interpolated from the valuations elicited concerning these 42 health
proles.
31The original OHS and OKS score each question between 1 and 5, but for the NHS PROMs programme this
is modied to scores between 0 and 4 (HSCIC 2013a).
32Due to rounding of the weights used for each question, the maximum AVVQ score is actually 99.658 (HSCIC
2013a).
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reversed so that, like all other measures examined, higher scores denote better health. Table 8
reports summary statistics for all the outcome variables examined in this paper, by procedure.
This section nally presents two important psychometric properties of the PROMs used in
this paper, e¤ect size and concurrent/convergent validity.33 E¤ect size captures the responsiveness
of a PROM to the intervention being studied by measuring the average health gain relative to
the amount of variation in the data:
E¤ect size =
Average(Health gain)
Standard deviation(Q1 score)
By convention, an e¤ect size of 0.2 is considered low, while 0.5 is considered moderate, and
0.8 is considered large (Smith et al. 2005). Table 9 reports the e¤ect sizes of the outcome
measures used in this paper. The procedure-specic outcome variables  the OHS, OKS,
and AVVQ  do an excellent job of capturing variation in health status, with e¤ect sizes
ranging from 0.71 to 2.32. The EQ-5D index score performs moderately well for minor surgical
procedures (0.38-0.39) and very well for major surgical procedures (0.93-1.25). By contrast, the
EQ-VAS score fails to detect any meaningful variation in health gain from minor surgery. Given
these ndings, this paper focuses mainly on the EQ-5D and the procedure-specic outcome
measures, but also reports estimates using the EQ-VAS. Overall, these e¤ect sizes show that
PROMs contain meaningful variation that should be capable of detecting changes in health
gain resulting from di¤erential exposure to competition.
A good outcome measure should be correlated with other measures that are known to
capture outcomes: a correlation of 0.2 or above is taken as evidence of convergent (or concurrent)
validity (Smith et al. 2005). While measures of elective surgery quality other than PROMs
themselves are not available, one can get a sense of the convergent validity of each PROM by
checking how closely correlated it is with other PROMs. These correlations are provided in
Table 10.34 All correlations are above 0.2 except for that between the AVVQ and the EQ-VAS
for varicose veins, at 0.19. There is a particularly strong correlation between the EQ-5D index
score and the Oxford Hip and Knee Scores (0.62 and 0.63 respectively). These correlations
provide suggestive evidence that PROMs are capturing a similar coherent, underlying concept
of health gain from surgery, and therefore that they should be capable of picking up any
variations in health gain from surgery arising from di¤erential exposure to competition.
33This section draws on the report by Smith et al. (2005), which analysed the psychometric properties of
various candidate PROMs and made recommendations as to which should be adopted by the NHS.
34The correlation between average adjusted PROMs health gains and death rates for each PROMs procedure
was also examined. It was found that there is no relationship between these outcome measures. This is
presumably a reection of the fact that death is an extremely rare outcome of all four PROMs procedures.
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6.3 Control variables
The regressions performed in this study include a rich set of patient-, hospital- and region-level
controls. Patient level controls include dummies for gender crossed with age (in ve-year
intervals), and dummies for the day and month of the operation date (to control for day-of-week
and seasonality e¤ects). They also include a dummy indicating whether the patient lives in an
urban area, a dummy indicating whether the patient was treated as a day case, two dummies
capturing lowand highseverity (respectively, just one diagnosis eld completed, and three or
more diagnosis elds completed), and a control for the patients Charlson score, which indicates
the patients 10-year survival probability based on their health status in relation to 17 conditions
likely to lead to death. Finally, a control for the Index of Multiple Deprivations income
deprivation score, which measures the percentage of households that are income deprived in
the patients Super Output Area of residence, is included. As poverty is associated with poor
health, including this last variable may control for unobserved dimensions of health status that
inuence outcomes.
At the hospital level, dummies are included that indicate whether the patients site of
treatment is part of a specialist trust, a teaching trust, a university trust, a standard acute
trust, or a private provider.35 Care quality tends to be higher, and costs lower, in larger health
care markets, and in larger hospitals. These volume (or scale) e¤ects can lead to upward-biased
estimates of the e¤ect of quality on competition if areas with larger markets and hospitals
also have higher competition intensity. For this reason, a control for population density in the
hospitals catchment area, as well as year-specic controls for the sites total number of patients
for the procedure in question, are included, as well as for the trusts total number of admissions
for all causes. A quadratic term is included for both total and procedure-specic admissions, to
control for possible non-linearities in scale e¤ects. As total and procedure-specic admissions
may be inuenced by hospital quality in the period after the introduction of patient choice, in
the baseline specication lagged values of these variables (specically, their average values over
the three years from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005) are used in place of current-period values.
Finally, year-specic dummies are included to indicate the region of England in which the
hospital site is located, to account for changing health policies at the Strategic Health Authority
level, as well as any possible other region-level trends in correlates of health outcomes. Table
11 provides average values for key control variables used in this paper.36
35A dummy denoting whether a hospital is a Foundation Trust (FT) is not included, as granting of FT status
is endogenous to hospital performance. By contrast, all of the hospital type dummies included in the regressions
reect historically determined (and therefore exogenous) hospital characteristics. Given the absence of an FT
dummy, the dummy denoting standard acute hospital encompasses both NHS Foundation Trusts and NHS
acute trusts that are not Foundation Trusts.
36For the regressions using predicted patient ow HHIs, a more limited subset of controls is used, as any
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7 Results
Table 12.1 reports the rst stage estimates when current-period competition intensity is
instrumented by the pre-reform average level of competition intensity. As expected, given that
a variable is simply being instrumented with its own lagged value, the rst stage is very strong
in all cases.
Table 12.2 reports the headline estimates using the papers main competition indices
(neighbourhood-centred HHIs based on actual or predicted patient choices). Columns (1) and
(3) use current-period values of competition intensity, and current-period values of total and
procedure-specic admissions. Columns (2) and (4) report estimates using the papers preferred
specication, in which current-period HHI is instrumented by its pre-reform average value, and
pre-reform averages are used as proxies for total and procedure-specic controls. In three of
the four specications, there is a negative e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery quality,
as captured by the OHS/OKS, which is signicant at the 5 per cent level. These estimates
are very similar in magnitude when normalised by the standard deviation of each competition
index a one standard deviation increase in competition intensity leads to a decrease in health
gain from orthopaedic surgery of between 0.256 and 0.394 points out of a maximum of 48. All
three point estimates easily lie within each others95 per cent condence intervals. In one case,
the nding of a negative e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery quality is replicated for
the EQ-5D outcome measure.
In two of the four cases, competition has a negative e¤ect on the quality of varicose vein
surgery, as captured by the AVVQ, that is signicant at the 5 per cent level; a third is signicant
at the 10 per cent level.37 The predicted HHI also replicates this result for the EQ-5D in
relation to varicose vein surgery, although it is only signicant at the 10 per cent level. None
of the estimates for groin hernia repair are signicant. Finally, using the EQ-5D PROM and
pooling all procedures together, with procedure dummies to control for level di¤erences in
health gains, competition leads to lower health gains from elective surgery in three out of the
four specications although all are only signicant at the 10 per cent level.
It is possible to make use of the cardinality of the EQ-5D to provide a sense of the magnitudes
of these impacts of competition. The estimates using the pre-reform HHI instrument imply
that a one standard deviation increase in competition intensity leads to a decrease in health
control variables included in the second stage should also be included in the rst stage  but for tractability
reasons only a limited number of predictors of patient choice can be included in the conditional logit model.
37This papers attitude towards estimates signicant at the 10 per cent level is that they are not particularly
meaningful in their own right, but that they sometimes provide suggestive evidence to either support or call in
to question other estimates that are signicant at the 5 per cent level.
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gain of 0.00632 from orthopaedic surgery, and of 0.00644 from varicose vein surgery. An average
orthopaedic surgery patient experiences an increase in health status from 0.376 before surgery
to 0.733 after surgery. If the hospital they attended experienced a one standard deviation
increase in competition intensity, their post-surgical health status would be only 0.727. Thus,
after the increase in competition, they would experience a post-operative health state such that
they are indi¤erent between one year in that state and 0.727 years in perfect health, as opposed
to 0.733 years before the increase in competition.
In like manner, an average varicose vein patient experiences an increase in health status
from 0.747 before surgery to 0.852 after surgery. If the hospital they attended experienced a
one standard deviation increase in competition intensity, their post-surgical health status would
be only 0.846. Thus, after the increase in competition, they would experience a post-operative
health state such that they are indi¤erent between one year in that state and 0.846 years in
perfect health, as opposed to 0.852 years before the increase in competition. These impacts of
competition could be characterised as being very small, but nonetheless distinguishable from
zero.
Table 13.3 reports estimates using the EQ-VAS outcome measure. Given the smaller e¤ect
sizes using the EQ-VAS that were reported in Table 9, estimates using this PROM are likely
to be less statistically signicant than those using the EQ-5D and procedure-specic PROMs.
Nonetheless, some statistically signicant ndings are obtained using the EQ-VAS. In one
specication, competition has a negative e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery signicant at the 5 per
cent level, while another specication is signicant at the 10 per cent level. Two specications
indicate a negative e¤ect on varicose vein surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent level.
Pooling all procedures, one specication indicates a negative e¤ect of competition on elective
surgery quality signicant at the 5 per cent level, while another is signicant at the 10 per cent
level.
In summary, the headline estimates suggest a negative e¤ect of competition on the quality of
both orthopaedic surgery and varicose vein surgery. When all procedures are pooled together,
there is a negative e¤ect on overall elective surgery quality, although it is mostly only signicant
at the 10 per cent level.
8 Robustness tests
This section examines the robustness of the estimates reported in the previous section. It rst
reports estimates under alternative specications that use the preferred (neighbourhood-centred)
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competition measures, and the preferred identication strategy involving instrumentation of
current-period competition intensity with the average pre-reform level of competition. It
secondly reports estimates using 95 per cent variable radius HHIs constructed by centring
hospital markets on GP surgeries rather than neighbourhoods; in this section estimates using
the historical location instrument discussed in Section Five are also reported. Thirdly, estimates
using alternative competition indices and identication strategies are reported.
8.1 Alternative specications with neighbourhood-centred markets
and pre-reform HHI instrument
Table 13.1 reports estimates using alternative specications with competition measured using
the neighbourhood-centred HHI based on actual patient choices; Table 13.2 reports the
corresponding estimates using the neighbourhood-centred HHI based on predicted patient
choices. This sub-section proceeds by rst discussing Table 13.1 in detail; Table 13.2 is then
covered in precis.
In the baseline specication, dummies for region of England crossed with year are included.
One might be concerned that these dummies soak up too much variation, and that a more
parsimonious set of controls might yield more statistically signicant treatment e¤ects. Column
(1) of Table 13.1 reports the regression estimates when separate year dummies and region of
England dummies are included. The results are largely unchanged.
One possible explanation for the insignicance of many of the estimates is that including
controls for urban status and catchment area population density over-controls for variables
that may be highly collinear with competition intensity. Column (2) reports the estimates
when these variables are not included. The results are largely unchanged. Studies of hospital
competition in England are often criticised on the grounds that they simply pick up di¤erences
between London and the rest of the country. Column (3) reports the estimates when all London
hospitals are excluded. The results are largely unchanged.
To ameliorate concerns about endogeneity of the hospital scale controls (total and procedure-
specic admissions, and their respective quadratics), the main specication uses the pre-reform
average values of these variables in place of their current-period values. An alternative approach
is to instrument the current-period values of these variables with their pre-reform averages.
Results are reported in column (4). They are very similar to the results from the baseline
specications. Column (5) reports estimates when total and procedure-level admissions, and
their respective quadratics, are omitted from the regressions altogether. The estimates for
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orthopaedic surgery using the EQ-5D PROM are no longer signicant, and the estimates using
the OHS/OKS are now only signicant at the 10 per cent level. Also, there is now a signicant
negative e¤ect of hospital competition on groin hernia surgery quality, although this nding
should be given little weight given that it is not replicated in any other specication. These
changes relative to the headline estimates suggest that hospital scale e¤ects are an important
driver of outcomes, and need to be controlled for.
Column (6) reports the estimates that use a log specication, in which any non-dummy
variable is replaced with its logged value, with variables scaled up where necessary to avoid
taking logs of zero or a negative number. The results are qualitatively unchanged using this
alternative specication.
Finally, column (7) reports estimates using procedure-specic competition indices, instead of
indices constructed by taking the weighted average of procedure-specic HHIs for six high-volume
elective surgical procedures. The use of weighted average HHIs captures the idea that hospital
managers do not perceive themselves as being exposed to di¤erent levels of competition intensity
for di¤erent surgical procedures, but rather perceive a single level of competition intensity
within their sphere of operation, which can be captured by calculating the average competition
intensity across a range of surgical procedures. By contrast, the estimates reported in column
(7) are motivated by the idea that hospitals do experience competitive pressure that is di¤erentiated
by surgical procedure. The results are little changed by this alternative specication. This is
unsurprising, as the procedure-level HHIs for a given hospital/year combination are generally
highly correlated.
In three of the seven alternative specications reported in Table 13.1, there is a positive
e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality as captured by the EQ-5D PROM but
all three are only signicant at the 10 per cent level. Section Nine discusses the overall weight
that should be given to these ndings.
Table 13.2 reports the estimates when the same set of regressions is run using the neighbourhood-
centred HHI based on predicted patient choices. The results are even more stable than those for
the HHI based on actual patient choices higher competition leads to lower orthopaedic surgery
quality as captured by the OHS/OKS and lower varicose vein surgery quality as captured by the
AVVQ. The EQ-5D PROM echoes this nding of a negative e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic
surgery quality and varicose vein surgery quality in some specications but not others, though
it is only ever signicant at the 10 per cent level.
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8.2 GP-centred competition measures and historical location instrument
Table 13.3 reports the rst stage estimates using the pre-reform HHI instrument for the
alternative competition indices based on GP-centred markets. As with the neighbourhood-centred
competition measures, the rst stage is very strong in all cases. Table 13.3 also reports the
rst stage estimates using the historical location instrument for both the neighbourhood-centred
competition measures and the GP-centred competition measures. Using the rule of thumb that
the F-statistic on the excluded instrument should be greater than 10, it can be seen that the rst
stage does not meet this threshold for any of the regressions using the neighbourhood-centred
HHIs, and for only one of the regressions using the GP-centred, hospital-level HHI. By contrast,
the F-statistic exceeds 10 for all the regressions using the GP-centred, GP-level HHIs. I
therefore report second stage estimates using the historical location instrument for the GP-centred,
GP-level competition measure, but not for the others.38
Table 13.4 reports the baseline estimates using HHIs based on GP-centred markets. The
estimates are quite di¤erent depending on whether the GP-level HHI or the hospital-level HHI
is used. The estimates using the hospital-level, GP-centred competition index are very similar
to those using the neighbourhood-centred HHIs, which are also calculated at the hospital level 
competition leads to lower orthopaedic surgery quality and lower varicose vein surgery quality.
There is also a positive e¤ect of competition on groin hernia repair quality signicant at the 10
per cent level but little weight should be given to this estimate, as it is not reected in any
of the other specications. Pooling all procedures, there is a negative e¤ect of competition on
overall elective surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent level. I conclude that the results
of the regressions using the hospital-level, GP-centred HHI are very much consistent with, and
therefore lend support to, the headline results using neighbourhood-centred HHIs reported in
Table 12.2.
The estimates using the GP-level, GP-centred HHI are, on the other hand, quite di¤erent.
None of the estimates using current-period HHI or the pre-reform HHI instrument are signicant,
with the exception of the regression of EQ-5D health gain pooling across all procedures on
current-period HHI, which indicates a negative e¤ect of competition on overall elective surgery
quality signicant at the 10 per cent level. Using the historical location instrument, there is
a negative e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality (as captured by the AVVQ)
signicant at the 10 per cent level, but a positive e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery
38Second-stage estimates using the historical location instrument with other competition measures are
available on the authors website at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/skellern. In keeping with the weakness of the rst
stage, these estimates are always insignicant, with the exception of the regression of the AVVQ on predicted
neighbourhood-centred HHI (with an F-statistic from the rst stage equal to 6.06), which indicates a negative
e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent level.
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quality (as captured by the OHS/OKS) signicant at the 10 per cent level. This suggestion
of a positive e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery quality even if only signicant at
the 10 per cent level is troubling, as it contradicts the considerable evidence of an oppositely
signed e¤ect found using alternative identication strategies. It will therefore be particularly
important to examine the robustness of this contrary nding to alternative specications.
Table 13.5 reports estimates from regressing the EQ-VAS PROM on the GP-centred HHIs.
All estimates are insignicant, with one noteworthy exception namely, the historical location
instrument indicates a negative e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality signicant
at the 5 per cent level.
Table 13.6 reports estimates using alternative specications with the GP-centred, GP-level
HHI instrumented by the standard deviation of distance to the nearest four hospitals.39 I
am particularly interested in examining the robustness of the nding that competition had a
positive e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery quality, given its inconsistency with many of the other
estimates for this surgical specialty reported in this paper.
The ndings in relation to orthopaedic surgery in Table 13.6 are a mixed bag. On the
one hand, column (6) indicates a positive e¤ect of competition signicant at the 5 per cent
level when the regression is run in logs. On the other hand, column (3) indicates that, when
London hospitals are omitted, the positive e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery quality
is no longer signicant. This suggests that the previous nding of a positive relationship
between competition and orthopaedic surgery quality using the historical location instrument
may simply have been picking up di¤erences between London and the rest of England; this
suggests, in turn, that the historical location instrument may not be doing a good job of
providing variation in competition intensity that is exogenous with respect to rural-urban
di¤erences.
Finally, columns (4) and (5) indicate that the orthopaedic surgery estimates are no longer
signicant when total and procedure-specic admissions are instrumented with their pre-reform
values (rather than being proxied by their pre-reform values, as in the headline estimates), as
well as when total and procedure-specic admissions are omitted from the regression altogether.
While Table 13.1 showed that the regression estimates using neighbourhood-centred HHIs and
the pre-reform HHI instrument were also not robust to the exclusion of controls for scale e¤ects,
39This full set of alternative specications was also run using the GP-centred, hospital-level HHI instrumented
by its average pre-reform value. They show that the estimates reported in column (2) of Table 13.4  in
particular, the signicant negative e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery as captured by the OHS/OKS
 are robust to these alternative specications. These estimates are available on the authors website at:
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/skellern.
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they were largely unchanged when current period scale e¤ects were instrumented by their lagged
values rather than being proxied by them.
The sensitivity of the historical location instrument estimates to these alternative specications
provides suggestive evidence that this instrument is not exogenous with respect to key determinants
of outcomes, both in relation to rural-urban di¤erences and in relation to hospital scale e¤ects.
The estimates using this instrument may therefore be a¤ected by omitted variable bias. I
conclude that, while the contrary ndings in relation to orthopaedic surgery quality when using
the historical location instrument do suggest a need for caution in relation to this surgical area,
they do not outweigh the substantial contrary evidence suggesting that competition generated
by the 2006 patient choice reforms had a negative e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery quality.
8.3 Alternative competition measures
Table 13.7 reports the estimates using several alternative competition measures combined
with the pre-reform competition level instrument. Using a simple xed-distance competition
measure, in which competition intensity is equal to the number of competitors within 30km,40
there is a signicant negative e¤ect of competition on quality of varicose vein surgery as captured
by the AVVQ; no other estimates are signicant. Using the GP-centred, GP-level competition
measure, but dening market size according to the distance travelled by the 75th percentile
patient (as opposed to the 95th), there is a negative e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery quality
signicant at the 10 per cent level for both the EQ-5D and the OHS/OKS. This is noteworthy,
as no such negative e¤ects were found using the corresponding 95 per cent measure. No
signicant e¤ects are found using the hospital-level, GP-centred measure with a 75 per cent
market radius.
Table 13.7 also reports estimates using HHIs constructed using hospital-centred markets,
which are known to have serious endogeneity problems. They indicate that competition had a
signicant positive e¤ect on the quality of orthopaedic surgery as captured by the OHS/OKS.
The contrast between these estimates and the other estimates, which indicate a negative e¤ect of
competition on orthopaedic surgery quality, suggest that the reverse causality problem discussed
in Section Five, in which hospitals with higher quality levels appear to be more competitive,
because they attract patients from further away, appears to be a signicant source of bias
here. Interestingly, however, the 95 per cent market radius hospital-centred HHI still shows a
negative e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality, although only signicant at the
10 per cent level.
40When calculating the xed radius competition measure, only hospitals that have at least 50 cases for the
procedure and year in question are included.
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Table 13.7 also reports estimates using the historical location instrument, with the GP-level
competition measure dened using a 75 per cent market radius (estimates using the historical
location instrument are not reported for any of the other alternative competition measures
because the rst stage of the IV regression does not meet the required threshold of signicance).
The results are similar to the baseline estimates using the corresponding competition measure
with a 95 per cent market radius, showing a positive e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic
surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent level.
Finally, Table 13.7 reports estimates using the predicted HHI with hospital xed e¤ects.
As discussed in Section Five, the predicted HHI measure should in theory allow identication
of the causal e¤ect of competition in a model with hospital xed e¤ects (that is, using only
within-hospital variation in year-on-year competition intensity) but the four years encompassed
by our dataset are unlikely to contain su¢ cient exogenous variation in within-hospital competition
intensity to allow for statistically signicant estimates to be obtained. The average within-hospital
standard deviation in the predicted HHI is only 0.1735, as compared with a between-hospital
standard deviation in average predicted HHI of 0.8506. To this extent, it is not surprising that
the estimates with predicted HHIs and hospital xed e¤ects do not nd any signicant e¤ects
of competition on elective surgery quality.
9 Discussion
9.1 Synthesis of ndings
A negative e¤ect of competition on varicose vein surgery quality is found in a wide variety of
specications, including both of this papers main competition indices, several of the alternative
competition measures, all three PROMs, and both instrumentation strategies as well as the
cross sectional estimates. Though some of these e¤ects are only signicant at the 10 per cent
level, the overall impression is that the introduction of patient choice of hospital for elective
surgery had a negative e¤ect on the quality of varicose vein surgery.
Notwithstanding these robust ndings, caution is needed in relation to these ndings concerning
varicose vein surgery quality, for three reasons. The rst is that three of the robustness tests
using the neighbourhood-centred HHI based on actual patient choices indicate a positive e¤ect
of competition on varicose vein surgery quality (as captured by the EQ-5D PROM) signicant
at the 10 per cent level. I am inclined to disregard these ndings, given that they are never
replicated using one of the headline specications, and given also the much stronger evidence
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(using both the EQ-5D PROM and the AVVQ) indicating a negative e¤ect of clinical quality
for this surgical procedure.
A second reason for caution is that only 8.9 per cent of the PROMs-HES linked dataset 
or 41,734 observations consists of varicose vein patients. While this relatively small sample
makes the nding of statistical signicance in a sense even more noteworthy, on the other
hand, it does also mean that the policy signicance of this nding is somewhat less than if
a similarly robust nding had been made in relation to orthopaedic surgery. A third reason
for caution is that varicose vein surgery is also conducted on an outpatient basis, and all such
outpatient procedures are not included in the dataset. While there is no reason to believe that
this selection of the sample of varicose vein patients will have led to biased estimates, it does
add another caveat to the ndings reported here.
There does not appear to have been any e¤ect of competition on the quality of groin hernia
repair surgery as captured by PROMs. The lack of any signicant ndings (bar one positive
estimate at the 10 per cent level in the cross-sectional estimates, and one negative estimate at
the 5 per cent level in the robustness tests) likely reects, in part, the lack of a procedure-specic
PROM, and the relatively poor ability of the EQ-5D to capture health gains from this surgical
intervention (as reected in the low e¤ect size reported in Table 9).
The most problematic and perplexing case studied is that of orthopaedic surgery. The
estimates using pre-reform competition intensity as an instrument for current-period competition
intensity indicate that competition had a negative e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery quality as
captured by the OHS/OKS, and also, in some cases, as captured by the EQ-5D. These ndings
are robust to a wide range of specications. However, when the GP-level HHI is used in
conjunction with the historical location instrument, there appears to be a positive e¤ect of
competition on quality. In the baseline regressions, this e¤ect is only signicant at the 10 per
cent level. However, in some of the robustness checks, such as those with outcome variables in
log form, the e¤ect is signicant at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, this nding does
not withstand several other important robustness tests in particular, those that instrument
current-period admissions with pre-reform admissions, and that exclude London observations.
This lack of robustness suggests that the historical location instrument may not be exogenous
with respect to key determinants of outcomes, and may therefore be subject to omitted variable
bias.
Overall, the evidence seems to indicate that hospital competition had a negative impact
on varicose vein surgery quality, and no impact on the quality of groin hernia repair. The
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estimates in relation to orthopaedic surgery are contradictory, but the evidence in support of
a negative e¤ect of competition on quality in this area is stronger and more robust than the
evidence in support of an oppositely signed e¤ect.
9.2 Credibility of estimates
The methods of measuring competitive pressure used in this paper convincingly control for
problems of reverse causality, in which hospital quality a¤ects (ones measure of) competition
intensity, and also for casemix bias due to patient selection, in which patient characteristics
inuence choice of hospital. However, one question mark that hangs over all the results reported
here is the extent to which they successfully control for correlates of geography in particular,
di¤erences in patient health status that a¤ect outcomes. I have argued that this study does
an excellent job of controlling for casemix di¤erences, given: the lack of correlation between
the competition indices and urban status; the casemix adjustment strategy which controls,
most importantly, for the patients pre-operative health status; and the use of change in health
status, rather than the post-operative level of health status, as an outcome variable.
Notwithstanding these important arguments, concerns may remain that the results reported
here may be inuenced by unobserved components of patient health status. It is worth noting,
in this regard, that even if unobserved components of patient health status did a¤ect health
gains from surgery, one should expect this, if anything, to lead to upward-biased estimates of
the impact of competition. If urban areas are both poorer, and experience higher intensity
of competition, than other areas, and (unobservably) sicker patients also have higher health
gains from surgery, then hospitals in high-competition areas will appear to o¤er higher quality
than is the case in reality. Estimates should therefore yield an upper bound of the e¤ect of
competition on quality. The fact that this paper largely nds a negative e¤ect of competition
on quality thus suggests that its ndings are unlikely to be driven by bias due to unobserved
casemix. Nevertheless, some uncertainties in this area do remain.
9.3 Interpretation of ndings
Two questions naturally arise in response to the ndings reported in this paper. Why did
competition have a negative e¤ect on the quality of varicose vein surgery and, possibly, orthopaedic
surgery? And, how should these ndings be understood in relation to the existing literature,
which indicates that competition had a positive e¤ect on quality as captured by various
mortality-based indicators of hospital performance?
The easiest part of these questions to answer should be that concerning the results for
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varicose vein surgery. Section Four put forward a model suggesting that hospitals may respond
to the introduction of patient choice of hospital by improving performance in areas where
the quality elasticity of demand is high, while neglecting areas where the quality elasticity of
demand is low. Minor surgical procedures such as varicose vein surgery are a good example of
a procedure that, it was hypothesised, will have a relatively low quality elasticity of demand.
Table 14 reports the average pre-operative health status of patients undergoing each of
the four PROMs procedures. I also construct a crude indicator of whether a patient made
an active choice of treatment location, by designating them as a chooserif they attended a
hospital further away than their fourth closest hospital.41 Minor surgery patients have higher
average pre-operative health status than major surgery patients, and are less likely to attend
a hospital far away. Across all procedures, regressing a dummy variable indicating that a
patient was a chooseron the log of their pre-operative EQ-5D score (scaled up to make all
values positive) reveals that a 1 per cent decrease in pre-operative health status increases the
probability of being a chooserby 4 per cent.
These correlations provide suggestive evidence that major surgery patients are more likely
to make an active choice concerning their treatment location, and may therefore have a higher
elasticity of demand with respect to quality, than minor surgery patients. It is therefore entirely
plausible to imagine that, if major and minor surgery are cost substitutes, hospitals exposed
to higher competitive pressure after the introduction of patient choice may have responded by
neglecting the quality of minor surgical procedures such as varicose vein surgery.
However, for such a negative e¤ect of competition on quality to arise in relation to minor
surgery, it must also be the case that higher competition intensity hospitals have higher quality
for surgical procedures with a high quality elasticity of demand. Hip and knee replacement
surgery are good examples of high-volume major surgical procedures that have a big impact on
a patients quality of life. It was therefore hypothesised that the quality elasticity of demand
for these orthopaedic procedures will be relatively high, as compared with many if not all
elective surgical procedures, and that orthopaedic surgery quality should therefore be higher
in high competition areas than low competition ones. The fact that the present study nds
little evidence of such a relationship is not only perplexing, but also, therefore, undermines
the above explanation for the observed negative relationship between competition and varicose
vein surgery quality.
Section Four put forward a theory that could simultaneously explain both the ndings in the
existing literature, that hospital competition led to lower mortality rates, and the nding of a
41Only hospitals that treated at least 50 patients for the procedure and year in question are included.
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possible negative e¤ect of competition on orthopaedic surgery quality. While information about
hospitalsperformance in relation to PROMs health gains has been available to researchers since
2010, little attempt has been made to communicate these data to patients undergoing a PROMs
procedure at the time of choosing their hospital. On the other hand, the NHS Choices website,
which helps such patients to choose a hospital by providing supposedly relevant information
about nearby hospitals, has reported hospitalsmortality rates to patients, even though this
statistic is of little direct relevance to the elective surgical procedures covered by PROMs.
It may be that hospitals, knowing this situation, focused on improving their performance in
relation to publicly reported dimensions of performance, such as mortality rates which is
surely a good thing in itself at the expense of other areas of activity in which quality is not
reported to patients.
A more general hypothesis that could explain both the ndings of the existing literature,
and the ndings of this paper, is that the hospital competition engendered by the patient
choice reforms had a positive e¤ect on hospital performance via a more di¤use mechanism than
that considered by formal economic models. That is, perhaps competition leads to improved
behaviour not via actual exertion of patient choice, leading to changes in market shares and
hence behaviour, but instead by making hospital managers in more competitive markets feel,
in a more general sense, that their performance was under scrutiny, and that they therefore
needed to lift their game in relation to observable and high-prole performance indicators such
as mortality. Such a mechanism could explain why competition for elective surgery patients
appears to have led to lower mortality rates in high competition areas, but not to improved
elective surgery quality.
Alternatively, a similar more di¤use e¤ect could operate via patient choice  perhaps a
hospitals mortality rates a¤ect its overall reputation for quality, and perhaps elective surgery
patients choose which hospital to attend on the basis of this general reputation, rather than on
the basis of knowledge about hospital quality in the specic surgical specialty that encompasses
their procedure. If patients chose in such a manner, it would make perfect sense for a hospital
to focus on reducing their mortality rates instead of (and perhaps at the expense of) improving
their elective surgery quality.
10 Conclusion
Previous studies of hospital competition and quality have tended to focus on mortality-based
indicators of hospital performance, yet in the spheres of hospital activity where competition
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for patients does occur, such as elective surgery, mortality is a relatively uncommon outcome.
This paper is the rst study of which I am aware to estimate the impact of English hospital
competition using a new outcome measure, Patient Reported Outcome Measures of health gain
from elective surgery, which directly captures clinical quality in the sphere of hospital activity
where competition for patients takes place. It does so within a framework that explicitly models
the hospital as a multi-product rm, and proceeds by generating and testing hypotheses about
possible impacts of competition that take into account interactions between production in
emergency care and elective surgery, and, within elective surgery, between major surgery and
minor surgery.
In contrast to the existing literature, this paper nds that, when elective-surgery-specic
outcome measures are used, it appears that the introduction of patient choice of hospital for
elective surgery to the English NHS during the 2000s may have had a negative e¤ect on clinical
quality in some areas of hospital activity. Although a number of caveats to these ndings are
noted, the very fact that they deviate substantially from those of the existing literature suggests
the value of looking again at this important policy reform using alternative outcome measures.
Beyond this new perspective on the 2006 patient choice reforms, however, this paper has
also sought to contribute to the literature on hospital competition and quality at a broader
methodological level, by arguing for a shift towards explicitly modelling the hospital as a
multi-product rm. Thinking about hospital production in this way introduces signicant
complexity, and this complexity is reected in the ambiguous ndings of the empirical component
of this paper. Nevertheless, modelling hospital activity in this way holds out the possibility of
a richer and more in-depth understanding of hospital production processes, and the impacts of
competition on these processes, than is contained in the existing literature.
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Appendix 1: Replicating the NHS PROMs casemix adjustment
methodology for patient-level data
A1.1 The casemix adjustment methodology
This paper has adapted the current NHS PROMs casemix adjustment methodology for provider-
level data to derive risk-adjusted health gain from surgery at the patient level. This methodology
is somewhat simpler than the NHS methodology, as aggregation to the provider level is not
required. The current NHS casemix adjustment methodology (DH 2012a; b; c; d; e) involves
the estimation of a GLS model with provider xed e¤ects:
Q2i = + 1Q1i + x
0
i2 + z
0
ij3 + uj + "ij (6)
In this equation, Q2i and Q1i denote the post-operative and pre-operative survey score
respectively for patient i attending hospital j; xi is a vector of patient characteristics; zij is a
vector of variables containing information about the patients hospital stay;42 uj is a hospital
xed e¤ect; and "ij is an error term. The control variables included in xi and zij are chosen
by regressing Equation (6) using a large, standard set of controls (listed below), and then
re-running the regression using only those variables which are signicant at the 5 per cent
level.
The rst step to deriving adjusted post-operative health status and adjusted health gain from
surgery from this regression is to calculate dQ2i, the tted Q2i, which is dened in the usual
way:
dQ2i = b+c1Q1i + x0ic2 + z0ijc3 + buj (7)
Secondly, the predictedQ2i, gQ2i, is then dened as the post-operative score that would
have been expected in the absence of the hospitals contribution to the patients health gain.
This is calculated by subtracting the hospital xed e¤ect, u^j , from the tted Q2i, and, as a
normalisation, replacing it with bu, the (weighted) mean value of the hospital xed e¤ect.43
That is: gQ2i = dQ2i   buj + bu = b+c1Q1i + x0ic2 + z0ijc3 + bu (8)
Thirdly, the providers Relative Performance Factor (RPF) the ratio of actual post-operative
42Both xi and zij are vectors of patient-level control variables  zij cannot contain any variables that are
invariant at the hospital level, as these are incorporated into the hospital xed e¤ect.
43 If N is the total number of patients for a given procedure and nancial year, and nj is the number of
hospital js patients, so
P
8j nj = N , then bu =P8j njN u^j
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health status to predicted post-operative health status is calculated for patient i:
RPFi =
Q2igQ2i (9)
Finally, the adjusted Q2 score (Q2ai) and adjusted health gain (Qai) are calculated with
reference to Q2 and Q1, the national average (by procedure and year) Q2 and Q1 scores:44
Q2ai = RPFi Q2 (10)
Qai = Q2ai  Q1 (11)
A1.2 Criticisms of the casemix adjustment methodology
As is well known from the example of estimating probabilities, estimating limited dependent
variables using linear regression methods can lead to predicted values that are outside the
support of the dependent variable. This is a known potential problem with existing PROMs
casemix adjustment methods (Coles 2010, p.10), as all PROMs can only take a restricted range
of values. Recent work using limited dependent variable models has sought to address this
concern (Hernández et al. 2012; Basu and Manca 2012; Gutacker et al. 2013). However,
it is not clear that the use of linear regression models for risk adjustment poses serious
problems in contexts where, unlike the case of estimating probabilities, the absolute level of
the dependent variable is not all that important, such as when comparing the performance of
health care providers. Furthermore, there may be advantages to not truncating the support
of the dependent variable when adjusting for casemix. Consider the situation of a patient who
records a post-operative EQ-5D prole of 11111 or perfect health, implying an EQ-5D index
score of 1. If this patients hospital characteristics and individual characteristics (including
pre-operative score) made such an outcome very unlikely, the patient should, arguably, receive
a score greater than 1, even though this implies a conceptually problematic more than perfect
health.
Table 15 provides the minima and maxima of the scale, observed, and adjusted minimum
and maximum post-operative (Q2) scores for the di¤erent PROMs used in this paper. Table A1
demonstrates that, while the adjusted scores project outside the original support of the outcome
variable in all cases, they do not do so in a way that drastically distorts the interpretation of
44Adjusted gain is calculated by taking the di¤erence between the adjusted Q2 score and the national average
Q1 score, rather than the individual patients Q1 score, because the individual Q1 score has already been
controlled for when risk adjusting Q2. An alternative method would be to omit the Q1 score from Q2 risk
adjustment, adjust both Q2 and Q1 scores for casemix separately, and then calculate adjusted health gain as
the di¤erence between these two adjusted scores. The method employed here has the advantage of not requiring
any adjustment of the Q1 scores.
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the outcome measure.
A1.3 Variables used in NHS casemix adjustment methodology
Variables taken from PROMs survey responses
 The Q1 score of the outcome measure being adjusted.
 The square of the Q1 score of the outcome measure being adjusted.
 Female dummy.
 Q1 assisted dummy.
 Q2 assisted dummy.
 Q1 living alone dummy.
 Q2 living alone dummy.
 Dummy previous surgery on same area.
 Dummy patient reported condition heart disease.
 Dummy patient reported condition high blood pressure.
 Dummy patient reported condition stroke.
 Dummy patient reported condition poor circulation.
 Dummy patient reported condition lung disease.
 Dummy patient reported condition diabetes.
 Dummy patient reported condition kidney disease.
 Dummy patient reported condition disease of central nervous system.
 Dummy patient reported condition liver disease.
 Dummy patient reported condition cancer.
 Dummy patient reported condition depression.
 Dummy patient reported condition arthritis.
 Dummy number of patient reported conditions = 2.
 Dummy number of patient reported conditions = 3.
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 Dummy number of patient reported conditions = 4 or more.
 Dummy symptoms experienced for less than one year.
 Dummy symptoms experienced for 1-5 years.
 Dummy symptoms experienced for 6-10 years.
 Dummy symptoms experienced for more than 10 years.45
Variables taken from Hospital Episode Statistics
 Age.
 Age squared.
 Dummy mixed ethnicity.
 Dummy Asian.
 Dummy black.
 Dummy other ethnicity.
 Dummy unknown ethnicity.
 Dummy revision of previous hip replacement.
 Dummy HRG code 41.
 Dummy HRG code 72.
 Dummy HRG code 80.
 Dummy HRG code 81.
 Charlson score.
 Dummy day case (no overnight stay).
 Dummy one comorbidity.
 Dummy two comorbidities.
 Dummy three or more comorbidities.
 Dummy self-discharge (patient discharged by self, friend or relative).
 Index of Multiple Deprivations score.
45For hernia repair, the last three dummies were replaced by a single Dummy  symptoms experienced for
more than a year.
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Appendix 2: Details of predicted patient choice model
This Appendix presents the details of the predicted patient choice model used in the present
study, which is based on Kessler & McClellan (2000) and Gaynor et al. (2013).46
A2.1 The Conditional Logit Model
This study uses a conditional logit model to predict each patients choice of hospital based on
plausibly exogenous parameters. The conditional logit model is an extension of the multinomial
logit model that allows determinants of outcomes (here, hospital choices) to be a function of
characteristics of those outcomes (hospitals) and not just, as in the multinomial logit model,
a function of characteristics of the individuals themselves. Let Hi denote patient is choice
of hospital: Hi = j denotes that hospital j is chosen. Let ij denote the probability that
patient i chooses hospital j: ij = Pr(Hi = j). Let ij denote the log of the odds that i will
choose hospital j against the reference hospital (namely the Jth hospital). Finally let xi (with
coe¢ cients j) be a vector of individual-specic explanatory variables that are independent of
choice of hospital, and let zij (with coe¢ cients ) be a vector of explanatory variables that
may either be hospital-level variables or patient-level variables that are a function of choice of
hospital. Then the conditional logit model is based on the premise that ij is a linear function
of the explanatory variables, xi and zij :
ij = log

ij
iJ

= x0ij + z
0
ij
ij = iJ exp(ij) = iJ exp(x
0
ij + z
0
ij) (12)
Summing Equation (12) over all J hospitals and noting that
PJ
j=1 ij = 1 yields that:
iJ =
1PJ
j=1 exp
 
ij
 (13)
Plugging the expression for iJ from Equation (13) into Equation (12), and replacing the
js in the former with s, yields:
ij =
exp(ij)PJ
=1 exp (i)
=
exp(x0ij + z
0
ij)PJ
=1 exp
 
x0ij + z
0
ij

46This Appendix draws from a similar appendix accompanying Gaynor et al. (2013).
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A2.2 Utility Reformulation of the Conditional Logit Model
Section A2.1 related a patients probability of choosing a given hospital to a set of individual-specic
and hospital-specic explanatory variables. The same idea can also be stated by assuming that
patients choose the hospital that maximises their utility, and specifying a patient utility function
with a random component. Let patient is utility from alternative j be an additive function of
a systematic component x0ij + z
0
ij and a random component "ij :
Uij = x
0
ij + z
0
ij + "ij
Since utility has a random component ("ij), the probability that i will choose j, ij , is the
probability that j is the utility maximising choice of hospital:
ij = Pr(Hi = j) = fPr(max fUi1; Ui2; :::; UiJg) = Uijg
If it is assumed that "ij is distributed standard Type 1 extreme value with cumulative
distribution function F (") = e e
 x
,47 then it can be shown (Maddala 1983) that:
ij =
exp(x0ij + z
0
ij)PJ
=1 exp
 
x0ij + z
0
ij

Thus the parameters of the model can be estimated in the same manner as in the formulation
presented in Section A2.1.
A2.3 Model setup
The hospitals in a patients choice set are dened to include their chosen hospital plus any
hospital within 100km of their MSOA of residence. The choice set must also include the
two closest: teaching hospitals; non-teaching hospitals; big hospitals (dened as larger than
the median, with reference to trust admissions); small hospitals (dened as smaller than the
median); NHS hospitals; and private hospitals. The choice set must include these hospitals
because the model postulates that patients may have preferences over the type of hospital they
attend (whether in relation to teaching status, size, or NHS vs private), and that utility from
attending a given hospital is a function not only of distance to that hospital, but also of the
47The Type 1 (Gumbel) extreme value distribution, also known as the double exponential distribution, has
parameters  and  and CDF F (") = exp(  exp( (x )=)). The mean is +, where  is Eulers constant
( 0:577), and the variance is 1
6
22. The standard Type 1 extreme value distribution is the case where
 = 0 and  = 1, so F (") = exp(  exp( x)).
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di¤erence between distance to that hospital, and distance to an alternative hospital with similar
(or di¤erent) characteristics.
Let h 2 f1; 2; 3g denote the three dimensions of hospital type over which preferences are
dened h = 1 refers to the distinction between teaching and non-teaching hospitals, h = 2 to
the distinction between big and small hospitals, and h = 3 to the distinction between NHS and
private hospitals. Let zhj be a binary indicator of whether hospital j possesses characteristic h:
z1j = 1 denotes a teaching hospital, z
2
j = 1 a big hospital, and z
3
j = 1 an NHS hospital.
Let dij denote distance from the centroid of patient is MSOA to hospital j, and let dhij+
denote the distance to the closest hospital that is a good substitute for hospital j in terms of
characteristic h. That is, if h = 1 and j is a teaching hospital, then dhij+ denotes the distance
to the closest teaching hospital (other than hospital j, if it is the closest). Likewise, let dhij 
denote the distance to the closest hospital that is a poor substitute for hospital j in terms of
characteristic h. Thus, with h = 1 and j a teaching hospital, dhij  would denote the distance to
the closest non-teaching hospital. Utility from attending hospital j is dened as a function of
the di¤erence between distance to j and the distance to the nearest good/poor substitute for j
in terms of each of the three dimensions of hospital types included in the model.48 Specically,
patient is utility from attending hospital j is dened as:
Uij =
3X
h=1
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
h1

dij   dhij+

zhj + 
h
2

dij   dhij+
  
1  zhj

+h3

dij   dhij 

zhj + 
h
4

dij   dhij 
  
1  zhj

+h5
 
femalei midi  zhj

+ h6
 
femalei  oldi  zhj

+h7
 
malei  youngi  zhj

+ j8
 
malei midi  zhj

+ h9
 
male  oldi  zhj

+h10
 
lowseverityi  zhj

+ h11
 
highseverityi  zhj

+ h12
 
charlsoni  zhj

+h13
 
urbani  zhj

+ h14
 
poori  zhj

+ h15
 
regioni  zhj

+ "ij
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(14)
Only two of the rst four terms will be turned on for any given dimension h. For example,
if j is a private hospital, then z3j = 0 and so the 
3
1 and 
3
3 terms will be turned o¤; the 
3
2 term
will then capture utility from di¤erential distance between j and the nearest private hospital,
while the 34 term will capture utility from di¤erential distance between j and the nearest NHS
hospital.
In addition to these di¤erential distance terms, which are used to satisfy the exclusion
restriction, the model seeks to capture possible di¤erences in preferences for di¤erent hospital
48This denition of utility in terms of di¤erential distances is the reason the choice set needs to include the
closest two hospitals in terms of each dimension of hospital heterogeneity included in the model.
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types based on patient characteristics. Terms are therefore included to capture di¤erences
in utility from attending a teaching hospital, a big hospital, or an NHS hospital (relative to
attending a non-teaching hospital, a small hospital, or a private hospital respectively) based
on a range of exogenous variables describing patient characteristics. The number of variables
that can be included in the model is constrained by the fact that computation time is relative
to the square of the number of choice determinants. Casemix is therefore accounted for by
dividing patients into three age categories young (below 60), mid (61 to 75), and old (over
75), and crossing these with gender to give six dummies (one of which is omitted). Dummies are
also included for low and high severity (respectively, any patient with only one diagnosis code,
or with three or more diagnosis codes), as well as for the patients Charlson score. Finally,
dummies are included for urban status (any patient living in an urban area), poverty (any
patient living in an area where more than 10 per cent of households are classied as being
income-deprived), and the nine regions of England (the bold coe¢ cient and variable denote
vectors). All of these variables are included in the conditional logit model three times, as they
are interacted with each of the three dimensions of hospital heterogeneity over which patients
have preferences, so that each patient characteristic can separately enter preferences concerning
each dimension.
The parameters of the model are estimated separately for each surgical procedure and
nancial year in the dataset, by maximum likelihood. When estimating the model, the dataset
is collapsed to include a single entry for all patients that are identical in terms of the model
(that is, who attend the same hospital, live in the same MSOA, and have the same patient
characteristics). All such patients within a given subtypehave the same choice set and the
same di¤erential distances, as distances are measured in terms of distance from MSOA centroids
to hospitals. After collapsing all such identical patients, the model is then estimated using
frequency weights to reect the number of patients in each subtype.
A2.4 Model outputs
For each patient subtype, the model gives a probability of attendance for each hospital in the
choice set. These probabilities sum to one, and are used in place of the subtypes actual choice
of hospital. Thus, if there are 10 patients in a given subtype, and the conditional logit model
gives probabilities of f0:2; 0; 0:4; 0:4g for hospitals A, B, C and D, then the predicted patient
choice model would allocate 2, 0, 4 and 4 patients from this subtype to each of these hospitals
respectively. A (predicted) HHI is calculated for each MSOA by aggregating across subtypes
within the MSOA to calculate the sum of hospitalssquared market shares for that MSOA; a
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hospitals predicted HHI is then calculated as the weighted sum of predicted HHIs of all the
MSOAs that it serves.
The resulting HHIs have a correlation of about 0.4 with MSOA-centred HHIs based on
actual patient choices. The choice estimates are robust to alternative specications of the
distance used to dene each patient subtypes choice set.
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Appendix 3: Procedure and diagnosis denitions
The OPCS4 procedure codes used to dene who should be given a PROMs survey are outlined
in HSCIC (2013a). A broader set of denitions was used to construct the dataset used in this
paper, in order to dene the market for each procedure in an intuitive and meaningful way for
the purpose of calculating competition intensity. For example, whereas the PROMs programme
only surveys groin hernia patients, I include all hernia patients in the dataset. Also, whereas
patients undergoing bilateral hip and knee replacement surgery are excluded from the PROMs
programme, I include these patients in the dataset. Of course, the additional records in the
dataset resulting from these expanded denitions are not included in the nal regressions, as
they cannot be linked to a PROMs survey response. The following OPCS4 procedure codes were
used to identify PROMs procedures in HES. HES provides allows up to 24 surgical procedures
to be listed in an episode; matching was conducted on all 24 elds.
 Hip replacement:
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with W37, W38, W39, W46, W47,
W48, W93, W94 or W95.
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with W52, W53, W54, or W58, as well
as any other procedure eld beginning with Z761, Z756, or Z843.
 Knee replacement:
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with O18, W40, W41, or W42.
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with W52, W53, or W54, as well as
any other procedure eld beginning with Z765, Z771, Z774, Z844, Z845, or Z846.
 Varicose veins:
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with L84, L85, L86, L87, L88, or L93.
 Hernia:
Any patient with a procedure eld beginning with T19 through to T27.
A knee arthroscopy case is dened as any patient with a procedure eld beginning with
W82 through to W89.
Cataract cases are identied using ICD10 diagnosis codes as well as procedure codes, and
are dened as any patient with a procedure code beginning with C71 through to C77, as well
as a diagnosis code beginning with H25, H26, H28, or Q120.
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Any patients with ICD10 diagnosis codes beginning with I21 and I22 are identied as having
experienced an acute myocardial infarction. In addition, to ameliorate concerns about possible
upcoding of diagnoses, patients with these diagnosis codes that were discharged alive with a
total length of stay of less than three days are excluded. Following Cooper et al. (2011), in
the analysis of AMI mortality, attention is restricted to patients that are aged 39 to 100, and
admitted on an emergency basis from their permanent or temporary abode (as opposed to, say,
from another NHS hospital).
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Chapter 2: Figures 
Figure 1 Adjusted PROMs health gain vs Standardised 
Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
Figure 1 graphs the relationship between hospital trusts’ standardised (risk-adjusted) mortality rates and average 
casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery as captured by the EQ-5D PROM. From 2010/2011, we use the 
NHS Standardised Hospital Mortality Indicator (SHMI) (HSCIC 2013b). For 2009/2010, we use Dr Foster’s 
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratios (HSMR) (Dr Foster 2011). 
Figure 1.1 Adjusted health gain from hip replacement vs SHM 
 
Figure 1.2 Adjusted health gain from knee replacement vs SHM 
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Figure 1.3 Adjusted gain from groin hernia repair vs SHM 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Adjusted gain from varicose vein surgery vs SHM 
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Figure 2 PROMs health gain vs AMI mortality 
Figure 2 graphs the relationship between individual hospital sites’ mortality rates for Acute Myocardial Infarction 
(AMI) and average casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery as captured by the EQ-5D PROM. 
Figure 2.1 Health gain from hip replacement vs AMI mortality 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Health gain from knee replacement vs AMI mortality 
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Figure 2.3 Health gain from groin hernia repair vs AMI mortality 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Health gain from varicose vein surgery vs AMI mortality 
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Chapter 2: Tables 
Table 1 Average mortality rates for PROMs elective 
procedures studied in this paper, plus AMI 
Procedure Average mortality rate (per cent) 
Varicose veins 0 
Knee replacement 0.0794 
Hernia repair 0.0367 
Hip replacement 0.0973 
Acute myocardial infarction 7.8411 
Table 1 reports 30-day in-hospital mortality rates in the four years from 2009/2010 to 2012/2013. Includes all 
elective admissions for the four listed procedures, and all non-elective admissions for AMI. 
Table 2 Correlation between trusts’ average EQ-5D 
health gains and Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
Table 2.1: Correlation between unadjusted health gain and SHM 
Unadjusted Standardised mortality 
Hip 
replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
Standardised mortality 1     
Hip replacement 0.1345 1    
Knee replacement 0.1816 0.2745 1   
Groin hernia 0.068 0.0806 0.0519 1  
Varicose veins 0.0559 -0.0158 -0.0145 0.0458 1 
Table 2.1 reports the correlation between trust-level average unadjusted EQ-5D health gain from elective surgery 
with Standardised Hospital Mortality, as captured by the Hospital Standardised Mortality Indicator (Dr Foster 
2011) for 2009/2010 data and by the Standardised Hospital Mortality Indicator for 2010/2011 to 2012/2013 data 
(HSCIC 2013b).  
Table 2.2 Correlation between adjusted health gain and SHM 
Adjusted Standardised mortality 
Hip 
replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
Standardised mortality 1         
Hip replacement -0.0603 1     
Knee replacement 0.0532 0.2575 1    
Groin hernia -0.0807 0.217 0.2229 1   
Varicose veins 0.0877 0.2197 0.186 0.0851 1 
Table 2.2 reports the correlation between trust-level average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from elective surgery with 
Standardised Hospital Mortality, as captured by the Hospital Standardised Mortality Indicator (Dr Foster 2011) for 
2009/2010 data and by the Standardised Hospital Mortality Indicator for 2010/2011 to 2012/2013 data (HSCIC 
2013b).   
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Table 3 Correlation between hospitals sites’ EQ-5D 
health gain from surgery and AMI mortality rate 
Table 3.1 Correlation between unadjusted health gain and AMI 
mortality rate 
Unadjusted AMI Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
AMI 1     
Hip replacement 0.0037 1    
Knee replacement 0.0259 0.2387 1   
Groin hernia 0.0384 0.0254 0.0354 1  
Varicose veins 0.0026 -0.0705 0.0156 0.0575 1 
Table 3.1 reports the correlation between hospital (site) level average unadjusted EQ-5D health gain from elective 
surgery with the site’s mortality rate from Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). The AMI mortality rate is 
calculated as the 30-day in-hospital mortality rate for patients aged 39 to 100, omitting all patients discharged alive 
with a total length of stay of less than three days, and including only patients admitted on an emergency basis from 
their place of residence. 
Table 3.2: Correlation between adjusted health gain and AMI mortality 
rate 
Adjusted AMI Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
AMI 1     
Hip replacement -0.0118 1    
Knee replacement -0.0085 0.1465 1   
Groin hernia 0.0238 0.0354 -0.0088 1  
Varicose veins -0.0265 -0.0553 0.0302 0.0273 1 
Table 3.2 reports the correlation between hospital (site) level average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from elective 
surgery with the site’s mortality rate from Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). The AMI mortality rate is 
calculated as the 30-day in-hospital mortality rate for patients aged 39 to 100, omitting all patients discharged alive 
with a total length of stay of less than three days, and including only patients admitted on an emergency basis from 
their place of residence. 
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Table 4 Correlation between change in hospital trusts’ 
average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from surgery and change 
in Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
Adjusted Standardised mortality 
Hip 
replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
Standardised mortality 1         
Hip replacement 0.0177 1     
Knee replacement 0.0351 0.0099 1    
Groin hernia -0.0112 0.0122 0.0222 1   
Varicose veins -0.1988 0.1697 0.168 0.012 1 
Table 4 reports the correlation between first differenced trust-level average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from 
elective surgery with first differenced Standardised Hospital Mortality, as captured by the Hospital Standardised 
Mortality Indicator (Dr Foster 2011) for 2009/2010 data and by the Standardised Hospital Mortality Indicator for 
2010/2011 to 2012/2013 data (HSCIC 2013b).  
Table 5 Correlation between change in hospital sites’ 
average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from surgery and change 
in AMI mortality 
Adjusted AMI Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
AMI 1     
Hip replacement 0.0495 1    
Knee replacement 0.0098 0.2816 1   
Groin hernia 0.0198 0.076 -0.0196 1  
Varicose veins 0.045 0.0011 0.1017 0.0882 1 
Table 5 reports the correlation between first differenced hospital (site) level average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 
from elective surgery with the site’s first differenced mortality rate from Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). The 
AMI mortality rate is calculated as the 30-day in-hospital mortality rate for patients aged 39 to 100, omitting all 
patients discharged alive with a total length of stay of less than three days, and including only patients admitted on 
an emergency basis from their place of residence. 
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Table 6 Correlations between site-level HHIs 
 
gga_95 gga_75 gsa_95 gsa_75 a_95 a_75 msa msp n30 urban 
gga_95 1.000 
         gga_75 0.685 1.000 
        gsa_95 0.448 0.393 1.000 
       gsa_75 0.327 0.401 0.871 1.000 
      a_95 0.183 0.186 0.546 0.601 1.000 
     a_75 0.164 0.215 0.592 0.727 0.749 1.000 
    msa 0.361 0.401 0.814 0.797 0.428 0.534 1.000 
   msp 0.237 0.177 0.439 0.417 0.422 0.392 0.360 1.000 
  n30 0.350 0.225 0.398 0.329 0.457 0.361 0.228 0.740 1.000 
 urban -0.097 -0.099 0.035 0.025 0.064 0.052 0.005 0.240 0.278 1.000 
Table 6 reports the correlation between measures of competition intensity used in the paper. Correlations between 
our main competition measures are highlighted in bold. HHIs are reported as a weighted average of the negative log 
of HHI across six high-volume elective surgical procedures – hip and knee replacement, hernia repair, varicose vein 
surgery, knee arthroscopy, and cataract repair. Abbreviations: gga_95 = GP-level, GP-centred 95 per cent market 
radius HHI; gga_75 = GP-level, GP-centred 75 per cent market radius HHI; gsa_95 = hospital-level, GP-centred 
95 per cent market radius HHI; gsa_75 = hospital-level, GP-centred 75 per cent market radius HHI; a_95 = 
hospital-level, hospital-centred 95 per cent market radius HHI; a_75 = hospital-level, hospital-centred 75 per cent 
market radius HHI; msa = hospital-level, MSOA-centred HHI; msp = hospital-level, MSOA-centred HHI calculated 
using predicted patient choices; n30 = number of hospitals within 30km; urban = dummy denoting that the patient 
lives in an urban area. 
Table 7 Number of PROMs procedures and linkage 
rates 
  Total number in dataset 
Number linked to a 
PROMs survey 
Linkage rate 
(%) 
Hernia Repair 442,101 102,671 23.22 
Hip Replacement 274,854 158,200 57.56 
Knee Replacement 294,989 165,973 56.26 
Varicose Veins 119,927 41,734 34.80 
Total 1,131,871 468,578 41.40 
Table 7 reports the number of PROMs procedures in our dataset used to calculate our competition indices, and the 
number of observations successfully linked to a PROMs survey observation. The linkage rate for Hernia Repair is 
low because, for the purpose of calculating our competition indices, we include all Hernia Repair patients, whereas 
the PROMs surveys are targeted only at Groin Hernia Repair patients. See Appendix 3 for the procedure and 
diagnosis codes used to define each condition. 
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Table 8 Outcome variables – summary statistics 
Outcome 
Measure Surgical Procedure Observations 
Average 
health gain 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
EQ-5D Groin Hernia 72409 0.095 0.168 -1.372 1.060 
EQ-5D Hip Replacement 110547 0.432 0.223 -0.926 1.516 
EQ-5D Knee Replacement 115402 0.323 0.237 -0.975 1.610 
EQ-5D Varicose Veins 24870 0.105 0.186 -1.341 1.335 
OHS Hip Replacement 122511 20.429 8.488 -17.592 67.002 
OKS Knee Replacement 126280 15.552 9.133 -18.181 83.047 
AVVQ Varicose Veins 26300 8.182 8.699 -65.870 73.386 
EQ-VAS Groin Hernia 68464 0.037 13.990 -79.099 243.520 
EQ-VAS Hip Replacement 106854 10.762 16.623 -64.149 93.224 
EQ-VAS Knee Replacement 111215 4.838 17.066 -66.627 103.204 
EQ-VAS Varicose Veins 24018 0.196 14.295 -78.504 96.747 
Table 8 reports the average casemix-adjusted health gain, by procedure, for each PROM used in this paper. 
Table 9 Effect sizes of PROMs outcome measures 
  Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement Groin hernia Varicose veins 
EQ-5D index score 1.25 0.93 0.38 0.39 
EQ-VAS 0.43 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 
OHS/OKS/AVVQ 2.32 1.87 N/A 0.71 
Table 9 reports effect sizes (average health gain divided by standard deviation of Q1 score) of the PROMs outcome 
measures.  
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Table 10 Convergent validity of PROMs outcome 
measures 
Table 10.1 Correlation between hip replacement outcome measures 
 OHS EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
OHS 1     
EQ-5D 0.6158 1   
EQ-VAS 0.4107 0.4685 1 
Table 10.1 reports the correlation between different PROMs outcome measures for hip replacement surgery. 
Table 10.2 Correlation between knee replacement outcome measures 
 OKS EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
OKS 1     
EQ-5D 0.6304 1   
EQ-VAS 0.3933 0.4329 1 
Table 10.2 reports the correlation between different PROMs outcome measures for knee replacement surgery. 
Table 10.3 Correlation between groin hernia outcome measures 
 EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
EQ-5D 1   
EQ-VAS 0.3954 1 
Table 10.3 reports the correlation between different PROMs outcome measures for groin hernia repair surgery. 
Table 10.4 Correlation between varicose vein outcome measures 
  AVVQ EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
AVVQ 1     
EQ-5D 0.3597 1   
EQ-VAS 0.1893 0.3447 1 
Table 10.4 reports the correlation between different PROMs outcome measures for varicose vein surgery. 
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Table 11 Control variables – averages 
  Groin hernia 
Hip 
Replacement 
Knee 
Replacement 
Varicose 
Veins 
Specialist hospital (%) 0.052 4.775 3.820 0.108 
Teaching hospital (%) 13.840 12.935 12.721 21.450 
Non-teaching university hospital (%) 14.339 16.123 16.391 15.098 
Standard acute hospital (%) 55.815 50.116 51.331 56.647 
Private hospital (%) 15.093 15.706 15.327 6.553 
Age 58.705 67.753 69.163 50.602 
Urban dweller (%) 75.649 71.958 75.554 79.635 
Catchment area population density 27.207 25.590 26.562 33.779 
Charlson score 0.817 1.330 1.515 0.446 
Dummy- 1 diagnosis (%) 40.414 15.009 13.285 60.025 
Dummy- 3+ diagnoses (%) 34.523 64.588 67.923 18.858 
IMD04 income deprivation score (%) 13.247 12.417 13.464 15.061 
Female (%) 7.282 59.267 57.033 62.159 
Procedure-specific site FCEs/year 448.8 422.0 417.3 275.0 
Total trust admissions/year 92431.3 88377.7 90283.5 112150.3 
Table 11 reports average values of key control variables used in this paper, separated by PROMs procedure. 
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Table 12 Main estimates 
Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the 
hospital level are reported in parentheses. Where relevant, the F-statistic on the excluded instrument is reported in 
italics. Abbreviations: orth = orthopaedic surgery (hip and knee replacement surgery pooled in a single regression, 
with a dummy variable for knee replacement to capture any differences in the level of health gains from the two 
procedures); her = groin hernia repair; vvs = varicose vein surgery; eq5d = EQ-5D index score; ox = Oxford 
Hip/Knee Score; avvq = Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire; eqvas = EQ-5D Visual Analogue Score. 
Table 12.1 First stage estimates: Pre-reform HHI instrument 
First stage Pre-reform HHI instrument 
  (1) (2) 
  MSOA- Actual MSOA- Predicted 
orth_eq5d 0.759*** 0.955*** 
  (0.0727) (0.0265) 
  109.2025 1298.1609 
orth_ox 0.761*** 0.956*** 
  (0.0726) (0.0263) 
  109.8304 1315.5129 
her_eq5d 0.682*** 0.990*** 
  (0.0831) (0.0205) 
  67.420521 2329.9929 
vvs_eq5d 0.720*** 1.008*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0304) 
  93.064609 1096.2721 
vvs_avvq 0.720*** 1.009*** 
  (0.0744) (0.0304) 
  93.7024 1103.5684 
Table 12.1 reports the first stage estimates for our pre-reform HHI instrument – we report the coefficient on the 
excluded variable (pre-reform average HHI) when current-period HHI is regressed on the excluded variable plus all 
the control variables included in the second stage. The estimates for our two orthopaedic surgery PROMs, and for 
our two varicose vein PROMs, involve running exactly the same regression, but yield slightly different results 
because some observations will be included in one regression but not the other due to survey non-completion. See 
start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 12.2 Headline estimates 
  MSOA-Actual MSOA-Predicted 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
  CS  Pre IV CS  Pre IV 
orth_eq5d -0.0015 -0.0239** -0.00446 -0.00454 
  (0.00485) (0.0113) (0.00289) (0.00341) 
    109.2025   1298.1609 
orth_ox -0.229 -1.492*** -0.322** -0.322** 
  (0.253) (0.501) (0.134) (0.153) 
    109.8304   1315.5129 
her_eq5d 0.00157 -0.0111 -0.00046 -0.000944 
  (0.00403) (0.00929) (0.00188) (0.00212) 
    67.420521   2329.9929 
vvs_eq5d -0.0044 0.0215 -0.00770* -0.00809* 
  (0.00834) (0.0144) (0.00417) (0.00467) 
    93.064609   1096.2721 
vvs_avvq -1.009* 0.178 -0.767*** -0.813*** 
  (0.524) (0.97) (0.238) (0.245) 
    93.7024   1103.5684 
proms_eq5d -0.00749* -0.0148* -0.00454 -0.00573* 
  (0.00388) (0.00854) (0.00293) (0.00314) 
    108.16   1588.8196 
Table 12.2 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable when we estimate the effect of competition on 
elective surgery quality using our headline specifications. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates using our 
neighbourhood-centred HHI based on actual patient choices, while columns (3) and (4) report our estimates using 
our neighbourhood-centred HHI based on predicted patient choices. Columns (1) and (3) use current-period HHI as 
our treatment intensity variable, and current-period values of total and procedure-specific admissions (and their 
respective quadratics) as controls. Columns (2) and (4) use pre-reform average HHI as an instrument for current-
period HHI, and lagged values of total and procedure-specific admissions (and their respective quadratics) as 
controls. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
Table 12.3 Estimates using EQ-VAS outcome measure 
  MSOA-Actual MSOA-Predicted 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
  CS  Pre IV CS  Pre IV 
orth_eqvas -0.751** -1.348* -0.172 -0.127 
  (0.362) (0.719) (0.179) (0.201) 
    109.2025   1322.7769 
her_eqvas 0.188 0.0297 0.129 0.0453 
  (0.370) (0.756) (0.164) (0.178) 
    67.420521   2300.1616 
vvs_eqvas -0.522 1.532 -0.539* -0.585* 
  (0.638) (0.996) (0.284) (0.315) 
    92.121604   1093.6249 
proms_eqvas -0.650** -1.004* -0.104 -0.136 
  (0.291) (0.538) (0.191) (0.194) 
    108.3681   1592.01 
Table 12.3 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable when we estimate the effect of competition on 
elective surgery quality using health gain as captured by the EQ-VAS score as our outcome variable. See Table 12.2 
for explanation of the columns. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13 Robustness tests 
Table 13.1 Alternative specifications: Actual patient choice 
neighbourhood HHI 
MSOA- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Actual NoYear-Region 
NoUrb 
Pop NoLond IVAdm NoAdm Logs 
Proc 
Level 
orth_eq5d -0.0220* -0.0224* -0.0236** -0.0239* -0.01 -0.0105* -0.0355*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0129) (0.00938) (0.00579) (0.012) 
orth_ox -1.417*** -1.359*** -1.439*** -1.551*** -0.708* -0.0195*** -1.977*** 
  (0.511) (0.525) (0.512) (0.552) (0.389) (0.00726) (0.561) 
her_eq5d -0.0108 -0.012 -0.0134 -0.0123 -0.0140** -0.00695 -0.0133 
  (0.00932) (0.00944) (0.0104) (0.00897) (0.00681) (0.00525) (0.0155) 
vvs_eq5d 0.0202 0.0234* 0.0269 0.0245* 0.0142 0.0161* 0.0917 
  (0.0148) (0.014) (0.019) (0.0141) (0.0111) (0.00908) (0.0656) 
vvs_avvq 0.281 0.296 0.775 0.222 -0.318 -0.000322 3.512 
  (0.988) (0.978) (1.136) (0.963) (0.842) (0.00833) (4.025) 
Table 13.1 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable (neighbourhood-centred HHI based on actual 
patient choices) for a range of alternative specifications. All specifications instrument current-period competition 
intensity by its pre-reform average value, and use pre-reform average values for all admissions controls. Column (1) 
includes separate year and region of England dummies (as opposed to interacting these dummies, as is the case in 
our headline specification). Column (2) omits controls for patient’s urban status and hospital catchment area 
population density. Column (3) omits all observations from London hospitals. Column (4) instruments total trust 
admissions, procedure-specific hospital site admissions, and their respective quadratic terms with their pre-reform 
averages. Column (5) omits our scale effects controls (total trust admissions, procedure-specific hospital site 
admissions, and their respective quadratic terms). Column (6) converts all outcome variables and non-dummy 
control variables to logs. Column (7) uses procedure-specific HHIs (e.g. competition intensity calculated using 
varicose vein observations when running regressions using a varicose vein outcome measure), as opposed to 
competition measures averaged across six procedures. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13.2 Alternative specifications: Predicted patient choice 
neighbourhood HHI 
MSOA- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Predicted NoYear- Region 
NoUrb 
Pop NoLond IVAdm NoAdm Logs 
Proc 
Level 
orth_eq5d -0.00454 -0.00454 -0.00524 -0.00748* -0.00454 -0.00291 -0.00464 
  (0.00341) (0.00341) (0.00347) (0.00396) (0.00341) (0.00198) (0.00323) 
orth_ox -0.322** -0.322** -0.350** -0.514*** -0.322** -0.00573** -0.352** 
  (0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.181) (0.153) (0.00256) (0.153) 
her_eq5d -0.000948 -0.000948 -0.000695 -0.00103 -0.000948 -0.00134 -0.00191 
  (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00216) (0.00225) (0.00212) (0.00144) (0.00232) 
vvs_eq5d -0.00837* -0.00837* -0.00612 -0.00734 -0.00837* -0.00616* -0.00639 
  (0.00467) (0.00467) (0.00486) (0.0052) (0.00467) (0.00324) (0.00562) 
vvs_avvq -0.822*** -0.822*** -0.732*** -0.838*** -0.822*** -0.00787*** -0.575* 
  (0.246) (0.246) (0.257) (0.294) (0.246) (0.00236) (0.325) 
Table 13.2 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable (neighbourhood-centred HHI based on 
predicted patient choices) for a range of alternative specifications. All specifications instrument current-period 
competition intensity by its pre-reform average value, and use pre-reform average values for all admissions controls. 
See Table 13.1 for explanation of the different specifications. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13.3 First stage estimates: GP HHIs & Historical location 
instrument 
First stage Pre-reform HHI instrument Historical location instrument 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  GP Ctd Hosp Level 
GP Ctd 
GP Level 
MSOA Ctd 
Actual 
MSOA Ctd 
Predicted 
GP Ctd 
Hosp Level 
GP Ctd 
GP Level 
orth_eq5d 0.923*** 0.768*** -0.000287 -0.00647 -0.00353 -0.0285*** 
  (0.0585) (0.0357) (0.00164) (0.00467) (0.00263) (0.00474) 
  249.0084 463.5409 0.030276 1.915456 1.811716 36.108081 
orth_ox 0.924*** 0.770*** -0.000245 -0.00638 -0.00342 -0.0284*** 
  (0.0585) (0.0361) (0.00164) (0.00465) (0.00262) (0.00474) 
  249.64 455.3956 0.022201 1.887876 1.710864 35.8801 
her_eq5d 0.709*** 0.785*** -0.00422*** -0.0124** -0.0116*** -0.0322*** 
  (0.0975) (0.028) (0.00144) (0.00549) (0.00217) (0.00633) 
  52.896529 787.3636 8.5849 5.094049 28.815424 25.857225 
vvs_eq5d 0.777*** 0.785*** -0.00242 -0.0155** -0.00836* -0.0258*** 
  (0.0842) (0.0329) (0.00298) (0.00633) (0.00487) (0.00632) 
  85.155984 571.21 0.659344 6.007401 2.944656 16.6464 
vvs_avvq 0.777*** 0.790*** -0.00247 -0.0153** -0.00849* -0.0257*** 
  (0.0843) (0.033) (0.00296) (0.00621) (0.00485) (0.00624) 
  84.916225 571.21 0.695556 6.061444 3.066001 17.023876 
Table 13.3 reports the first stage estimates for our pre-reform HHI instrument with our GP-centred competition 
indices, as well as the first stage estimates for our historical location instrument with both our neighbourhood-
centred and our GP-centred competition indices. Columns (1) and (2) report the first stage estimates for our pre-
reform HHI estimate – we report the coefficient on the excluded variable (pre-reform average HHI) when current-
period HHI is regressed on the excluded variable plus all the control variables included in the second stage. 
Columns (3) to (6) report the first stage estimates for our historical location instrument – we report the coefficient 
on the excluded variable (standard deviation of distance to nearest four hospitals) when current-period HHI is 
regressed on the excluded variable plus all the control variables included in the second stage, including average 
distance to nearest four hospitals. Columns (1) and (5) use our GP-centred, hospital-level HHI. Columns (2) and (6) 
use our GP-centred, GP-level HHI. Columns (3) and (4) use our neighbourhood-centred HHIs based on actual 
patient choices and predicted patient choices respectively. For each of the six columns, the estimates for our two 
orthopaedic surgery PROMs, and for our two varicose vein PROMs, involve running exactly the same regression, 
but yield slightly different results because some observations will be included in one regression but not the other 
due to survey non-completion. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13.4 Headline estimates: Variable radius HHI using GP-centred 
markets 
  GP Ctd - Hosp Level GP Ctd - GP Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  CS  Pre IV CS  Pre IV Hist IV 
orth_eq5d -0.00139 -0.00512 -0.000904 -0.00233 0.00164 
  (0.00286) (0.00425) (0.00142) (0.00277) (0.00526) 
    249.0084   463.5409 36.108081 
orth_ox -0.208 -0.481** 0.0221 -0.198 0.426* 
  (0.135) (0.202) (0.0696) (0.122) (0.242) 
    249.64   455.3956 35.8801 
her_eq5d 0.00331* -0.00159 0.00110 -0.00345 0.00484 
  (0.00201) (0.00398) (0.00145) (0.00244) (0.00550) 
    52.896529   787.3636 25.857225 
vvs_eq5d -0.00535 0.00646 -0.00141 -0.00128 0.00354 
  (0.00498) (0.00822) (0.00328) (0.00513) (0.0135) 
    85.155984   571.21 16.6464 
vvs_avvq -0.631** -0.114 -0.205 -0.156 -0.863* 
  (0.305) (0.607) (0.160) (0.269) (0.513) 
    84.916225   571.21 17.023876 
proms_eq5d -0.00364* -0.00321 -0.00196* -0.00255 0.00241 
  (0.00216) (0.00355) (0.00115) (0.00222) (0.00418) 
    184.6881   667.1889 42.263001 
Table 13.4 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable when we estimate the effect of competition on 
elective surgery quality using our GP-centred competition indices. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates using our 
GP-centred, hospital-level HHI, while columns (3) to (5) report our estimates using our GP-centred, GP-level HHI. 
Columns (1) and (3) use current-period HHI as our treatment intensity variable, and current-period values of total 
and procedure-specific admissions (and their respective quadratics) as controls. Columns (2) and (4) use pre-reform 
average HHI as an instrument for current-period HHI, and lagged values of total and procedure-specific admissions 
(and their respective quadratics) as controls. Column (5) uses standard deviation of distance to nearest four 
hospitals, conditional on average distance to nearest four hospitals, as an instrument for current-period HHI, and 
lagged values of total and procedure-specific admissions (and their respective quadratics) as controls. See start of 
Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13.5 Estimates using EQ-VAS PROM and GP-centred HHIs 
  GP- Hosp Level GP- GP Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  CS  Pre IV CS  Pre IV Hist IV 
orth_eqvas -0.178 -0.125 -0.0438 0.0722 -0.140 
  (0.188) (0.253) (0.110) (0.196) (0.386) 
    246.8041   454.5424 36.7236 
her_eqvas 0.183 0.182 0.142 -0.181 -0.141 
  (0.176) (0.288) (0.122) (0.209) (0.503) 
    53.626329   796.3684 25.060036 
vvs_eqvas -0.352 0.361 -0.155 0.379 -1.735** 
  (0.366) (0.592) (0.239) (0.366) (0.766) 
    85.082176   569.7769 16.941456 
proms_eqvas -0.154 -0.0689 -0.0228 -4.33e-05 -0.292 
  (0.158) (0.204) (0.0899) (0.152) (0.302) 
    184.1449   654.8481 42.484324 
Table 13.5 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable when we estimate the effect of competition on 
elective surgery quality using health gain as captured by the EQ-VAS score as our outcome variable. See Table 13.4 
for explanation of the columns. See start of Table 12 for further explanation. 
Table 13.6 Alternative specifications: GP-centred, GP-level HHI with 
historical location instrument 
GP- GP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Level NoYear Region 
NoUrb 
Pop NoLond IVAdm NoAdm Logs 
Proc 
Level 
orth_eq5d 0.00112 0.00614 0.00188 0.00135 0.00304 0.00203 0.00168 
  (0.00526) (0.00417) (0.00542) (0.00558) (0.00556) (0.00315) (0.00578) 
orth_ox 0.408* 0.611*** 0.349 0.403 0.42 0.00895** 0.458* 
  (0.244) (0.203) (0.238) (0.248) (0.259) (0.00425) (0.258) 
her_eq5d 0.00467 0.00639 0.00292 0.00332 0.00931 0.00344 0.00423 
  (0.00547) (0.00494) (0.00505) (0.0057) (0.00607) (0.0037) (0.00477) 
vvs_eq5d 0.00385 0.00152 0.00348 0.00496 0.00338 0.000627 0.00488 
  (0.0136) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.00879) (0.0186) 
vvs_avvq -0.826 -0.894* -0.304 -0.919* -0.732 -0.00656 -1.195 
  (0.516) (0.469) (0.514) (0.551) (0.555) (0.00523) (0.73) 
Table 13.6 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable (GP-centred, GP-level HHI) for a range of 
alternative specifications. All specifications instrument current-period competition intensity by standard deviation 
of distance to nearest four hospitals, conditional on average distance to nearest four hospitals, and use pre-reform 
average values for all admissions controls. See Table 13.1 for explanation of the different specifications. See start of 
Table 12 for further explanation. 
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Table 13.7 Alternative competition indices and identification strategies 
	  	  
Pre-reform HHI IV Hist loc IV 
Hospital 
FE 
	  	   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  #(in GP-Hosp GP-GP Hosp-hosp  
Hosp-
hosp  GP-GP MSOA 
	  	   30km)  75% HHI 75% HHI 75% HHI 95% HHI 75% HHI Predicted 
orth_eq5d -0.000446 0.00112 -0.00580* 0.00329 0.00202 0.00203 -0.00558 
  (0.000358) (0.00663) (0.00326) (0.00324) (0.00189) (0.00652) (0.0036) 
  1630.544 104.04 287.981 137.828 305.9 31.36   
orth_ox -0.0291 -0.249 -0.267* 0.243* 0.204** 0.528* -0.125 
  (0.0183) (0.288) (0.149) (0.147) (0.0902) (0.302) (0.121) 
  1631.352 104.04 295.152 138.298 307.652 31.203396   
her_eq5d 0.0000893 -0.00526 -0.00472 -0.00157 0.00245 0.00695 0.0117 
  (0.000186) (0.00706) (0.00314) (0.00294) (0.00196) (0.00794) (0.0106) 
  1287.374 27.921 282.576 115.993 177.956 17.023876   
vvs_eq5d 0.000241 0.0139 -0.00415 0.00364 -0.00283 0.00497 0.0524 
  (0.000531) (0.0106) (0.00566) (0.00548) (0.00393) (0.0189) (0.453) 
  2923.565 50.808 379.47 177.156 125.216 15.163236   
vvs_avvq -0.0553** -0.163 -0.35 -0.0576 -0.437* -1.223 -0.00447 
	  	   (0.0235) (0.81) (0.308) (0.334) (0.261) (0.746) (0.0106) 
	  	   2880.469 50.396 378.303 176.358 122.766 15.492096 	  	  
Table 13.7 reports the coefficient on our treatment intensity variable when using a range of alternative competition 
indices and identification strategies. Column (1) uses a simple fixed-distance competition index, in which 
competition intensity is defined as the number of hospital sites within 30km of the hospital (conditional on treating 
at least 50 patients for the surgical procedure and year in question). Columns (2) uses a GP-centred, hospital-level 
HHI in which each GP surgery’s market is defined by the distance from GP to hospital of the 75th percentile 
patient, rather than the 95th percentile patient as in our preferred specification. Columns (3) and (6) use a GP-
centred, GP-level HHI in which each GP surgery’s market is defined by the distance from GP to hospital of the 75th 
percentile patient, rather than the 95th percentile patient as in our preferred specification. Columns (4) and (5) use 
hospital-centred, hospital-level HHIs in which each hospital’s market is defined as the distance from hospital to 
location of residence of, respectively, the 75th percentile and 95th percentile patient. Column (7) uses our 
neighbourhood-centred, hospital-level HHI based on predicted patient choices. In columns (1) to (5), current-period 
competition intensity is instrumented using its pre-reform average value. In column (6), current-period competition 
intensity is instrumented by standard deviation of distance to nearest four hospitals, conditional on average 
distance to nearest four hospitals. In column (7), no instruments are used, but hospital fixed effects are included in 
our regression, so that the impact of hospital competition is identified using year-on-year variation in within-
hospital competition intensity. In all seven columns, pre-reform average values are used in place of current-period 
values for all admissions controls. 
 
 
. 
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Table 14 Average pre-operative health status and 
‘chooser’ status by procedure 
  EQ-5D pre-operative health status 
Number of 
choosers 
Total 
patients 
Percentage 
choosers 
Groin hernia 0.778 9,066 102,671 8.83 
Hip replacement 0.332 21,102 158,198 13.34 
Knee replacement 0.381 20,308 165,971 12.24 
Varicose veins 0.747 4,885 41,734 11.71 
Table 15 reports the average pre-operative health status of patients undergoing each PROMs procedure as captured 
by the EQ-5D. It also reports the percentage of patients for each procedure that are ‘choosers’, where we define a 
‘chooser’ as a patient who did not attend one of the four closest hospitals who offered the procedure in question.  
Table 15 Minimum and maximum values of adjusted and 
unadjusted post-operative health status scores 
Outcome variable Adjusted min 
Scale 
min 
Observed 
min 
Observed 
max 
Scale 
max 
Adjusted 
max 
EQ-5D Index -0.594 -0.594 -0.594 1 1 2.082 
EQ VAS 0 0 0 100 100 322.619 
Oxford Hip Score 0 0 0 48 48 84.594 
Oxford Knee Score 0 0 0 48 48 101.229 
Aberdeen Varicose 
Vein Questionnaire 14.383 0.342 13.362 100 100 153.639 
Table 15 reports the minimum and maximum Q2 (post-operative) values of the PROMs studied in this paper, 
before and after casemix adjustment. The “Scale min” and “Scale max” columns report the minimum and maximum 
possible values of each PROM before adjustment. Unlike the other PROMs used in this paper, for the Aberdeen 
Varicose Vein Questionnaire (AVVQ), a higher score denotes worse health status. In this paper, including in Table 
A1, the AVVQ score is reversed, so that 0 denotes the worst possible health state, and 100 denotes perfect health. 
More precisely, the worst possible health state is 0.342, due to rounding of the weights used for each question. 
  
Chapter 3: Do do-gooders do good?
Busan, mission conict and occupational choice
Abstract
Should aid and other charitable donations be given in line with the priorities of
recipients, as the Busan Declaration on Aid E¤ectiveness suggests? We show that, when
donors and recipients are exogenously matched and have di¤erent preferences concerning
the NGOs mission, donors may ine¢ ciently enforce their preferred mission. In such
circumstances, social welfare is maximised when charities are run by ideologuespeople
who care a lot about implementing a particular mission  as they raise the costs, to
donors, of ine¢ ciently enforcing their preferred mission. We then embed our model of
donor-entrepreneur interactions in a model of the market for charitable donations, in
which occupational choices, donor-recipient matchings and total donations are endogenous.
We show that enforcing the Busan Declaration can increase social welfare if donors have
weak preferences for their preferred mission, and if enforcement does not reduce total
donations by too much. In so doing, we also o¤er an answer to a question posed by the
economic literature on the mission choice problem namely, when principals and agents
can match assortatively, why should we expect mission conict to arise in the rst place?
For it to arise in our model, we require that (i) mission preferences are correlated with
income-earning ability in the private sector, and (ii) there are private costs of running an
NGO. In such a world, rich philanthropists may have di¢ culty nding NGO entrepreneurs
who share their preferences, and charitable entrepreneurs may be willing to compromise
on the mission to access the larger donation budgets that come from being paired with
a rich philanthropist. These two factors combine to create a charitable sector with a
systematic tendency towards donor-entrepreneur pairings that involve disagreement over
the mission. In this way, we o¤er an insight into how rich philanthropists can exert a
decisive inuence over the charitable sector, but we also suggest that this inuence comes
at the cost of a charitable sector riven with mission conict. Finally, we show that the
charitable sector is likely to be dominated by ideologueswhen inequality in private sector
earning opportunities is low, but dominated by agents with less strident mission preferences
when income inequalities are high.
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1 Introduction1
Too often, donors decisions are driven more by our own interests or policy
preferences than by our partnersreal needs
Hillary Clinton, Busan High-Level Forum November 2011
A young man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the visitor. After his
name are printed three letters: NGO. What do you do?, the visitor asks. I have
formed an NGO.Yes, but what does it do? Whatever they want. I am waiting
for some funds and then I will make a project.
The Economist, reporting from Somalia in 2000
Since the Rome High Level Forum on Aid E¤ectiveness in 2002, donor countries and
institutions in the eld of international development assistance have made a series of escalating
verbal commitments  in Paris in 2005, in Accra in 2008, and in Busan in 2011  to give
ownership of development priorities to aid recipients, and to give aid in line with these priorities
(OECD 2014). The limited data on implementation of these non-binding2 commitments
suggests, however, that follow-through to make these goals a reality has not been as thorough
as it could be (Hedger and Wathne 2010; Leo 2013).3
This paper uses the Busan Declaration as a springboard to asking a question of broad
relevance to many contexts involving donor funding of NGO activity namely, is it ever socially
desirable for donors to seek to shape the mission undertaken by recipient organisations in
accordance with the donors own preferences? Or should donors, as the Busan Declaration
suggests, limit their activity to providing funding, and allow recipients to implement their own
preferred missions?
We consider these questions by constructing a model of the market for charitable donations,
in which there is heterogeneity in the preferences of donors and recipients concerning the mission
that a charity should undertake. Donors earn money by working in the private sector, and
1We are grateful to Tim Besley, Maitreesh Ghatak, Inna Grinis and Henrik Kleven for useful comments and
suggestions. We are particularly grateful to Kimberley Scharf for her participation in the initial stages of this
project.
2According to the OECD (2014), The Busan Partnership document does not take the form of a binding
agreement or international treaty. It is not signed, and does not give rise to legal obligations. Rather, it is a
statement of consensus that a wide range of governments and organisations have expressed their support for,
o¤ering a framework for continued dialogue and e¤orts to enhance the e¤ectiveness of development co-operation.
3Hedger and Wathne (2010) note that, while donors pay lip service to the principles of alignment and
ownership, it is implicitly understood by both donors and recipients that the objectives of the former should
not be overridden: A number of respondents to the latest ODI study note that while many national and sector
strategies appear to be domestically owned, governments recognise that the policies they adopt must address
donor expectations to some degree.
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donate to NGO entrepreneurs, who run the charities that receive donations. In this paper, we
use the terms charityand NGOinterchangeably, to describe what Hansmann (1980) calls a
donative non-prot organisationthat is, an organisation with a non-distribution constraint
whose activities are funded by donations rather than by sales to the end recipients of the goods
and services that the organisation provides.4
We show that, when donors and entrepreneurs are exogenously matched and have di¤erent
mission preferences,5 donors may impose their preferred mission on the entrepreneur in a
manner that fails to maximise social welfare. When such a situation arises, enforcing the Busan
Declaration that is, insisting that charities implement the recipients preferred mission would
be social-welfare-improving. However, if donors can choose to donate or to keep their funds
for private consumption, we show that enforcing the Busan Declaration only increases social
welfare if it does not reduce total donations by too much, and if prospective donors have weak
preferences for their preferred mission. When prospective donors care a lot about achieving one
particular mission over another, restricting their ability to implement their preferred mission
may lead them not to become donors in the rst place.
A second objective of this paper is to study the role of ideology which we dene as an
agents marginal rate of substitution between their preferred mission and a less preferred mission
 in determining whether an agent selects into working in the charitable sector, becoming a
donor, or remaining completely uninvolved in the charitable sector. In particular, we are
interested in examining the circumstances under which ideologuespeople who care a lot
about implementing a particular mission  tend to select disproportionately into working in
the NGO sector, and in the social welfare implications of having a charitable sector that is so
composed.6 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an ideologue is an adherent of an
4We are aware that a charityhas a specic legal denition in many jurisdictions, for example in relation to
tax liability. However, the specic legal status of a charity is not relevant to our model all that is important is
that the organisations activities are funded by donors rather than by the direct beneciaries of the organisations
activity.
5A mission is an action choice (choice of project) or choice of ethos (such as a religious or secular approach),
and can be represented formally as a choice of the variety of the good that the NGO produces. Bilodeau
and Slivinski (1997) note that non-prot rms can attempt to di¤erentiate themselves by o¤ering public goods
that have particular characteristics. For example, communities often include several nonprot organizations that
provide a variety of in-kind assistance to the indigent, shelters for battered spouses or runaway teenagers, or
support alternative kinds of medical research. Private post-secondary educational institutions in the U.S. di¤er
considerably in the nature of the education they provide, and are partly funded through private contributions.
The towns of London, Ontario and Sherbrooke, Quebec are each home to a number of youth hockey leagues,
each of them o¤ering di¤erent programs and each soliciting private contributions to aid their operations.
6This notion of an ideologuesomeone who su¤ers a larger loss from not realising their preferred mission
 is distinct from the notion of intrinsic motivation as the term is used, for example, in Besley and Ghatak
(2005). A highly intrinsically motivated agent is someone that has a high valuation of NGO output (or some
substitute, such as quality, voluntary labour supplied, or donations provided) relative to money. In our model,
all agents have an equal marginal rate of substitution between money and NGO output when their preferred
mission is realised. Alternatively, highly intrinsically motivated agents might have a low cost of e¤ort relative
to their valuation of NGO output. Again, all agents in our model have the same evaluation of this comparison
when their preferred mission is chosen. However, ideologues, in our model, su¤er a greater loss from having
their less preferred mission implemented than do moderates.
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ideology, especially one who is uncompromising and dogmatic.Rose-Ackerman (1996) gives a
denition which corresponds very well to our own usage of the term:
An ideologue is a person with strong beliefs about the proper way to provide
a particular service. He or she espouses an educational philosophy, holds religious
beliefs that imply certain forms of service delivery, or subscribes to a particular
aesthetic of psychological theory.
We are interested in examining these questions concerning the positive and normative
implications of having a charitable sector dominated by ideologues for two reasons. The rst is
that there is a widespread view that workers in the charitable sector are indeed distinguished
from workers in other sectors not only by their high overall levels of intrinsic motivation, but
also by their attachment to particular causes and particular ways of pursuing those causes. For
example, Sir Nicholas Young, Chief Executive of the British Red Cross, has commented that the
charitable sector possesses a huge bonus of having sta¤, volunteers and donors that do really
care about the workbut that sometimes it is tricky to control this passion, particularly in
big organisations, as this energy and zeal can lead you to the wrong places(Bergson 2012).
A similar sentiment is expressed by Craig Dearden-Phillips, CEO of Speaking Up, who
commented that Having passionate volunteers and sta¤ is fantastic until you want to change
something they dont agree with. Then all the passion can swiftly turn from a positive to a
negative for you as a CEO(Kirchner 2007). In light of these observations, we are interested in
constructing a formal economic model of the charitable sector, and examining the circumstances
under which the charitable sector does indeed end up being dominated by ideologueswith
strong preferences concerning the mission that their NGO undertakes. Our interest in the
social welfare implications of having a charitable sector dominated by ideologues takes up a
question rst posed in the economic literature by Rose-Ackerman (1996) in relation to non-prot
organisations:
Consider the possibility that ideological commitment plays an important role...
are there advantages to customers or government agencies of selecting a service
provider riding an ideological hobbyhorse?
A second reason for our interest in the role of ideology in determining agentsoccupational
choices, and selection into the charitable sector in particular, relates more directly to the Busan
Declaration. As the Busan Declaration is a non-enforceable aspirational statement, the extent
to which it is voluntarily adhered to will be inuenced, in part, by the kinds of agents that select
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into working in the NGO sector. In our setting, ideologueNGO entrepreneurs need to be paid
more to implement a less preferred mission, whereas moderateNGO entrepreneurs are more
malleable. In this way, having a charitable sector dominated by ideologues can lead to voluntary
adherence to the Busan Declaration, as they can make it cost-ine¤ective for donors to enforce
their preferred mission. We show that, when matching between donors and entrepreneurs is
endogenous, the NGO sector will be dominated by ideologues if income earning abilities in the
private sector are not too unequal, and by moderates if income inequality is high enough.
Our concept of an ideologue corresponds closely to the notion of a do-gooder. The
Cambridge Dictionary denition of a do-gooder is someone who does things that they think
will be helpful, although other people may not nd their actions helpful. What we take
from this denition is that do-gooders are not simply people who prefer pro-social actions
more generally, but that they have a strong belief in the desirability of a particular action
relative to other possible actions.7 More than that, though, the concept of a do-gooder
encapsulates the idea that there is an important connection between having strong convictions
and taking action to put those convictions into practice. In our model, we think of NGO
entrepreneurs as those that do good, while donors fund the doing of good. Thus, another way
of understanding our interest in examining the selection of ideologues into the charitable sector
is that we are interested in examining whether, as the term do-goodersuggests, agents with
strong ideological convictions do select into being NGO entrepreneurs rather than being NGO
donors. In other words, is it true that do-gooders do(that is, select into charity work), or
do they give (that is, select into donating to charities)? Moreover, if do-gooders do do(that
is, select into charity work), is this good for society? We nd that, when wealth and mission
preferences are correlated, and wealthy agents are not too ideological, NGO entrepreneurs will
indeed tend to be ideologues. In this sense, ideologues or do-gooders do dogood.
In addition to providing a perspective on the rationale for the Busan Declaration, and
on the role of ideologues, or do-gooders, within the charitable sector, a third objective of
this paper is to make a methodological contribution to the economic literature on the mission
choice problem, by o¤ering an insight into the origins of mission conict in the NGO sector.
While mission conict between NGO donors and entrepreneurs is, as we show in Section Two,
a well-documented phenomenon, how are we to understand the origins of this conict in a
7 In 1923, around the time that the term do-gooderrst emerged, an article was published in The Nation
stating that There is nothing wrong with the United States except the parlor socialists, the uplifters and
the do-goods [sic]. This quote, to our mind, captures well the negative connotations of the term do-gooder.
Yet do-gooders maintain a positive view of themselves. One can buy a T-shirt that proclaims oneself to be
a corporate bashing, hippy loving, cause ghting, organic eating, Birkenstock wearing, campervan touring,
life a¢ rming do f***ing gooder, and Yahoo sponsors annual Do-Gooder Non-Prot Video Awards for the
organisation providing the best clip or lm showing how their work contributes to the social good. For more,
see http://www.thedailydogooder.com.
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theoretical model? In particular, if agents can choose whether to be donors or entrepreneurs,
and are paired endogenously in a matching market such as that analysed by Besley & Ghatak
(2005) and hence can seek to be paired with someone that shares their own mission preferences,
is there any reason to believe that equilibria might arise in which donor-entrepreneur pairings
disagree over the mission in the rst place?
Besley and Ghatak (2005) show, in a model with heterogenous mission preferences, that
principals and agents will be assortatively matched, with mismatch occurring only if there is
an exogenously imposed shortage of principals relative to agents (or vice versa) of a particular
mission preference. Say there are two possible mission choices, R and S. If there are more
principals than agents with mission preference S, then some S principals will have to be matched
with R agents. Yet it is not clear how or why such a shortage would arise in the rst place.
When occupational choice is endogenous that is, when participants in the model can choose
whether to enter as a principal or as an agent could a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the entry game ever arise in which unequal numbers of a given mission preference type enter
the two sides of the market?
In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose whether to become a donor or
an entrepreneur; donors can choose whether or not to give; and donors and entrepreneurs can
match assortatively in a stable matching equilibrium. We show that a shortage of donors or
entrepreneurs of a particular mission preference can indeed exist in equilibrium that is, we
generate mission conict as an endogenous feature of our model if (i) mission preferences are
correlated with income-earning opportunities in the private sector (and hence with the amount
they can give to an NGO), and (ii) the entrepreneur incurs a private (e.g. e¤ort) cost of running
an NGO.
Private costs of running charities make it more attractive for agents to fund the doing of
good works (i.e. to become donors) than to perform those good works themselves hence donors
will be willing to put up with some probability of being mismatched in order to avoid incurring
the private costs of running a charity for themselves. On the entrepreneur side, heterogeneity in
income-earnings opportunities in the private sector creates a situation in which entrepreneurs
are willing to compromise on their charitys mission in order to access the larger donation
budget that comes with being matched with a richer donor. If income-earning opportunities
and mission preferences are correlated, these two dynamics will combine to create a charitable
sector in which there is a systematic tendency towards mission conict (that is, towards the
creation of donor-entrepreneur pairs that have di¤erent preferred missions).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews evidence of mission
conict in the charitable sector, and positions this paper within two literatures within the
economics of public organisation on the mission choice problem, and on occupational choice
within the charitable sector. Section Three introduces our model in a simple context where
allocation to the donor and entrepreneur roles, and matching between donors and entrepreneurs,
is exogenously imposed. Section Four extends this model to allow for endogenous choice
of occupational role, and studies the properties of a stable matching equilibrium when all
agents su¤er the same utility loss from realising their less preferred mission. We demonstrate
that mission conict in the charitable sector can be generated endogenously when there is a
correlation between mission preferences and income-earnings capacity in the private sector,
and there are private costs associated with running a charity. Section Five extends this model
further to allow for heterogeneous strength of feeling (or ideology) concerning the mission,
and discusses the implications of our model for the Busan Declaration, and for the role of
ideologues, or do-gooders, in the charitable sector. Section Six concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Mission conict in the NGO sector
The international e¤orts to agree upon broadly-supported principles of aid e¤ectiveness,
culminating in the Busan Declaration, reect a recognition that mission conict between
international aid donors and recipients is a widespread phenomenon. The problem of mission
mismatch, and the pressure donors may exert on aid recipients, is extensively documented by
Smillie (1995). Discussing relationships between Northern government aid donors and Southern
NGOs, Smillie notes that:
There are very real and sometimes volatile tensions between governments and
the voluntary sectors of the North and the South. On the one hand, more service
delivery is expected of voluntary organizations as governmental expansion in health,
education and job creation halts or retreats. Faced with static levels of private
income, voluntary organizations are easily enticed by the nancial blandishments of
large benefactors. Governments, however, which are providing them with more and
more support, do so on conditional terms... Advocacy and reform, long an integral
part of the voluntary raison dêtre, are unwanted or feared by governments, and
means are sought, through legislation, contracting and spurious theorizing about
voluntarism, to minimise, subvert or suppress it.
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Smillie also discusses a di¤erent, but equally high-stakes tension in interactions between
non-governmental Northern NGO donors and their partner Southern recipients:
The greatest tension for the thoughtful Northern NGO today lies in the attempt
to balance fundraising messages for a public most easily moved by short-term
disaster appeals, with a recognition that long-term development depends on the
willingness of that same public to support di¢ cult and costly structural change.
This is a tension between the appealof helplessness and antipathy towards empowerment,
between concern for children and indi¤erence towards parents, between the provision
of food and the creation of jobs, between aid and trade, between charity, as some
NGOs say quite clearly, and justice.
Meyer (1995) documents some of the disparaging language used about NGOs who accept
large grants that lead to some degree of mission compromise. Other NGOs who question
the legitimacy of such organisations have been known to call them BINGOs (big NGOs),
DONGOs(donor-organised NGOs), GONGOs(government-organised NGOs), or even Yuppie
NGOs.
In spite of the declarations at the High-Level Fora on aid e¤ectiveness, it seems that
implementation of the commitments enunciated in Fora declarations has been patchy. Leo
(2013), for example, shows that US development assistance is less aligned with the priorities
of developing country residents than multilateral assistance provided through the African
Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, suggesting less than complete
implementation of the Busan Declarations commitments in this area.
Mission mismatch is not just a phenomenon found in the eld of development assistance.
Conict between donors and NGO managers/workers over the mission has been noted in many
other contexts where donors fund the activities of charities and non-prot organisations. Pache
and Santos (2010) note that internal actors in NGOs often have strong beliefs about how
organisations should be run which may be in conict with external demands:
Institutional demands are conveyed by sta¤members, executives, board members,
or volunteers who adhere to and promote practices, norms, and values that they have
been trained to follow or have been socialized into. Organizational members, by
being part of social and occupational groups, enact, within organizations, broader
institutional logics that dene what actors understand to be the appropriate goals,
as well as the appropriate means to achieve these goals.
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Pache and Santos (2010) show that competing views of how to run an organisation can be
strong enough to tear it apart. In the 1980s, ten years after it was founded, Médecins Sans
Frontières was divided over the appropriate role of the NGO vis-à-vis the state. On the one side,
there were the so-called legitimists, who believed that the only legitimate actors in humanitarian
crises were nation states, and argued that the NGO should therefore see itself as an adjunct
to and assistor of state actions. On the other were those who believed that the organisation
should have an independent approach, driven by a legitimacy over and above that enjoyed by
some states, which implied that they should have an independent and fully-functional logistical
machine for intervention into humanitarian crises. Ultimately the di¤erence of opinion was
resolved when a group of legitimists left and became Médecins du Monde.
Alexander (1996) studies the evolution of exhibitions at leading art galleries in the United
States during a period when the main source of gallery funding shifted from individual
philanthropists (from the 1920s to the 1970s) to corporate funders, private foundations, and
public arts foundations such as the National Endowment for the Arts. She shows that,
whereas funding by individual philanthropists often led to exhibitions containing art from
an individual collector, corporations and public and private art foundations have tended to
favour more popular and accessible formats that are more likely to attract a broad public
(such as high-prole exhibitions focused on a single artist). However, Alexander also provides
evidence that the changes brought about by this shift in funding sources has been mediated by
museum curators in our model, NGO entrepreneurs who ensured that, whilst the format of
exhibitions may have changed, their content in terms of the artworks displayed did not.
Oliver (1991), in a seminal contribution to the institutional logics and resource dependency
literature, develops a typology of institutional responses to external pressures to adopt a
particular approach (or mission). Internal actors can respond to such pressure with compliance,
active deance (dismissal, challenge and attack), and passive deance (acquiescence, compromise,
and bu¤ering  that is, reducing the degree of external inspection and scrutiny). Whilst
our theoretical framework is not rich enough to separately model these di¤erent potential
organisational responses to external pressure, a central feature of our model is the related
notion that it is costly for external agents in our model, donors to impose their preferred
approach on an organisation, and that these costs are greater when internal actors have a
stronger adherence to their own preferred approach (on this point, see also Greenwood and
Hinings 1996).
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2.2 Economic literature on mission-driven organisations
This paper brings together two literatures in the area of public organisation the rst concerned
with the mission choice problem and the way in which disagreements over the mission play out
within public organisations, and the second concerned with the problem of occupational choice
within the charitable and non-prot sectors. As well as developing a model that addresses the
problems of mission conict and occupational choice within a unied framework, we contribute
to each of these individual literatures by developing new tools of analysis which are described
below.
To the best of our knowledge, Rose-Ackerman (1982) is the rst paper in the economics
literature that analyses mission conict within charitable organisations. She considers an NGO
sector with multiple varietiesof output (missions) and free entry of charitable entrepreneurs
(who remain separate from the set of potential donors). Whilst Rose-Ackerman considers
the e¤ect of multiple varieties on donors giving decisions, she does not allow the choice of
mission to a¤ect the payo¤s of recipients: charities are run by output-maximising entrepreneurs,
whose decision to enter the charitable sector may reduce net output of the sector by provoking
increased competition for donations and hence higher fundraising expenditures.
Aldashev and Verdier (2010) analyse the social welfare implications of a similar problem,
in which an NGO delivers a projectthat is produced using a combination of time and money.
Like Rose-Ackerman (1982), they assume that the NGO manager simply maximises the impact
of their project the NGOs mission does not have an e¤ect on their payo¤s. Our paper,
in contrast with both Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Aldashev and Verdier (2010), assumes that
all participants in the model have preferences over the mission that the NGO adopts, and
furthermore assumes that these preferences are a key driver of occupational choice.
In Rose-Ackerman (1987), NGOs maximise an objective function that includes its mission
choice as an argument, and small (atomistic) donors with di¤erent mission preferences donate
to the NGO. She shows that, in equilibrium, the extent of mission mismatch between these
donors and the NGO is dependent on the extent of unconditional support from a large donor
(such as the government). Mission is perfectly observable. Similarly Meyer (1995) considers
a single NGO who must decide whether to accept an ideologically compromising grant, which
may increase the NGOs visibility at the cost of its legitimacy with local people. As acceptance
of the grant would entail the adoption of what we would term a particular mission, Meyer,
like Rose-Ackerman (1987), assumes that the mission is observable.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) study matching between principals and agents in a contractible
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mission setting and show that mismatch (which they dene as a stably matched principal-agent
pair in which the two parties have di¤erent mission preferences) only occurs when there is an
asymmetry in the type space that is to say that many principals have one preferred mission,
whereas few agents share it. Why such a correlation between preferences and roles might arise
is not clear. By contrast, in our model, with endogenous choice of donor/entrepreneur roles,
we show that such an asymmetry can indeed arise as an equilibrium phenomenon if di¤erences
in private sector earnings opportunities are correlated with mission preferences.
Cassar (2013), again in a contractible mission setting, shows that, when a single donor
chooses between NGOs, all of whom have di¤erent mission preferences from the donor, the
donor can screen between those who are more or less willing to substitute between mission and
money. Like us, Cassar nds that the donor may make the entrepreneur choose a mission which
is not socially optimal in the sense of being too close to the donors preferred mission. However,
she does not provide the micro-foundations for mismatch that we outline in this contribution.
Besley and Ghatak (2014) also study principal-agent matching in an environment in which,
as well as e¤ort moral hazard, there is, rstly, a mission choice problem, where the mission
corresponds to a choice between purposeand prot, and, secondly, a choice of organisational
form, between a non-prot organisation, a for-prot organisation, and a social enterprise. The
founder (principal) can x the mission in advance by choosing to establish either a non-prot
(corresponding to a mission-driven organisation) or a for-prot (corresponding to a prot-driven
organisation), or they can delegate the choice of mission to an agent (manager) by choosing to
create a social enterprise (which has a mix of mission-driven and prot-driven objectives). The
latter option allows the manager to choose the mission after observing some state-contingent
private information about the size of social payo¤s from each choice. In order to generate
managerial e¤ort, the more intrinsically motivated the manager, the more likely the founder is to
favour a non-prot or a social enterprise (organisational forms favouring social payo¤s). Thus,
even a relatively unmotivated founder may end up establishing a social enterprise or non-prot
if the manager is su¢ ciently intrinsically motivated. Like Besley and Ghatak (2005), this paper
predicts assortative matching between principals and agents based on pro-social motivation,
conditional on a balanced type space for the pro-social types. That is to say, mismatch is only
residual phenomenon.
The economic literature on the mission choice problem has generally assumed either that
an organisations choice of mission is (explicitly or implicitly) contractible and hence that
donors can directly prescribe the mission that an NGO undertakes (Meyer 1995; Besley &
Ghatak 2005; Cassar 2013), or else that donors have no means of constraining NGO managers
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or workersinclination to implement their own preferred mission (Bilodeau & Slivinski 1997;
Aldashev et al. 2014).8 Both of these strains of the literature, however, share an assumption
that an NGOs choice of mission is observable. We develop an intermediate scenario (between
donors being able to directly prescribe the mission via the contracting process, and donors
being completely unable to inuence the mission) by making an alternative observability
assumption rst suggested by Scharf (2010)  namely that the NGOs choice of mission is
initially unobservable, but that an imperfect signal of the mission is observable and contractible.
This setup gives rise to a mission moral hazard problem, in which the donor can structure her
contributions to induce a particular mission by satisfying a mission incentive compatibility
constraint.9
In addition to contributing to the literature on mission choice, we contribute to the literature
on occupational choice within the not-for-prot sector by considering the role of ideology, or
strength of feeling concerning the mission, in inuencing an agents choice of whether to become
a charitable donor or a charitable entrepreneur. In so doing, we take up a suggestion made by
Rose-Ackerman (1996) that ideologues may congregate in non-prot as opposed to for-prot
rms.10 However, unlike Rose-Ackerman, we also consider the possibility that ideologues might
seek to realise their preferred mission through gifts of money (as donors), and not just through
gifts of time (as NGO entrepreneurs), and elucidate the conditions under which each choice
will arise.
Auriol and Brilon (2014) consider the occupational choice problem in relation to agents who
actively harm an NGOs mission for example, paedophiles who seek to work for a childrens
charity. Although they do not consider the mission choice problem explicitly, they do analyse
the trade-o¤s involved in the NGOs decision concerning the degree to which they monitor the
activities of employees. We do not go as far as considering NGO entrepreneurs who actively
wish to sabotage the donors mission but NGO entrepreneurs do need, in our model as well
as in that of Auriol and Brilon, to be incentivised to do the rightthing from the donors point
of view.
8One paper that does not t easily into this distinction is Rose-Ackerman (1987), who, by assuming that
individual donors are innitesimally small, constructs a model in which individual donors have no inuence over
the mission as individuals, but do inuence the mission in aggregate terms.
9Besley & Ghatak (2005) and Cassar (2013) analyse an e¤ort moral hazard problem in a setting where
principals and agents both care about the mission that the organisation adopts, and the mission is assumed to
be observable and contractible. Their setup gives rise to an agency problem that is not dissimilar to our own
modelling of a mission moral hazard problem. This is especially true in the case of Cassar (2013), who also
allows for di¤erential strength of feeling about the mission that the NGO adopts.
10The main advantage of the nonprot form to the ideologue is the absence of owner-investors. Of course, a
for-prot business wholly owned by the principal could also eliminate outside investors, but if the rms founder
is motivated by ideals rather than prot, relatively moderate tax or regulatory benets would push the founder
in the nonprot direction. The legal constraints imposed on the nonprot rms mission may be an advantage
to those who hope that their ideas and projects will outlive them. Therefore, within any given individual service
sector I would expect that nonprot providers would include more ideologues than in competing for-prot rms
(Rose-Ackerman 1996).
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Aldashev et al. (2014) look at occupational choice in a framework which breaks the link
between donorsdesires to give and the outcomes of funding to non-prot organisations. Donors
may still receive warm glow utility from giving, even when the expected outcomes from giving
are poor. Those who run non-prots are heterogeneous in their desire to use funds for the
public good as opposed to for their own benet. There exists a badequilibrium in which the
non-prot sector is primarily run by those who enter to divert donations for their private usage.
Our paper does not go as far as these authors in breaking the link between the motivation for
giving and the results achieved indeed, all agents in our model rationally anticipate the way
that their funds will be used to achieve a project with a particular mission, and this drives
their occupational choice. Nevertheless, Aldashev et al. (2014) is one of the few papers that,
like ours, examines the problem of occupational choice in a principal-agent model of charitable
sector activity.
Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) consider both choice of mission and occupational choice, but
with one constraint that we do not have here  the NGO entrepreneur always chooses his
preferred mission. As compared with our own setting, mission is not only non-contractible, but
donors have no means of inuencing the entrepreneurs choice of mission by making a payment
conditional on the realisation of a signal. Donors can, however, choose which NGO to donate
to. They show that, in general, NGOs will specialise and choose extreme missions, but they
provide no denitive answers about who enters as a donor and who as an entrepreneur.
More broadly our paper also relates to the delegation literature. Aghion and Tirole (1997)
consider the trade-o¤s faced by a principal who can decide whether to rubber-stamp or overrule
an agents project proposition. Overruling the agent allows the principal to avoid projects which
are bad for him ex post, but at the cost of reducing the agents e¤ort to nd projects ex ante.
Preference alignment leads the principal to delegate more authority, and there is a cost of
enforcing the principals preferred project which comes from spending on mission-inuencing
activities. In our model, agents can decide to become donors who may be matched with NGO
entrepreneurs who have di¤erent preferences, or to undertake the project themselves. The lower
the chance that they will face an entrepreneur with di¤erent mission preferences, the higher
the chance they choose to donate their earnings.
Other contributions (Prendergast 2007; 2008; see also Vickers 1985 for a review of an earlier
related literature) examine situations in which a principal might actively wish to hire an agent
that does not share her own preferences, for example because of measurement problems, or
because of the fact that citizens only challenge a bureaucrats decisions when they incorrectly
rule against them, not when they rule in their favour. We examine a di¤erent situation, in
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which participants in the model prefer, ceteris paribus, to be assortatively matched, but can
nevertheless end up mismatched in equilibrium if there is a correlation between income-earnings
capacity and preferences over the mission.
3 Model with exogenous matching
3.1 Model setup
We rst present our model in a simplied setting where donor and entrepreneur are exogenously
matched. Later, we allow for endogenous occupational choice (between being a donor, being a
charitable entrepreneur, or being completely uninvolved in the charitable sector), and examine
the properties that must be possessed by a stable matching equilibrium of the occupational
choice entry game.
A donor (D, she) gives money to a charitable entrepreneur (E, he), who in turn runs
an NGO that delivers goods and services valued by both the donor and the entrepreneur.
While the goods and services provided by the NGO may themselves be private (for example,
the charity might give mobility scooters to disabled people), the output of the NGO has a
public goods character in the sense that both the donor and the entrepreneur care about the
circumstances of recipients of the NGOs goods and services, and cannot be prevented from
deriving utility from the improvements in recipientscircumstances that are brought about by
the NGOs activity.
In this section, we consider a single donor-entrepreneur pairing. Later, we consider a market
in which there are multiple such pairings. While in practice there may be spillovers from the
NGOs services to other agents outside the specic donor-entrepreneur pair (that is, donors or
entrepreneurs in one pairing might derive utility from the output of another pairing), we do not
include these possible external benets in our welfare calculations, as doing so would require us
to make specic assumptions about how agents outside the pairing value such services compared
to the services that they themselves are involved in funding or providing.
Agents have a preferred mission mi 2 fR;Sg, i 2 fD;Eg.11 This mission could correspond
to a method of teaching literacy (phonics versus whole language approaches), methods of HIV
prevention (abstinence versus contraception), or an ideology permeating the programme (such
11Our model involves interaction between a principal (donor) and an agent (entrepreneur). However, to
avoid cumbersome language, we use the term agentas a generic term to describe a participant in our model,
irrespective of whether they are a donor or an entrepreneur. We therefore avoid using this term to refer to
entrepreneurs specically.
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as a religious or secular approach).12
When a donor and entrepreneur pair have the same preferred mission, we say that mission
match occurs. When a donor and entrepreneur pair have di¤erent preferred missions, we say
that mission mismatch occurs. When donors and entrepreneurs are mismatched, we show that
donors will sometimes adhere voluntarily to the Busan Declaration  that is, that they will
o¤er a contract which results in the entrepreneurs preferred mission being chosen because
it is too costly for them to do otherwise. However, sometimes it is not in donorsinterests to
adhere to the Busan Declaration even when it maximises social welfare to do so. In theory,
donors could be forced for example, by some supra-national authority to go against their
optimal choice of contract and allow the entrepreneur to implement his preferred mission. We
refer to this eventuality by saying that the Busan Declaration is enforced. Given the voluntary
and unenforceable nature of the Busan Declaration, we are considering a hypothetical but it
is nonetheless a useful one to contemplate if reputational issues around failing to live up to the
principles embodied in the declaration have some incentive e¤ect on signatories.
We denote project size, or NGO output, by b, and use pD and pE to denote the private
consumption of the donor and the entrepreneur respectively. If the donors preferred mission
is chosen, they receive utility:
 = b+ pD
We assume that , the donors marginal rate of substitution between her preferred mission and
money, is strictly greater than one. If the other mission is chosen, the donor receives utility:
 = (1 D)b+ pD
We assume that D 2 (0; 1) ; and say that D represents the donors ideology, i.e. the
wedge between utility derived from realising their preferred mission and their less preferred
mission.
If the entrepreneurs preferred mission is chosen, they receive utility
 = b+ pE   c
12Our assumption that the mission is discrete simplies the analysis, but similar results can be obtained in a
model where the mission is a continuous variable. The critical feature possessed by our model is that, when a
donor and entrepreneur who are paired together have di¤erent preferred missions, the donor is better o¤ with
a moderate, but ideologue entrepreneurs obtain higher utility from being paired with the donor than moderate
entrepreneurs do, because ideologues make it more costly for the donor to enforce her own preferred mission.
In a Web Appendix to this paper, available from the authors website (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/skellern),
we construct an analogous model to the one presented here but where mission is a continuous variable, and
derive su¢ cient condtions such that payo¤s have this critical feature: ideologues can obtain higher payo¤s than
moderates when matched with a donor who prefers a di¤erent mission, by making it more costly for the donor
to insist on a mission closer to their own preferred one.
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The private (e.g. e¤ort) cost of running a charity is c > 0. If the entrepreneurs less
preferred mission is chosen, they receive utility
 = (1 E)b+ pE   c
Again, we assume that E 2 (0; 1), and say that E represents the entrepreneurs ideology.
We assume that E 2 fL;Hg, where L < H . When E = H , we say that the
entrepreneur is an ideologue, while when E = L we say they are a moderate. Note that
ideologues are not more intrinsically motivated than moderates in the sense that this term is
used by Besley and Ghatak (2005), as both have the same marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
between their preferred mission and money (). Where they di¤er is in their MRS between one
mission and another for a given b, ideologues experience a larger utility loss than moderates
from implementing their less preferred mission.13
Our model includes two distortions away from the rst best, in order to model the agency
problem between donors and entrepreneurs concerning the mission that the NGO adopts. The
rst is that the mission is not contractible. Entrepreneurs choose the NGOs mission m 2
fR;Sg. The entrepreneurs choice of mission is observable to the donor in the long run, when
the donor experiences the utility of public good provision from the NGOs activity. In the
short run, however, donors cannot observe the mission, but do observe a contractible signal
 2 f0; 1g, which is a function of the entrepreneurs choice of m.14 This setup gives rise to a
mission moral hazard problem, in which the donor can use  to incentivise the entrepreneur to
act in a particular way. Let mD denote the donors preferred mission. Then
Pr( = 1jm = mD) = 1
Pr( = 1jm 6= mD) = 0 < 1
We dene a measure of signal strength  the e¤ectiveness with which the signal distinguishes
13Donors may also be heterogeneous in their ideology. Rose-Ackerman (1996, p.712) notes this possibility
when talking about a distinction between paternalist and liberal donors: Thus paternalists feel better o¤
if the groups they care about consume goods and services of which they approve. Such people might donate
to support the education of disadvantaged minority children but refuse appeals to provide general support for
the poor. In contrast, others, motivated by liberal a¤ection, benet from the happiness of others. Such
people prefer to make untied monetary grants to worthy people rather than provide in-kind benets such as
housing, food, or family counseling.This distinction between liberalsand paternalistshas similarities to our
distinction between moderatesand ideologues. However, we do not place any restrictions on the values that
can be taken by D because we will proceed by considering the di¤erent implications of having an ideologue
or a moderate as entrepreneur, for some arbitrary value possibly high, possibly low of D .
14An equivalent modelling setup would be to assume that the mission is fully observable but only partly
veriable, i.e. that it is partly non-contractible in the sense that the term is used by the Grossman-Hart-Moore
literature (Grossman & Hart 1986; Hart & Moore 1990).
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between desirable and undesirable actions by the entrepreneur as:15
 =
1   0
1
The donor can contribute to the NGOs activity in two di¤erent ways: by o¤ering a contribution
to project size b, and by o¤ering a signal-conditional payment w () to the entrepreneur.16 17
The second deviation from the rst best is a Limited Liability Constraint: as the entrepreneur
has no resources of their own, the wage must be non-negative in all states of the world: w ()  0
8  2 f0; 1g. As there is no reason to ever pay a positive wage conditional on the realisation
of a bad signal, we assume that w (0) = 0 always and refer to w (1) simply as w.
The donor earns d in the private sector, which she can use either on private consumption or
on charitable donations.18 Given the two uses to which donations may be put (contributing to
NGO output or o¤ering a signal-conditional payment), the donor faces the budget constraint:19
d  b+ w () (1)
In this paper we assume that a single donor is paired with a single entrepreneur that is,
15We motivate our assumption regarding the observability of the entrepreneurs choice of mission by noting
that there are many situations in which the full benets of an NGOs activity are only observable in the long
run. For example, in the short run a charitable entrepreneur can share data with a donor about how many
people attend a clinic for an HIV test, but it takes longer to evaluate the e¤ects of such an initiative on new
HIV infections. The rst may be an indicator of the second, but the second is what the donor really cares
about. Alternatively, mentoring is a common approach to tackle delinquency amongst disa¤ected youth. In
the short run, a donor to a mentoring programme may be able to observe how many mentor-mentee pairs have
been formed and how often they have met, but it would take years to be able to compare the outcomes for
mentees against comparable youths who were not mentored. Finally, an aid donor may want to promote trade
and development, and may fund the construction of new roads in order to facilitate the exchange of goods. In
the short run, the donor may be able to verify how many roads have been constructed. But to gauge the long
term impact, the donor needs to know how well the roads are maintained, and what additional trade has taken
place.
16We assume that contributions to NGO output b cannot be made conditional on the signal  because the
NGO generates  by its production decisions, and production is not possible without b.
17We sometimes refer to w as a wage, but it could take other forms (e.g. perquisites)  the key feature is
that it is for the agents private consumption, rather than being a contribution to NGO output.
18Thus the donor faces a xed budget constraint. Whilst many foundations and governments do have xed
donation budgets, our model can also be thought of as a reduced form version of a richer model in which
donors have quasi-linear utility (linear in private consumption, concave in NGO output). In a Web Appendix
to this paper, available from the authors website http://personal.lse.ac.uk/skellern), we present such a model.
In order to obtain the same results as those obtained using a model with linear utility in particular that joint
surplus is higher when the entrepreneur is an ideologue rather than a moderate it is necessary that the donor
pre-commit to a given donation budget d before matching occurs. That is, the donor cannot be allowed to
divert d to private consumption if they are paired with an ideologue of the opposite mission preference type.
Funding arrangements of this kind can be observed in relation to many aid agencies and charitable foundations.
19We assume that the donor has access to actuarily fair insurance, and that when she o¤ers the entrepreneur
a contract involving a strictly positive conditional payment, she fully insures against the possibility of having
to make this payment. Thus, the donors budget constraint must be satised in expectation, but does not
necessarily need to be satised ex post. Alternatively, we could simply assume that, while the donor still faces
a donation limit of d in expectation, she also has her own savings in addition to earning d in the private
sector, which she is able to draw from if required to make a conditional payment. The analogy to a charitable
foundation provides a further motivation for our assumption that the donors budget constraint must be satised
in expectation, but does not necessarily need to be satised ex post. Charitable foundations will generally have
an annual donations budget  indeed, many are required to disburse a certain amount of their fund each year
(for more, see the discussion in Section Four) but are usually able to accommodate uctuations arising from
uncertainty about the need to deliver on individual funding commitments.
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donors cannot donate to multiple charities, and entrepreneurs can only receive money from a
single donor. This is a strong assumption though there is substantial evidence that donors
do face capacity constraints, which prevent them from scaling up their activities even when
new funding sources become available.20 Feeny and de Silva (2012) provide a typology of such
constraints. These include physical and human capital constraints, policy and institutional
constraints, macroeconomic constraints and social and cultural constraints. Both within and
outside of development contexts, capacity building is a commonly used term to indicate that
NGOs may need investment in their management, strategy, human resource management and
culture in order to be able to scale up their activities (including by accepting funds from
multiple donors) and hence to achieve their maximum possible impact. The United Nations
Development Program has a Capacity Development Group to support aid recipients to develop
their leadership, institutions knowledge and accountability mechanisms (UNDP 2011).
In this section, we consider what happens when a donor and an entrepreneur are exogenously
paired. The timing of the game is as follows:
 t = 1: Donor o¤ers contract fw; bg, and forwards b, to the entrepreneur.
 t = 2: Entrepreneur chooses m and NGO production takes place.
 t = 3: Donor receives signal  and makes any signal-conditional payments w specied in
the contract.
 t = 4: Donor and entrepreneur experience the utility of public good provision. The signal
is a short term evaluation: the real benets are realised with a delay.
3.2 When donor and entrepreneur disagree over the mission
Without loss of generality, assume that the donor prefers mission S, while the entrepreneur
prefers mission R. As a baseline, we rst derive the First Best by solving the social planners
problem. As the social planner can choose the mission directly, there is no need for any
signal-conditional payments, and so all of the donors budget is put towards NGO output:
b = d. If the social planner implements mission S, the donor receives uD = d, the entrepreneur
receives uE =  (1 E) d   c, and joint surplus is J =  (2 E) d   c. If the social
planner implements mission R, the donor receives uD =  (1 D) d, the entrepreneur receives
uE = d   c, and joint surplus is J =  (2 D) d   c. Thus the First Best can be simply
characterised:
20 In other work (Sandford and Skellern 2014a), we adapt the model presented in this paper to an environment
that allows for more than one donor to contribute to a given NGO, but (unlike the model presented below)
players are exogenously allocated to either the donor or the entrepreneur role.
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Proposition 1 First Best: Social Planners problem. Consider an S donor exogenously
matched with an R entrepreneur. Then, if E  D, the First Best solution is to implement
mission R, the entrepreneurs preferred mission. Otherwise, the First Best solution is to
implement mission S.
Proof By comparison of the joint surpluses outlined in the preceding paragraph.
Proposition (1) says that, when the entrepreneur (aid recipient) is at least as ideological as
the donor, the socially optimum mission is the entrepreneurs preferred mission.
We now consider how the outcome changes when the mission is non-contractible and a
Limited Liability Constraint holds. At t = 1, the donor must choose whether to o¤er a contract
fwS ; bSg that will induce her preferred mission S. If she implements S, she must satisfy the
entrepreneurs mission incentive compatibility constraint, which says that the entrepreneurs
utility from choosing S must be weakly higher than that from choosing R:
(1 E)bS + 1wS   c  bS + 0wS   c () 1wS  EbS (2)
We henceforth make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 Participation Constraints Satised: 


+E

> 1,

(1 E)+E
+E

d 
c > 0.
The two conditions in Assumption (1) ensure that, respectively, the donors and the
entrepreneurs Participation Constraints are always satised. The rst states that the donors
marginal utility of donating and implementing mission S always exceeds the marginal utility of
private consumption. This ensures that she will donate up to her donation limit d, and hence
that the donors budget constraint holds with equality: d = w()+ b. The second states that
the entrepreneur receives su¢ cient utility from implementing his less preferred mission that it
is worthwhile to incur e¤ort cost c to ensure that NGO production occurs.
When combined with the budget constraint d = bS + 1wS (which will be satised with
equality as a result of Assumption (1) (Participation Constraints Satised)), Equation (2)
implies that the optimal contract for the donor, conditional on implementing mission S, is:
fwS ; bSg =

Ed
1 ( + E)
;
d
 + E

(3)
Thus, when the donor chooses to induce the entrepreneurs less preferred mission S, project
size bS is decreasing in the entrepreneurs ideology. The intuition is straightforward: if the
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entrepreneur is more ideological, he requires a higher conditional wage payment in order to be
induced to choose mission S, leaving less of the donors donation budget d to contribute to
NGO output.
The contract o¤er outlined in Equation (3) yields donor payo¤, entrepreneur payo¤, and
joint surplus of, respectively:
 =


 + E

d;  =

(1 E) + E
 + E

d c; J =

(2 E) + E
 + E

d c (4)
Suppose, instead, that the donor decides to induce mission R.
Assumption 2 Donors Always Donate: (1 D) > 1
Assumption (2) ensures that the donor prefers to contribute to the NGO than to spend her
donation budget d on private consumption, even if doing so leads to her less preferred mission
being realised. If the donor implements mission R, there is no need to o¤er a conditional
payment (which detracts from project size), as the only reason to o¤er such a payment is to
induce the entrepreneur to choose a mission that he would not choose of his own volition. The
optimal contract for the donor in this case is therefore fwR; bRg = f0; dg. This contract yields
utilities and joint surplus of:
 = (1 D)d;  = d  c; J = (2 D)d  c (5)
We now establish the Second Best  that is, the choice of mission that maximises joint
surplus, subject to mission non-contractibility and the LLC.21
Proposition 2 Second Best optimum: Non-contractible mission and LLC. Consider
an S donor exogenously matched with an R entrepreneur. Then:
 Case (A): Mission S maximises joint surplus if:
E  D(+ 1)+(1 D) () D  E
h
1 + ( 1)+(1 E)+E
i
 Case (B): Mission R maximises joint surplus if:
E >
D
(+ 1)+(1 D) () D > E
h
1 + ( 1)+(1 E)+E
i
(6)
21A proof of this Proposition, and all Lemmas and Propositions that follow, is provided in the Appendix.
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Like the First Best solution outlined above, Proposition (2) says that the Second Best
optimum is to implement mission S if D is su¢ ciently high relative to D that is, if the
donor cares enough about the mission relative to the entrepreneur and to implement mission
R otherwise. We know that the square-bracketed term in Equation (6) is strictly greater than
1, as  > 1,  > 0, and E 2 (0; 1). Thus, unlike in the First Best, there are a range of values
of E just below D for which mission R maximises joint surplus. This deviation from the
First Best arises because, in the Second Best, mission S can only be achieved by o¤ering a
signal-conditional payment w. This payment detracts from project size and is thus a source of
social ine¢ ciency. Consequently, when E is not too far below D, joint surplus is maximised
when the donor does not make these payments and instead allows mission R to be implemented.
The Busan Declaration was the outcome of an increasing recognition, by both donors and
recipients of foreign development assistance, that there needs to be a greater emphasis on the
objectives of aid recipients when determining the uses to which development assistance funds
are put. Proposition (2) provides a justication for that declaration. It says that, when aid
recipients have at least as much at stake from an NGOs choice of mission as do the recipients,
the Busan Declaration should be enforced. It seems reasonable to assume that this condition
will hold much more often than not, and hence that the Busan Declaration should have wide
applicability.
However, notice that Proposition (2) depends on there being an exogenously imposed
donor-entrepreneur pairing with mission mismatch. This result should therefore be interpreted
with caution. Mission mismatch may not occur in the rst place in a more general model where
agents can choose whether to become donors or entrepreneurs, and can sort themselves, after
making this choice, into a stable matching equilibrium. In the next section we will micro-found
mission mismatch, to show that it can indeed occur in equilibrium even when choice of role
is endogenous. Then we will introduce an extensive margin to the donors giving decisions
(allowing them to choose between donating and not donating), which will add nuance to our
analysis of the Busan Declaration.
We note a parallel between Propositions (1) and (2) and Besley & Ghatak (2001)s model
of public goods provision under incomplete contracts, which concludes that the agent that
values the project the most should be given ownership rights over it. While their model is
quite di¤erent to ours  theirs involves the production of a homogeneous good (so there is
no mission choice problem), while ours shuts down the question of ownership by imposing a
non-distribution constraint the two results have a similar avour, in that both argue that,
when two agents collaborate on a project that has a public goods character, the one that cares
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the most should get their way (with some adjustment made to this rule in Proposition (2) given
the constraint imposed by Limited Liability), irrespective of the relative importance of each
agents contribution to project outcomes.
Now we turn our attention to the decentralized solution in which the mission is chosen by
the donor rather than the planner. The donor will choose to o¤er either contract fwS ; bSg or
contract fwR; bRg. The following Proposition compares the joint-surplus-maximising solution
(the Second Best optimum) with the decentralised solution that arises as a result of interaction
between the donor and entrepreneur when the mission is non-contractible and the LLC holds.
Proposition 3 Decentralised solution: Non-contractible mission and LLC. Consider
an S donor exogenously matched with an R entrepreneur. Then:
 Case (A1): The donor implements her preferred mission S, which is socially optimal,
if:
E  D
( +   1) + (1 D)
 Case (B1): The donor implements her preferred mission S, even though the entrepreneurs
preferred mission R is socially optimal, if:
D
( +   1) + (1 D)  E 
D
(1 D)
 Case (B2): The donor implements the entrepreneurs preferred mission R, which is
socially optimal, if:
D
(1 D)  E
Proposition (3) elucidates the way in which the decentralised process of donor-entrepreneur
interaction leads to an ine¢ ciency relative to the solution that the social planner would
impose in the presence of mission non-contractibility and Limited Liability. When the donor
implements mission S, she sacrices some NGO output in order to o¤er a conditional wage
payment. She also makes the entrepreneur worse o¤ than if mission R were implemented, as
the entrepreneur always prefers that the donor implement mission R. The donor takes into
account the rst e¤ect, as her payo¤s are increasing in NGO output, but not the second, as she
does not internalise the e¤ect of her contract o¤er on the entrepreneurs payo¤s. This failure,
by the donor, to internalise the e¤ect of her choice of mission on the entrepreneurs payo¤s
leads to the divergence between the donors decision and the Second Best optimal outcome in
Case (B1).
189
The Limited Liability Constraint plays an important role in generating the deviation from
the Second Best optimum in Case (B1) of Proposition (3). Consistent with the Coase Theorem,
if entrepreneurs have independent nancial resources and are able to make transfers to donors,
then they can compensate the donor for the loss of their preferred mission, and the socially
optimal mission can always be achieved. For example, a developing country government that
receives project funding from a rich country donor is more likely to be able to inuence the
direction of that project if they also contribute their own funds to it.
Proposition 4 No Limited Liability: Suppose that we are in Case (B1) of Proposition (3).
If the entrepreneur has funds that they can contribute to the project, the socially optimum
mission can still be achieved if the entrepreneur contributes the following to NGO output:
bE = d


( + E) (1 D)   1

The donor o¤ers a contract fw; bg = f0; dg, NGO output is equal to bE+d; and the entrepreneur
chooses mission R.
Proposition (4) expresses the basic intuition that NGO entrepreneurs are able to have more
inuence over the activities that they undertake if they are able to bring their own funds to
the table. However, in a wide variety of circumstances, it is unrealistic to assume that NGOs
have access to independent resources of this kind, so we maintain the assumption of Limited
Liability for the remainder of the paper.
Given that the Busan Declaration is non-binding, what is the role of entrepreneur ideology
in determining whether the socially optimal mission is realised? Proposition (3) says that,
conditional on it being socially optimal to implement the entrepreneurs preferred mission,
more ideological entrepreneurs are more likely to be allowed by the donor to implement their
preferred mission. We now make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Ideologue Entrepreneurs Enforce Preferred Mission:
D
( +   1) + (1 D)  
L  D
(1 D)  
H
Assumption (3) restricts attention to the range of values of E and D for which the
entrepreneurs preferred mission, R, is socially optimal (that is, it rules out Case (A) of
Proposition (3)). However, it is utility-maximising for the donor to implement mission R
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only when the entrepreneur is an ideologue. That is, L is in the range of values covered
by Case (B1) of Proposition (3), while H is in the range of values covered by Case (B2) of
Proposition (3).
Proposition 5 Ideologue Entrepreneurs Increase Joint Surplus: Given Assumption (3)
(Ideologue Entrepreneurs Enforce Preferred Mission), the socially optimal mission is chosen for
ideologue entrepreneurs, but not for moderate entrepreneurs. Further, social surplus is strictly
higher when a donor is matched with an ideologue than with a moderate.
Proposition (5) says that ideologues or do-goodersdo do goodbecause their strong
preference for doing things their way can help to overcome the donors failure to consider
entrepreneur utility when deciding which mission to implement. When the entrepreneur is
very ideological, the donor faces such high private costs of implementing her preferred mission
that she decides to take the social welfare maximising route of allowing the entrepreneurs
preferred mission to be implemented.22 In the sections that follow, we return to this result,
to examine whether it continues to hold when agents endogenously choose whether to enter as
donors or as charitable entrepreneurs.
3.3 When donor and entrepreneur agree over the mission
If the donor and the entrepreneur have the same preferred mission, then there is no problem of
mission moral hazard. The donor has no need to o¤er a conditional wage payment to induce
the entrepreneur to choose her preferred mission, so she puts her whole donation budget into
b. Hence the optimal contract is fw; bg = f0; dg, yielding donor payo¤, entrepreneur payo¤,
and joint surplus of, respectively,
 = d;  = d  c; J = 2d  c (7)
4 Why does mismatch occur?
4.1 Occupational choice
Section Three analysed the outcome of donor-entrepreneur interactions under exogenous matching.
However, it is not clear that pairings of this kind will arise in equilibrium. Besley and Ghatak
22This is a standard application of the general theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956/7).
If mission were contractible and there were no liability constraints, pairing an S donor with an R ideologue
entrepreneur would generate weakly lower joint surplus than if the R entrepreneur were a moderate. However,
in the presence of these departures from the First Best, pairing the S donor with an ideologue R entrepreneur
generates higher joint surplus than pairing them with a moderate R entrepreneur, because it counteracts the S
donors tendency to over-implement mission S relative to the social optimum.
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(2005) show, for example, that when agents are heterogeneous in mission preferences, they
are assortatively matched in a stable matching, with NGO managers of mission preference A
matched with workers of mission preference A, and so forth. Mismatched pairings only arise if
there is an exogenously given shortage of managers or workers of one preference type. When
agents can endogenously choose to become a donor or an entrepreneur, it is not clear that such
a shortage will arise in equilibrium. Moreover, even if mismatch does occur in equilibrium,
it is not clear that the mission resulting from the donor-entrepreneur contracting process will
be socially sub-optimal. In Section Four, we provide necessary conditions for such a shortage
to arise when agents endogenously choose their roles, in an environment in which all agents
have the same ideology . In Section Five, we extend these results to settings where  is
heterogeneous.
Assume that there are N 2 R agents who prefer mission R, and N agents who prefer mission
S. Agents can choose to enter as NGO entrepreneurs, or to enter the private sector. The number
of agents who enter as entrepreneurs is NE , which can be decomposed into S and R types:
NE = N
R
E +N
S
E . Those who enter the private sector either become donors, or remain uninvolved
(i.e. spend all their earnings on private consumption). Thus, conditional on entering the private
sector, the choice of whether to donate d is itself an endogenous outcome of the model. We can
decompose the number of donors and uninvolved agents into S and R types: NU = NRU +N
S
U
and ND = NRD +N
S
D. Finally, we have that N = N
S
E +N
S
U +N
S
D = N
R
E +N
R
U +N
R
D .
Assumption 4 ND < NE
Assumption (4) restricts attention to situations in which the number of donors is smaller
than the number of entrepreneurs available to receive donations. We restrict attention to
these situations primarily because of their correspondence to the real world, where there is a
shortage of donations relative to possible uses. However, we also make this assumption because
our objective is to determine whether or not the e¢ cient mission is achieved when donors and
entrepreneurs have di¤erent mission preferences. If entrepreneurs are on the short side of the
market, the e¢ cient mission can always be achieved because donors can make transfers to
entrepreneurs. If, however, entrepreneurs are on the long side of the market, we may obtain
ine¢ ciencies because the Limited Liability Constraint implies that entrepreneurs cannot make
transfers to donors.23
23Unlike all the other assumptions in this paper, Assumption (4) places a restriction on outcome variables of
the model, rather than on the models primitives. Thus, Assumption (4) should best be understood not as a
parametric restriction, but as a restriction that focuses attention on cases that have real-world applicability. We
further note that this restriction on our outcome variables will itself be generated by a corresponding restriction
on the primitives of the model. In an extension to the present work, we intend to characterise this mapping,
and thus state Assumption (4) in terms of model inputs rather than model outputs.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
 t =  1: Agents make simultaneous, irreversible decisions to enter the private sector or
to become an NGO entrepreneur. Agents who enter the private sector choose whether to
become a donor or remain uninvolved.
 t = 0: Donors are matched with NGO entrepreneurs. We do not specify the matching
process we only require that it is stable (see below). Agents cannot change the entry
decision they made at t =  1, even if they end up unmatched.
 t = 1 to t = 4: The game proceeds as per the timing outlined in Section Three.
Our equilibrium concept is that of a stable matching subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We identify the equilibria of the occupational choice entry game using backwards induction.
In Section Three, for a given entry conguration at t =  1 and a given matching at t = 0,
we examined the outcome of donor-entrepreneur interaction between t = 1 and t = 4. Using
this knowledge, we next determine which matchings at t = 0 are stable for a given entry
conguration at t =  1. Finally, using our knowledge of the stable matchings that are possible
at t = 0, we examine the entry congurations that can arise as a (mixed strategy) subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium at t =  1.
At t =  1, entering as a donor or as an entrepreneur often involves an uncertain outcome
(being matched with one type of agent with some probability, and another type of agent with
another probability). In such cases, the agent decides which role to adopt on the basis of
expected utility calculated using the probability that each type of match will arise in a stable
matching.
Assumption (4) (ND < NE), combined with our prior Assumption (2) ((1   D) >
1 Donors Always Donate), implies that private sector entrants will never wish to remain
uninvolved in the charitable sector. This is because ND < NE implies that donors will always
be paired with an entrepreneur that is, they will never remain unmatched. The worst outcome
for a donor is thus to be paired with an entrepreneur of the opposite mission preference 
but the assumption that  (1 D) > 1 ensures that this outcome is always preferable to
remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector and spending all of ones earnings on private
consumption. Hence, under these assumptions, all private sector entrants will become donors
and NSU = N
R
U = 0. In Section Five, we drop our assumption that (1 D) > 1, thus allowing
for the possibility that some private sector entrants will choose to be completely uninvolved in
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the charitable sector, in order to create an extensive margin for donation decisions and thus to
investigate the impact of enforcing the Busan Declaration on giving.
Agents entry decisions at t =  1, to become an entrepreneur or a donor, or to remain
uninvolved in the charitable sector, are irrevocable. We think of the choice between entering
the NGO sector or the private sector as an occupational choice  it seems reasonable to
rule out the possibility of switching between these careers. The assumption that the choice
between donating and spending all of ones earnings on private consumption is also irreversible
is stronger, but we make it because it is a widely observed characteristic of both charitable
foundations and international development assistance arrangements that donors commit in
advance to donating, and only later are paired with recipients, and decide the uses to which their
donation should be put. Once funds are paid into a charitable foundation, donors cannot recover
these funds for private use, and thus are constrained to disburse these funds to charitable causes
as best they are able. In the United States, private foundations with a 501(c) tax exemption
must pay out at least 5 per cent of the value of their endowment each year to charitable causes
(IRS 1999). In the eld of development assistance, funding is often agreed in advance (for
example, as a result of a multilateral or bilateral agreement by heads of government), and
aid agencies thereafter experience so-called disbursement pressureto get the funds out of the
door.24
Notwithstanding these important real-world motivations for our irreversibility assumption
concerning occupational choices, there are also important modelling reasons for making this
assumption. Firstly, if occupational choices were reversible, entrants to the charitable sector
who went unmatched would want to reverse their entry decisions. Secondly, when private
sector entrants would prefer ex post to donate to a moderate entrepreneur than to spend all
their earnings on private consumption, but would prefer private consumption to donating to
an ideologue entrepreneur, our irreversibility assumption implies that their willingness to enter
24For example, Bernstein and Sessions (2007) document the practical di¢ culties that arose between 2003 and
2005 when trying to manage the large increases in aid funding targetting HIV and AIDS from the World Bank,
the Global Fund, and the US Presidents Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief. UNAIDS estimated that global
funding to combat HIV/AIDS in low and middle income countries grew from $2.1 billion in 2003 to $8.9 billion
in 2005. By the end of 2005, the targeted funding from US development agencies to Uganda and Ethiopia
exceeded these countriestotal 2003 health budgets. These and other countries lacked the health infrastructure
required to spend the money on the time scale envisaged by funders. As a consequence, between 2005 and 2007,
the scheduled disbursements were smaller than were foreseen than in legally binding commitments, meaning
that the assigned funds were spent in later years. Such disbursement problems have been observed more
widely. Odedokun (2003), for example, examines the actual disbursement rates of eleven donor countries that
contribute 80 per cent of the aid given by OECD Development Assistance Committee donors. He nds that,
between 1970 and 2000, these countries only disbursed 57 per cent of all their yearly commitments made to
recipient countries. Though some of this shortfall occurred as a result of aid conditionality criteria not being
met, a signicant portion was due to di¢ culties identifying suitable recipient organisations. Though the detail
of this example i.e. the failure to disburse all of the funds assigned for development assistance within a given
year is not reected in our modelling assumption that agents who commit to donating at t =  1 must donate
d at t = 0, it supports the general proposition underlying our model, namely that the decision to become a
donor, and to put aside funds for this purpose, often precedes more specic decisions such as whom to donate
to, and how to allocate ones funds between specic uses.
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as a donor (rather than remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector) will be determined by
the proportion of charities that are run by ideologues as opposed to moderates. This setup will
allow us to analyse the implications of having a charitable sector dominated by ideologues, or
by moderates, on donorsgiving decisions.
4.2 Stable matching equilibrium
A matching is a pairing between donors and entrepreneurs, in which every donor [entrepreneur]
is either matched with an entrepreneur [donor], or goes unmatched. LetF be the set of donors,
and E the set of entrepreneurs, at t = 0. If f 2 F and e 2 E , a matching is a function
 : E [F ! E [F
such that:
1. (f) 2 ffg [ E
2. (e) 2 F [ feg
3. (e) = f () (f) = e
If (i) = i, then i is matched with herself (that is, remains unmatched). These three
conditions say that f must be matched with herself or with an element of E ; e must be
matched with himself or with an element of F ; and if e is matched with f , then f must be
matched with e.
Our equilibrium concept of a stable matching at t = 0 follows Roth & Sotomayor (1989)
and Besley & Ghatak (2005). We say that a matching is stable if there exists no donor and
entrepreneur, who, whilst not matched with one another, could obtain higher payo¤s if they
were to be matched with each other (with at least one of these agents obtaining a strictly higher
payo¤). We assume that, if an agent is indi¤erent between two matchings, they choose the one
that maximises the joint surplus produced by the match (i.e. they choose the match for which
their partner receives higher utility).25
Letm(i) denote an agents preferred mission and(i) their ideology. For a given entrepreneur
of type (mE ;E) and a given donor of type (mD;D), we denote by ((mE ;E); (mD;D))
25This assumption ensures that there is a unique class of stable matching equilibrium at t = 0 for a given
entry conguration at t =  1. It also ensures that this unique class of equilibrium is pareto-e¢ cient. We need
there to be a unique class of stable matching equilibrium for a given entry conguration because this enables
agents making their entry decision at t =  1 to assign probabilities to each possible outcome associated with
choosing a given occupational role, and thus to make an entry decision based on an expected utility calculation.
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and ((mE ;E); (mD;D)) the maximum value functions representing donors and entrepreneurs
payo¤s respectively when the donor implements the mission that maximises her utility. Our
equilibrium concept states that a matching is stable if there does not exist two matched
donor-entrepreneur pairs (f1; e1) and (f2; e2) such that (fi) = ei and (ei) = fi 8i = 1; 2
and both:
((m(e2);(e2)); (m(f1);(f1)))  ((m(e1);(e1)); (m(f1);(f1)))
((m(e2);(e2)); (m(f1);(f1)))  ((m(e2);(e2)); (m(f2);(f2)))
(8)
with at least one inequality strict. If two such donor-entrepreneurs exist, then donor f1 and
entrepreneur e2 would want to break their existing pairing to match with each other, so the
matching would not be stable.
4.3 Equilibrium when mission preferences and earnings capacities are
uncorrelated
In this section, we analyse the possible stable matching equilibria of the occupational choice
entry game when mission preferences and earnings are uncorrelated. Specically, we maintain
our prior assumption that all participants in the model have homogenous earning capacity d
in the private sector. We also assume a homogenous level of ideology  for all agents in the
model so there are no moderates or ideologues.
We start by holding xed the entry conguration at t =  1 and examining the types of
matching at t = 0 that are stable in the sense dened by Equation (8).
Lemma 1 Stable Matchings Homogenous Ideology (): Suppose that Assumption (4)
(ND < NE) holds. Then, for a given entry conguration at t =  1, a stable matching at t = 0
can take one of two possible forms:
 Case (1): No Mission Mismatch (see Figure 1): If N iE > N iD (the number of
entrepreneurs of type i is greater than the number of donors of type i) 8i fR;Sg, then
all S donors are matched with S entrepreneurs, and all R donors are matched with R
entrepreneurs. The remaining entrepreneurs go unmatched.
 Case (2): Mission Mismatch (see Figure 2): If NSE < NSD (the number of S entrepreneurs
is smaller than the number of S donors) then all S entrepreneurs are matched with
S donors, and the remaining S donors (who number NSD   NSE) are matched with R
entrepreneurs. All R donors are matched with R entrepreneurs, and all unmatched
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entrepreneurs are of type R. A corresponding mission mismatch case exists if there is
an excess of R donors rather than S donors.
Lemma (1) says that, for a given entry conguration at t =  1, stable matching equilibria
can arise that involve either a complete absence of mission mismatch, or some degree of mission
mismatch. The intuition for Lemma (1) is straightforward. Assumption (4) (ND < NE) means
that there cannot simultaneously be an excess of both types of donor relative to entrepreneurs
of their own mission preference type. The only matching without mission mismatch consistent
with Assumption (4) (ND < NE) is one in which all donors are paired with entrepreneurs of the
same mission preference, and any remaining entrepreneurs go unmatched. Similarly, as both
donors and entrepreneurs prefer to be matched with someone of their own mission preference
type, the only way that mission mismatch can arise if there is an excess of donors of one mission
preference type relative to the number of entrepreneurs sharing that mission preference.
We now examine which types of stable matching can arise at t = 0 when agents have a free
choice at t =  1 between entering the charitable sector or the private sector. We show that,
when all agents have the same earnings capacity d in the private sector, mission mismatch can
never arise at t = 0.
Proposition 6 No Mission Mismatch with Homogenous Income Earning Ability
(d): Suppose that Assumption (4) (ND < NE) holds and that all agents have the same earnings
capacity, d, in the private sector. Suppose that N iD > 0 for i 2 fR;Sg. Then there can be no
entry equilibrium in which some donors of mission preference i are matched with entrepreneurs
of mission preference j 6= i. That is to say, no equilibrium of the occupational choice entry
game can take the form given in Case (2) (Mission Mismatch) of Lemma (1).
Proposition (6) says that, when income earnings opportunities in the private sector are
homogenous, no subgame perfect stable matching equilibria of the entry game can arise in
which there are donor-entrepreneur pairings that disagree over the mission. The proof has the
following intuition. Assume there is a matching equilibrium with mission mismatch of the kind
specied in Case (2) (Mission Mismatch) of Lemma (1) say, with more S donors than there are
S entrepreneurs. Then we know from Lemma (1) that there will always be some mismatched
or unmatched R entrepreneurs. This means that, at t =  1, the expected payo¤ of an R type
choosing to enter as an entrepreneur is less than d c, the payo¤ they would obtain if matched
with an R donor with certainty. An R entrepreneur facing such an entry decision could, at
t =  1, decide instead to become a donor, which by Case (2) (Mission Mismatch) of Lemma
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(1) implies being matched with an R entrepreneur with certainty, which would yield payo¤ d.
As this payo¤ is strictly greater than the payo¤ from entrepreneurship, all R types would want
to enter as donors but this would lead to a violation of Assumption (4) (ND < NE), as we
assumed at the outset that there is an excess of S donors relative to S entrepreneurs.
4.4 Equilibrium when mission preferences and earnings capacities are
correlated
We have just shown that, if R and S types have the same earnings capacity, there cannot
be an equilibrium of the entry game at t =  1 that gives rise to a stable matching involving
mission mismatch at t = 0. If, instead, we assume that mission preferences and income-earning
capacities are correlated say, that preferring missionR is correlated with low earnings capacity,
while preferring mission S is correlated with high earnings capacity then an equilibrium with
mismatched donor-entrepreneur pairs can arise.
Assumption 5 Heterogeneous Income Earning Ability: Let all S agents have private
sector earnings capacity d, and let all R agents have earnings capacity d. Furthermore, assume
that  < , where   d=d and   (1 )++ .
Assumption (5) posits that the correlation between high earnings capacity and preferring
mission S is equal to one. This assumption is extreme, but helps to bring out more clearly the
role of income-earnings di¤erences as a driver of equilibrium mission mismatch. If we were to
have an imperfect correlation between mission preferences and earnings capacity, it would give
rise to a wider range of matched pairs in equilibrium, but some mismatch could still occur.26
Assumption (5) also posits that the inequality in earnings capacities between S types and R
types, which is captured by   d=d, is su¢ ciently large ( < ) that R entrepreneurs prefer
to be paired with S donors than with R donors:
Lemma 2 Stable Matchings Homogenous Ideology () and Heterogeneous Income
Earning Ability (d): If Assumption (5) (d=d   <   Heterogeneous Income Earning
Ability) holds
 Part (1): R entrepreneurs prefer to be paired with S donors rather than R donors.
26Suppose that we were to start from an entry conguration achieved when all S and R types have earnings
capacities d and d respectively. Now suppose that we change the donations limit of some S types to d. Then
this would change the entry equilibrium in the following way. If, in the initial entry conguration, there were
more S donors than S entrepreneurs, then the lower earnings capacity S types would now be more inclined to
enter as entrepreneurs, thus creating some assortatively matched fS donor, S entrepreneurg pairs. If, on the
other hand, there were more S entrepreneurs than S donors, then a higher earnings capacity S entrepreneur
would now be tempted to change their entry decision to become a donor.
198
 Part (2): The set of possible matching equilibria remains as specied in Lemma (1).
Part (1) of Lemma (2) holds because agents in our model care about both project size (NGO
output) and the mission that the NGO adopts. If the di¤erence in earnings capacity between
S and R donors is su¢ ciently large, then R entrepreneurs will prefer to be matched with S
donors, even if the S donor implements mission S, because the increase in utility that the R
entrepreneur obtains from larger project size outweighs the loss in utility su¤ered as a result of
not achieving their preferred mission. Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income
Earning Ability) provides the condition on inequality in earnings capacity required for this
situation to arise. Part (2) conrms that, for a given entry conguration at t =  1, the types
of stable matching that can occur at t = 0 are una¤ected by the introduction of heterogeneity
in income-earnings opportunities.
The next Proposition establishes that, if Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous
Income Earning Ability) holds and there is Limited Liability (w ()  0) and private costs of
entrepreneurship (c > 0), then there exist stable matching equilibria of the occupational choice
entry game in which donors are matched with entrepreneurs of the opposite mission preference
type.
Proposition 7 Stable Matching Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Homogenous
Ideology ().
 Part (1): The following are necessary conditions for the existence of a stable matching
equilibrium in which donors are matched with entrepreneurs of the opposite mission
preference type: (i) Limited Liability (w ()  0); (ii) private costs of entrepreneurship
(c > 0); and (iii) correlation between mission preferences and income-earnings ability in
the private sector, e.g. Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income Earning
Ability).
 Part (2): If the three conditions specied in Part (1) hold, a stable matching equilibrium
exists in which some donors are matched with entrepreneurs of the opposite mission
preference type so long as inequality in earnings capacity is su¢ ciently large. In this
equilibrium, S and R types enter both sides of the market in the following proportions:
NSD =

1
1+ 

N; NSE =

 
1+ 

N; NRD=


1+

N; and NRE=

1
1+

N (9)
where   d    c
d   ;   d max
n

+ ; 1 
o
; and   d (
1  
1+ )(d c)
(d c)+( 1  1+ )(d c)
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In Part (2) of Proposition (7), we have demonstrated that a stable matching equilibrium of
the occupational choice entry game exists in which some donor-entrepreneur pairings disagree
over the mission. In this way, we have answered a question that was implicitly posed by Besley
& Ghatak (2005)s paper on the mission choice problem in the not-for-prot sector namely,
when principals and agents can choose who they match with, is there any reason to expect
that conict over the mission will arise in equilibrium, as opposed to principals and agents
being assortatively matched? Should we not expect principals and agents to self-select into
assortative matchings? It is not obvious that such an equilibrium (i.e. one involving mission
mismatch) could arise. Indeed, in Proposition (6), we show that, when all agents have the
same income-earning opportunities in the private sector, such an equilibrium of the entry game
cannot arise.
In Proposition (7), however, we provide an explanation for the phenomenon of mission
conict in the NGO sector that has clear real-world relevance. This is that disagreement
over the mission can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon when there is a correlation between
income-earnings opportunities in the private sector and preferences over the mission. If the
di¤erence in income-earnings opportunities between mission preference types is su¢ ciently
large, then poorentrepreneurs will prefer to be matched with richdonors of the opposite
mission preference type than with poordonors of the same mission preference type, because
the resulting increase in NGO output confers a payo¤ that outweighs the loss in utility from
possibly having to implement ones less preferred mission.
Heterogeneity in income-earning opportunities is not in itself su¢ cient however, as it does
not explain why richdonors might be content with an equilibrium in which they outnumber
entrepreneurs who share their mission preferences, implying that they are matched with
entrepreneurs of the opposite mission preference type with some probability. If such a conguration
of the entry game arose, would some rich donors not wish to revise their entry decision at
t =  1 to instead become an entrepreneur, implying that they would be matched with a rich
donor who shares their mission preferences with certainty? Our model shows that richdonors
might be willing to put up with some possibility of mismatch if there are private costs of
running a charity, which create a wedge between payo¤s from being a donor and from being
an entrepreneur. If such private costs of entrepreneurship exist, richdonors might be willing
to tolerate some possibility of mission mismatch in order to avoid having to incur these costs.
Notice that limc!0X = 12N 8X 2

NSD; N
S
E ; N
R
D ; N
R
E
	
that is, as c goes to zero, mission
mismatch also goes to zero. Conversely, so long as c > 0, NSD > N
S
E , which implies that
some mismatch occurs. Moreover, the degree of mismatch is increasing in c, as higher c makes
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entering as an entrepreneur less attractive, and therefore means that S types are willing to
tolerate a higher probability of mismatch when entering as a donor. The degree of mismatch
is also decreasing in , the common ideology of all agents. We show this by constructing a
measure of mismatch from Equation (9) which is equal to the fraction of mismatched pairs
relative to total pairs:
NSD NSE
ND
=
1   
1+


1+

(1 +  )
The numerator is the number of pairs in which an S donor is matched with anR entrepreneur
(which is equal to the number of S donors left over after as many as possible have been paired
with S entrepreneurs), while the denominator is the total number of matches. As the right
hand side is a decreasing function of  , it is a decreasing function of 27 that is to say, the
more ideological the agents are, the lower will be the fraction of pairs where there is mission
mismatch. This makes sense the higher the utility loss from implementing ones less preferred
mission relative to ones preferred mission, the less frequent pairings involving such a loss will
be.
By explaining mission conict in the charitable sector as a consequence of a correlation
between earnings opportunities and mission preferences, we o¤er an insight into how rich
philanthropists can exert a decisive inuence over the direction taken by the charitable sector
 but we also suggest that this unequal inuence may be a key driver of mission conict
within NGOs. Rich philanthropists are interested in funding good works  but they are
not necessarily interested in undertaking such works themselves, as doing so requires time
and e¤ort. If an agents mission preferences are not correlated with their earnings capacity,
then rich philanthropists will have little di¢ culty nding like-minded charitable entrepreneurs.
If, however, rich and poor favour di¤erent charitable causes, rich philanthropists may have
di¢ culty nding charitable entrepreneurs who share their world view, as most like minded
individuals tend also to be rich, and therefore also keen to avoid the drudgery associated with
front-line charitable work. However, there will be numerous charitable entrepreneurs with
di¤erent mission preferences that are not only willing to receive donations from them, but
actively prefer to work for the rich philanthropists charity, where they have large budgets
despite possibly having to undertake work that is in their view somewhat tainted, than in
ideologically pure charities with small budgets and little impact.
27Notice that  is decreasing in  and that  is decreasing in . This implies that  is increasing in .
Notice also that  is decreasing in

1  
1+ 

and that

1  
1+ 

is decreasing in  ; therefore  is increasing in  
and .
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When mission preferences and income-earnings opportunities  or, more simply, wealth
 are correlated, these dual pressures  the desire of the rich to fund good works without
actually undertaking them, and the willingness of charitable entrepreneurs to compromise on
the mission in order to access larger donations combine to create a charitable sector in which
there is a systematic tendency towards disagreement over the mission between donors and NGO
managers and workers. This disagreement, in turn, creates an agency problem in which donors
must weigh up the costs and benets of incentivising the entrepreneur to chose their preferred
mission, in the knowledge that the conditional payments required to undertake this task imply
a reduction in NGO output.
How does the mission mismatch we have identied compare to the social optimum? We
imagine a scenario where the planner chooses each agents entry decision, the matching given
these entry decisions and the mission in each match. Given Proposition (1), and the fact that
all agents have the same ideology , the planner is indi¤erent between choosing the R and
S mission when donor and entrepreneur have di¤erent mission preferences. The planner will
also ensure no agent goes unmatched, for otherwise they could change the entry decision of
the unmatched agent to create higher surplus. We nd that whether the planner chooses an
equilibrium with mission mismatch or with no mission mismatch depends on parameters in the
following way:
Lemma 3 First Best Entry Decisions with Homogenous Ideology (): When mission
is contractible, there is no Limited Liability, and all agents have the same ideology , the First
Best entry decisions, matching and mission choice decisions are as follows:
 Part (1): Specialisation (non-assortative matching): If  < 1   , then the
First Best involves all N S types entering as donors, and all N R types entering as
entrepreneurs, at t =  1. At t = 0, all agents are placed into mismatched donor-entrepreneur
pairs. The mission chosen for each pair may be either R or S.
 Part (2): Assortative matching: If  > 1   , then the First Best involves half of
all S types entering as donors, and the other half entering as entrepreneurs, at t =  1.
Likewise, half of all R types enter as donors, while the other half enter as entrepreneurs,
at t =  1. At t = 0, donors and entrepreneurs are assortatively matched with respect to
mission preferences, and the assortatively matched pairs implement their own preferred
mission.
 Part (3): We note that Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income Earning
Ability) and Assumption (2) ((1   ) > 1 Donors Always Donate) together imply
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that 1    > . Thus, the First Best entry conguration involves full specialisation
(non-assortative matching).
Lemma (3) shows that the characteristics of the First Best boil down to an intuitive
parameter restriction: if inequality in earnings abilities is high enough (that is, if  is small
enough), then all donors should be S types and all R types should be entrepreneurs. High-
income-earning-ability types should do the earning and the giving, whilst the low-income-
earning-ability types should be the charitable entrepreneurs. Every donor-entrepreneur pairing
involves mission mismatch, and thus either the donor or the entrepreneur su¤ers a utility loss
from not realising their preferred mission, but this utility loss is more than compensated for
by the fact that all high-income-earning-ability types enter the private sector, and contribute
their resulting earnings to charitable causes. This is indeed the case under the parametric
restrictions we have studied to date, as Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income
Earning Ability) and Assumption (2) ((1   ) > 1 Donors Always Donate) imply that
1  > . In an alternative universe where income earnings inequality is lower, the gains from
having all high-earnings-ability types enter the private sector are smaller relative to the losses
arising from mission mismatch, thus leading the planner to choose an assortative scenario, in
which both the R and S types do some of the earning and giving, and some of the doing.
In this scenario, all donors and entrepreneurs are assortatively matched, and consequently get
their preferred mission.
Given that 1    >  under the parametric restrictions we make in this section, Lemma
(3) would seem to suggest that, relative to the social optimum, there is not enoughmission
mismatch in the decentralised solution. However, this is an erroneous view, for in the decentralised
equilibrium there are further costs from the existence of mismatched pairs that do not arise
in the First Best, as mismatched donors can only realise their preferred mission by o¤ering a
signal-conditional payment, which detracts from NGO output and therefore joint surplus.
5 Do do-gooders dogood?
5.1 Mission mismatch with ideologues and moderates
In the previous section, we derived conditions under which mission mismatch can arise when
all agents have the same ideology . Here, we extend our matching model of occupational
choice to a setting with heterogeneous ideology, in which some agents are ideologues and others
are moderates, in order to better understand the role of ideologues or do-gooders  in the
charitable sector, and reect further on the meaning and implications of the Busan Declaration.
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We continue to assume that all S types can earn d in the private sector, while all R types
can earn d < d. There are NR type R agents a proportion h are ideologues (with R = H),
while a proportion (1  h) are moderates (with R = L). There are NS type S agents, all
of whom have a single level of ideology S .28
Assumption (3) (Ideologue Entrepreneurs Enforce Preferred Mission) says that ideologue
entrepreneurs can always induce the donor to implement the socially optimal mission by making
it too costly to do otherwise, whilst moderate entrepreneurs cannot. Thus, if a stable matching
involves all S donors matched with R ideologues, the principles enunciated in the Busan
Declaration which under Assumption (3) (Ideologue Entrepreneurs Enforce Preferred Mission)
are socially optimal are adhered to voluntarily, so there is no potential role for policy. To
understand the relevance and potential policy implications of the Busan Declaration, we would
therefore like to examine under what circumstances R moderates are matched with S donors,
in light of the voluntary nature of agentsentry decisions at t =  1.
The total number of uninvolved agents can be broken down into S and R types, NU = NSU +
NRU , as can the total number of donors (ND = N
S
D+N
R
D) and entrepreneurs (NE = N
S
E +N
R
E ).
Donors, entrepreneurs and uninvolved agents who prefer mission R can be further broken down
by ideology: NRU = N
RL
U +N
RH
U , ND = N
RL
D +N
RH
D and N
R
E = N
RL
E +N
RH
E .
In this section, we focus on the case where d   c < d, which restricts attention to
equilibria in which S types prefer to remain uninvolved than to enter the charitable sector
as entrepreneurs. This reduces the S types entry decision at t =  1 to choosing between
becoming a donor and remaining uninvolved.29 Consequently, any resulting equilibrium will, by
assumption, involve some degree of mission mismatch, as S types will never become entrepreneurs.
We have already shown that mission mismatch can arise as a stable matching equilibrium of
the entry game; this new assumption is better suited to analysing whether the charitable sector
is likely to be dominated by ideologues or moderates, and the consequent implications for the
entry decisions of agents whose main margin of adjustment is between becoming a donor and
remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector.
Assumption 6 No S Entrepreneurs: d  c < d.
28The assumption that all S types have a single level of ideology, S , is a simplication rather than a reection
of our view of reality, and is made to limit the number of possible cases in the entry game. It can be done
without losing insight about the value of the Busan Declaration, and it also allows us to make predictions about
the how ideological those who enter as entrepreneurs will be.
29Other equilibria exist in which d  c > d but ignoring these equilibria does not a¤ect our analysis of the
interesting cases that arise when d  c < d. We intend to characterise the equilibria that arise when  d  c > d
in an extension to the present work.
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Assumption (6) also makes our occupational choice model better applicable to the eld
of international development assistance, and consequently positions us better to analyse the
Busan Declaration. In this setting, we think of high income-earning capacity (S) types as
individuals living in a rich country (or, perhaps, institutions based in a rich country) who face
a decision between becoming a donor and remaining uninvolved in the NGO sector, while we
think of low income-earning capacity (R) types as individuals living in a developing country
whose main choice is between entering the NGO sector and seeking funds from aid donors, or
entering the private sector and, possibly, also becoming a donor.
In Section Three, we made Assumption (2) (1 < (1   D) Donors Always Donate),
which ensured that agents who enter the private sector prefer to donate and implement their
less preferred mission than to remain uninvolved in the charitable sector. We now drop this
assumption, so that 
 
1 S may be greater than or less than 1.
Assumption 7 (1 S) ? 1.
Assumption (7) allows for the possibility that (1   S) < 1 in order to introduce an
extensive margin in the decision of private sector entrants concerning charitable donations. We
introduce such a margin to examine the possibility that, while enforcing the Busan Declaration
may be socially optimal for a given entry conguration, it may also be the case that, when agents
have a free choice of occupational role at t =  1, the knowledge that the Busan Declaration will
be enforced may lead prospective donors to not participate in the charitable sector whatsoever.
When an S type is deciding, at t =  1, whether to become a donor or remain uninvolved,
they do not know whether, if they become a donor, they will be matched with an ideologue
or a moderate. If 
 
1 S < 1, an S type would want to donate if they were to be paired
with an R moderate with certainty, and would not want to donate if they were to be paired
with an R ideologue with certainty. Thus, their choice between becoming a donor or remaining
uninvolved will depend on the relative number of R ideologues and R moderates who have
entered as entrepreneurs, and the consequent probability of being paired with each.30
The following Lemma characterises the matchings at t = 0 that are stable for a given
conguration of the occupational choice entry game at t =  1.
30A very similar problem would arise if we instead assumed that donors cannot observe whether the
entrepreneur they are paired with is an ideologue or an entrepreneur. In other work (Sandford and Skellern
2014b), we construct such a model and show that there exists a screening contract o¤ered by an S donor which
has the same payo¤ properties as the full-information case. S donors either always give or never give, depending
on the probability that an R entrepreneur will be a moderate or an ideologue.
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Lemma 4 Stable Matchings Heterogeneous Ideology (): Suppose that Assumptions
(5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income Earning Ability) and (6) (No S Entrepreneurs)
hold. Then, for a given entry conguration at t =  1, a stable matching equilibrium at t = 0
can take one of two forms:
 Case (1): There are more S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs (NRLE  NSD
see Figure 3). Then a stable matching involves all R moderate entrepreneurs being
matched with S donors, while any remaining S donors are matched with R ideologue
entrepreneurs. The former implement mission S, while the latter implement mission
R. R donors are matched with any remaining R ideologue entrepreneurs. Unmatched
entrepreneurs are always R ideologues.
 Case (2): There are fewer S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs (NRLE >
NSD see Figure 4). Then a stable matching involves all S donors being matched with
R moderate entrepreneurs and implementing mission S. R donors are matched with the
remaining entrepreneurs, who may be R moderates or R ideologues. The entrepreneurs
who remain unmatched may also be either R moderates or R ideologues.
The common property shared by Cases (1) and (2) of Lemma (4) is that S donors are
paired preferentially with R moderate entrepreneurs.31 This situation arises because S donors
prefer R moderates to R ideologues, and R moderate entrepreneurs prefer S donors to R
donors (by Assumption (5) (d=d   <  Heterogeneous Income Earning Ability)). Lemma
(4) notes that, given this preferential pairing, stable matching equilibria can take one of two
forms: either there are fewer R moderate entrepreneurs than S donors, or there are more R
moderate entrepreneurs than S donors. Either way, however, the fact that S donors are paired
preferentially with R moderate entrepreneurs means that there is an ine¢ ciency: no S donor
is matched with an R ideologue entrepreneur if there is an R moderate entrepreneur matched
with an R donor or left unmatched, yet fS donor, R ideologue entrepreneurg pairs generate
higher joint surplus than fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairs. If the entrepreneurs in
an fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairing and an fR donor, R ideologue entrepreneurg
pairing could be switched, social welfare would therefore increase, as the surplus generated by
fR donor, R entrepreneurg pairings is not a function of entrepreneur ideology.
Proposition 8 Enforced Matching: Fix the entry decisions of agents at t =  1 and, once
donors are matched, let the contract o¤er fb; wg be freely chosen by the donor as in Section
31For the remainder of the paper, all references to casesand sub-casesuse the numbering of cases in Lemma
(4).
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Three. Then social welfare would be strictly higher than in the stable matchings described in
Lemma (4) (Stable Matchings  Heterogeneous Ideology) if, instead, a social planner could
enforce a matching without regard to stability considerations, such that all S donors were
matched with R ideologue entrepreneurs until there were no R ideologue entrepreneurs left,
and any remaining S donors were matched with R moderate entrepreneurs.
Proposition (8) says that, for a given entry conguration at t =  1, a social planner could
impose a matching that generates higher social welfare than the matching that arises as a
stable equilibrium by pairing S donors preferentially with R ideologues rather than with R
moderates. Proposition (8) thus provides a perspective on the e¢ ciency of the matchings in
Lemma (4) (Stable Matchings Heterogeneous Ideology), but it takes entry decisions at t =  1
as given. In Proposition (10), we ask a related question that does take agentsentry decisions
into account namely, in what circumstances would it be socially optimal for a benevolent
planner to commit at t =  2 to enforcing the Busan Declaration, while still allowing agents
a free choice at t =  1 between becoming a charitable entrepreneur, becoming a donor, or
remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector?
5.2 Equilibrium properties of the occupational choice entry game
We now analyse the entry congurations at t =  1 that can form part of a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, given the knowledge provided by Lemma (4) about the stable matchings that
can arise at t = 0 for a given entry conguration. For each Case in Lemma (4), we analyse the
expected payo¤s of each type of agent given each possible entry decision, and draw conclusions
about the di¤erent entry congurations that can arise in equilibrium.
5.2.1 Case (2) Fewer S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs (NRLE > N
S
D)
Case (2), in which all S donors can be matched with R moderate entrepreneurs, implies that
all S types enter as donors (NSD = N
S), as S donors prefer being matched with R moderates
to remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector. Furthermore, every R ideologue must strictly
prefer entering as a donor to entering as an entrepreneur. Given Assumption (4) (ND < NE),
if an R ideologue enters as a donor they are paired with an R entrepreneur with certainty and
receive payo¤ d, while if they enter as an entrepreneur they are paired with an R donor (since
there is no chance of being paired with an S donor), implying payo¤ d   c, with probability
less than one, and are unmatched otherwise. The payo¤ from becoming a donor is thus strictly
higher.
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If an R moderate enters as a donor, they are paired with an R entrepreneur for sure
and receive payo¤ d. If they enter as an entrepreneur, they are paired with an S donor
with probability NS=NRLE , implying payo¤ d  c; paired with an R donor with probability
NRD=N
RL
E , implying payo¤ d   c; and are unmatched with the remaining probability. Thus,
their expected payo¤ at t =  1, conditional on making an optimal entry decision, is:
max
n
d;

NS
NRLE

(d  c) +

NRD
NRLE

(d  c)
o
(10)
The R moderates payo¤ to donorship cannot be strictly larger than their payo¤ from
entrepreneurship, as we are dealing with a case in which there are enoughRmoderate entrepreneurs
to match with all S donors. Hence there are two sub-cases: R moderates are indi¤erent between
entrepreneurship and donorship, and entrepreneurship is strictly preferable. These two cases
are analysed, and the remaining properties of the equilibrium established, in the Proof of
Proposition (9) (Equilibria Heterogeneous Ideology).
5.2.2 Case (1) More S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs (NRLE  NSD)
Case (1), in which all R moderate entrepreneurs can be paired with an S donor, requires rst
of all that there be some S donors. This implies that the payo¤ to an S type from becoming
a donor must be at least as good as that from remaining uninvolved.32 However, S types may
strictly prefer being a donor to being uninvolved, or may be indi¤erent between donorship and
remaining uninvolved. We therefore analyse each possibility separately.
If 
 
1 S  1 (that is, if S types are not too ideological), all S types enter as donors
(NSD = N
S), as their worst outcome from donorship being paired with an ideologue is better
than remaining uninvolved.
If 
 
1 S < 1 (that is, if S types are su¢ ciently ideological), and an S type remains
uninvolved, they receive payo¤ d. If they become a donor, with probability NRLE =N
S
D they are
paired with an R moderate, implement mission S, and receive payo¤


+L

d. With the
remaining probability, they are paired with an R ideologue, implement mission R, and receive
utility (1  S)d. Thus their expected payo¤ at t =  1, conditional on making an optimal
32 In fact, no equilibrium of the entry game consistent with Assumption (4) (ND < NE), and involving the
existence of an NGO sector, can arise if there are no S donors (i.e. if all S types remain uninvolved in the
charitable sector). In such a situation, an R type who enters as a donor would be paired with an R entrepreneur
with certainty, implying payo¤ d, whereas if they entered as an entrepreneur, they would be paired with an
R donor with some probability and remain unmatched with the remaining probability, implying an expected
payo¤ < d  c. Hence R types would strictly prefer to enter as donors. Thus there would be no entrepreneurs,
and no NGO production would occur.
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entry decision, is:
EUS = max

d;

NRLE
NSD


 + L

d+

1  N
RL
E
NSD

(1 S)d

(11)
Rearranging Equation (11) gives that:
NSD =

1


NRLE , where  
1  (1 S)



+L
  (1 S)
 (12)
By Assumption (1) (Participation Constraints Satised),  < 1. Thus, Equation (12) says
that a fraction  of S donors are paired with R moderate entrepreneurs, while the remaining
1   are paired with ideologues. Also,  is an increasing function of S hence the fraction
of S donors who are matched with an R moderate entrepreneur is increasing in S .
Next we study the entry decision of R types. R types who become donors are matched with
an R entrepreneur with certainty, yielding payo¤ d. As this payo¤ is strictly higher than the
payo¤ from being uninvolved, d, no R type will stay uninvolved in the charitable sector. An
R moderate who enters as an entrepreneur is paired with an S donor with certainty, in which
case mission S is implemented. Thus an R moderates expected payo¤ at t =  1, conditional
on making an optimal entry decision, is:
EU(R;L) = max

d; d  c	 , where   (1 L) + L
 + L
(13)
As neither of the possible payo¤s in Equation (13) depend on the proportions of entrants
to one or the other side of the market, R moderates will never be indi¤erent between entry
options, but instead will strictly prefer either being a donor or being an entrepreneur. Recalling
that   d=d, if   c
d
>  (high inequality), all R moderates become NGO entrepreneurs. If
  c
d
<  (low inequality), all R moderates become donors.33
These observations about the incentives of S types and R moderate types allow us to
characterise the properties of possible entry equilibria associated with Case (1) into three
sub-cases: see Table (1). Table (1) provides a typology of cases based on what we already
know, which will be used as inputs into the Proof of Proposition (9) (Equilibria Heterogeneous
Ideology). We refer to the bottom right cell as Case (X), rather than Case (1)(iv), because it
is not actually consistent with Case (1), which requires that there are at least some S donors.
In Case (X), the fact that NSD =
1
N
RL
E implies that N
S
D = 0, as the number of R moderate
entrepreneurs is also equal to zero. Furthermore, as we noted in Footnote (32), no equilibrium
33The dening characteristic of Case (1) is that NRLE < N
S
D . This encompasses the situation where N
RL
E = 0.
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of the occupational choice entry game involving NGO production can arise when there are no
S donors.
Finally, we analyse the entry decision of an R ideologue. If an R ideologue becomes a donor,
they are matched with an R entrepreneur with certainty, yielding payo¤ d. If they enter as
an entrepreneur, they are paired with an S donor with probability
 
NSD  NRLE

=NRHE (the
numerator is the number of S donors left over after S donors have rst been preferentially
paired with R moderate entrepreneurs), in which case mission R is implemented and payo¤
d  c is obtained; with an R donor with probability NRD=NRHE , yielding payo¤ d  c; and are
unmatched with the remaining probability, yielding payo¤ zero. Hence the expected utility of
an R ideologue at t =  1 is:
EU(R;H) = max

d;

NSD  NRLE
NRHE

(d  c) +

NRD
NRHE

(d  c)

(14)
At least some R ideologues must become entrepreneurs, otherwise some S donors are
unmatched, which means that Assumption (4) (ND < NE) is violated. Hence R ideologues can
either mix between the donor and entrepreneur roles, or they can strictly prefer the entrepreneur
role. In the Proof of Proposition (9), we analyse both of these possibilities for each of the three
variants of Case (1) in Table (1).
5.2.3 Equilibrium of the occupational choice entry game
Analysing the various possibilities within Case (1) and Case (2) separately, we obtain the
following:
Proposition 9 Stable Matching Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Heterogeneous
Ideology (): Suppose that Assumptions (4) (ND < NE) and (6) (No S entrepreneurs) hold.
Then there exist parameter values

h;NS ; NR; d; d
	
such that, for h 2 (0; 1), NS > 0, NR > 0,
and 0 < d < d:
 Part (1): The entry decisions of agents can give rise to an entry equilibrium with the
stable matching as in Case (1) of Lemma (4). That is, all R moderate entrepreneurs
are matched with S donors, and any remaining S donors are matched with R ideologue
entrepreneurs. The former implement mission S, while the latter implement mission
R. R donors are matched with any remaining R ideologue entrepreneurs. Unmatched
entrepreneurs are always R ideologues.
210
 Part (2): The entry decisions of agents can give rise to an entry equilibrium with the
stable matching as in Case (2) of Lemma (4). That is, all S types as well as all R
ideologues become donors. All S types are matched with R moderate entrepreneurs and
implement mission S. R donors are matched with the remaining entrepreneurs.
Proposition (9) shows that a stable matching subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
entry game does indeed exist. In the Proof of Proposition (9), we show that eight classes of
equilibrium can arise. Six of these are sub-cases of Case (1). For each of Cases (1)(i), (1)(ii) and
(1)(iii) in Table (1), there are two classes one where all R ideologues become entrepreneurs,
and the other where some become entrepreneurs and others donors. The remaining two classes
are sub-cases of Case (2) one where all R moderates become entrepreneurs, and the other
where some become entrepreneurs and others donors. In the Proof, we show that each of the
eight classes of equilibrium can arise for some combination of values of

h;NS ; NR; d; d
	
.34
Before going on to study the e¤ects of the Busan Declaration which we take to mean that,
once matched, every donor-entrepreneur pairing must implement the entrepreneurs preferred
mission we study the First Best matching equilibrium in which the social planner chooses the
entry decisions, the matching and the mission. Dene:
E() =
8>>>><>>>>:
min(S ;L) if (1  h)NR  NS
min

S ;

(1 h)NR
NS

L

+ min

1  (1 h)NR
NS

; H

if N
S
NR
2 ((1  h) ; 1)
(1  h) min(S ;L) + hmin  S ;H if NS  NR
We obtain, analogously to Lemma (3):
Lemma 5 First Best Entry Decisions with Heterogeneous Ideology (): When the
mission is contractible, there is no Limited Liability, and R type agents are either ideologues
(H) or moderates (L), the First Best entry decisions, matching and mission choice decisions
are as follows:
 Part (1): Specialisation (non-assortative matching): Let  < 1  E().
 Let NR > NS. Then all S types are donors, 12 (NR  NS) R types are donors, and
the remaining R types are entrepreneurs. R ideologues are used to ll the R donor
roles rst, and R moderates are only allocated to the donor role if there are fewer than
34 In an extension to the present work, we intend to more fully characterise the relationship between the
parametric conditions that must obtain for each class of equilibrium to be possible, in order to be able to state
which classes of equilibrium can arise for a given set of primitives.
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1
2 (NR  NS) R ideologues. S donors are matched with R moderate entrepreneurs
rst, and with R ideologue entrepreneurs only if and when all the R moderate
entrepreneurs have been allocated to other S donors. fS donor, R entrepreneurg
pairings implement the mission preferred by the most ideological agent in the pairing.
The remaining pairings, between R donors and R entrepreneurs, implement mission
R.
 Let NS > NR. Then all R types are entrepreneurs, 12 (NS  NR) S types are
entrepreneurs, and the remaining S types are donors. fS donor, R entrepreneurg
pairings implement the mission preferred by the most ideological agent in the pairing.
The remaining pairings, between S donors and S entrepreneurs, implement mission
S.
 Part (2): Assortative matching: Let  > 1 E(). Then N2 S types are donors and
the remaining N2 S types are entrepreneurs. Similarly,
N
2 R types are donors and
N
2 R
types are entrepreneurs. Donors and entrepreneurs are assortatively matched with respect
to the mission, and all donors and entrepreneurs always realise their preferred mission.
Lemma (5) says that, when ideology () is heterogeneous, with R types being either
ideologues (H) or moderates (L), the First Best involves either complete specialisation
(either all S types become donors or all R types become entrepreneurs) or complete assortative
matching (each mission preference type divides equally between the donor and entrepreneur
roles, and always matches with someone of the same mission preference type). As in Lemma
(3), the choice between complete specialisation and complete assortative matching boils down
to a trade-o¤ between gains from having S types as donors, and gains from having assortatively
matched donor-entrepreneur pairs; moreover, the condition under which each is optimal can
again be expressed in terms of the income inequality parameter   d=d.
If income inequality is su¢ ciently high (that is, if  is su¢ ciently low), then S types earn
a lot more in the private sector than R types do, and so it is socially optimal for S types to
specialise into the donor role, even though this will lead to the creation of many mismatched
donor-entrepreneur pairs, in which either the donor or the entrepreneur su¤ers a utility loss
from not realising their preferred mission. But if income inequality is su¢ ciently low (that is,
if  is su¢ ciently close to 1, or if d is su¢ ciently close to d), then a charity funded by an R
type donor will be almost as big as a charity funded by an S type donor. Hence, the gain
from having assortatively matched donor-entrepreneur pairs, so that both the donor and the
entrepreneur realise their preferred mission, outweighs the loss from not always having S types
as donors, and so social welfare is maximised by complete assortative matching.
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By comparing Proposition (9) with Lemma (5), we can obtain an insight into the nature of
the distortions involved in the stable matching subgame perfect Nash equilibria that arise under
the decentralised solution to our model. These distortions are: rstly, Limited Liability and
mission non-contractibility, implying ine¢ cient mission choice; and, secondly, the decentralisation
of entry and matching decisions. We discussed the rst class of distortions in Section Three. The
second class of distortions comes from the fact that each agent decides for themselves whether
to enter the private sector or the charitable sector, and who to match with after entering. These
entry and matching decisions are not always socially optimal. As we have seen, S donors prefer
to match with R moderate entrepreneurs rather than R ideologue entrepreneurs, even though
matching with the latter generates higher joint surplus than matching with the former. In
regard to entry decisions, R types tend to over-enter the charitable sector relative to the social
optimum, because in so doing they face a positive probability of being matched with an S type
but this leads to some charitable entrepreneurs going unmatched, which detracts from social
welfare.
In studying the implementation of the Busan Declaration on the types of equilibrium that
can arise in a decentralised setting, we will see that, as well as reducing the ine¢ ciencies
that arise from the rst class of distortions outlined above, enforcing the Busan Declaration
can increase the ine¢ ciencies that come from the second class of distortions outlined above.
In particular, we will see that S types may choose to respond to enforcement of the Busan
Declaration by remaining uninvolved in the charitable sector more often, while even more R
types may switch their entry decisions from being a donor to being an entrepreneur, now that
they are assured of realising their preferred mission.
We now use Proposition (9) (Equilibria Heterogeneous Ideology) to answer the questions
posed at the start of this paper. Would enforcing the Busan Declaration improve social
welfare when prospective donors know that this will happen, are able to choose whether to
become donors or remain uninvolved in the charitable sector, and are able to sort into a stable
matching once occupational choices are made? And under what circumstances do ideologues
(or do-gooders) tend to select disproportionately into charitable work  that is, when will
do-gooders dogood? To answer these questions, we henceforth focus on Case (1), in which
there are more S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs.35
35We do this because we are interested in examining the potential role of ideologues (or do-gooders) as
charitable entrepreneurs, and, in Case (2), in which there are fewer S donors than R moderate entrepreneurs,
all ideologues become donors.
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5.3 Should the Busan Declaration be enforced?
Would enforcing the Busan Declaration improve social welfare when prospective donors, knowing
that a social planner has credibly committed at t =  2 to insisting that charities implement the
preferred mission of recipients (entrepreneurs), are able to choose whether to become donors or
remain completely uninvolved in the charitable sector? To answer this question, we dene social
welfare as the sum of joint surpluses for all the donor-entrepreneur pairings in the economy,
plus the utility accruing to any uninvolved agents. Recall that, in Case (1) of Lemma (4), there
are NRLE fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairs,
 
NSD  NRLE
 fS donor, R ideologue
entrepreneurg pairs, NRD fR donor, R entrepreneurg pairs, and
 
NS  NSD

uninvolved S
agents. Thus, dening Jfi jg as the joint surplus from the pairing of an i donor with a j
entrepreneur, social welfare is equal to:
W =
 
NS  NSD

d+NRLE JfS RLg + (N
S
D  NRLE )JfS RHg +NRDJfR Rg
JfS RLg, JfS RHg, and JfR Rg are given by Equations (4), (5) and (7) respectively.
Incorporating these values of joint surplus into our measure of social welfare gives:
W =
 
NS  NSD

d+NRLE

(2 L)+L
+L

d  c

+(NSD  NRLE )
 
(2 S)d  c+NRD(2d  c) (15)
This denition will allow us to compare social welfare given the equilibria found in Proposition
(9) with the equilibria which would arise if, once matched, each donor was obliged to implement
the entrepreneurs preferred mission.
We restrict our attention to  <    c
d
(high inequality)  that is, to Cases (1)(i) and
(1)(iii) of Table (1), in which some S donors are paired with R moderate entrepreneurs.
We do this because, if  <    c
d
(low inequality), we are in Case (1)(ii) of Table (1),
where all entrepreneurs are R ideologues, and all S donors consequently implement mission R
because mission S is too expensive. Thus, in Case (1)(ii), the Busan Declaration is voluntarily
implemented, and there cannot be any gain from a policy that enforces it.
When the Busan Declaration is enforced, there are two e¤ects. The rst, primary, or static
e¤ect is a gain from enforcement: fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairings generate a
higher joint surplus when they implement mission R rather than mission S. The second e¤ect
operates via agentsincentives to enter the private sector and donate. A key determinant of
social welfare in our model is the number of private sector entrants, as these agents generate
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income in the private sector while charitable entrepreneurs do not. Ceteris paribus, a larger
number of private sector entrants means higher social welfare and for a given number of private
sector entrants, a larger number of donors relative to uninvolved agents also increases social
welfare, as there are positive externalities from donating but not from private consumption.
Enforcing the Busan Declaration may increase or decrease donor entry. If it increases donor
entry, there is a double gain from enforcement. If it decreases donor entry, the static welfare
gains from making fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairs implement mission R must be
weighed against the welfare losses from reduced entry into the private sector and the donor
role.
Proposition 10 Enforcing Busan Declaration: Assume that  <   c
d
(high inequality)
that is, restrict attention the decentralised entry equilibria corresponding to Cases (1)(i) and
(1)(iii) of Table (1), in which some S donors are paired with R moderate entrepreneurs. Then
there exists a threshold value of S type ideology, ~S, such that enforcing the Busan Declaration
increases social welfare for all S  ~S. Further, the threshold ~S obeys 

1  ~S

 1.
Proposition (10) provides a rather pessimistic perspective on the desirability of implementing
the Busan Declaration when entry decisions are endogenous, giving is voluntary, and agents
can sort into a stable matching. It says that, when 
 
1 S < 1 (S types prefer to remain
uninvolved in the charitable sector than donate to a charity that implements mission R),
enforcing the Busan Declaration always reduces social welfare. But, even when 
 
1 S > 1
(S types prefer to donate to a charity that implements mission R than to remain uninvolved
in the charitable sector), enforcing the Busan Declaration only increases social welfare for S
su¢ ciently small (that is, for S  ~S). The fact that enforcing the Busan Declaration
always reduces social welfare when 
 
1 S < 1 is quite unsurprising. This condition says
that S types prefer to remain uninvolved in the charitable sector than to donate to a charity
that implements mission R. But, if the Busan Declaration is enforced, charities will always
implement mission R, and so no S types will ever become donors. Hence, enforcing the Busan
Declaration would clearly reduce social welfare.
The fact that enforcing the Busan Declaration may decrease social welfare even when

 
1 S > 1 (S types prefer to donate to a charity run that implements mission R than to
remain uninvolved in the charitable sector) is a little more counter-intuitive. If 
 
1 S > 1,
enforcing the Busan Declaration will not lead to reduced entry by S types into the donor role
 that is, it will not lead more S types to stay uninvolved in the charitable sector. Given
that enforcing the Busan Declaration will also involve a static gain from enforcement (matched
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fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairs now implement mission R, which confers higher
joint surplus than implementing mission S), surely enforcing the Busan Declaration should
unambiguously increase social welfare?
It turns out, however, that enforcing the Busan Declaration has a third e¤ect, which can
make enforcement undesirable even when there are static gains from doing so, and even when
there are no losses from enforcement in the form of reduced entry by S types into the donor
role. This is that enforcing the Busan Declaration also makes it more attractive for R types
to become NGO entrepreneurs. For R ideologues, becoming an entrepreneur is unambiguously
more attractive under enforcement because, although they continue to always achieve mission
R, enforcement means that they are now more likely to be paired with an S donor (because S
donors are now indi¤erent between them and R moderate entrepreneurs, unlike the situation
before enforcement, when S donors preferred R moderate entrepreneurs). For R moderates,
enforcing the Busan Declaration has two counteracting e¤ects entrepreneurship is now more
attractive because R moderate entrepreneurs would now realise mission R rather than mission
S, but it is less attractive becauseRmoderate entrepreneurs are no longer matched preferentially
with S donors. The net e¤ect is that enforcing the Busan Declaration may lead to lower social
welfare even when 
 
1 S > 1 (so that there is no reduced entry by S types into the donor
role), because there is reduced entry by R types into the donor role, which counteracts the
static welfare gains that result from the fact that fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pairs
now implement mission R rather than mission S. Thus we need (1  ~S)  1 for the negative
e¤ects of fewer R donors to be outweighed by the gains from the entrepreneurs mission always
being chosen.
5.4 Do do-gooders dogood?
In this paper, we set out to answer the question: do do-gooders dogood? That is, do people
with strong views about the mission that a particular charity adopts people that we refer
to as do-gooders or ideologues  tend to select into charity work (and hence do good)
disproportionately, or do they tend to instead select into becoming donors (and hence fund
the doing of good)? We are now in a position to show the conditions under which, in equilibrium,
ideologues will select disproportionately into charitable work.
Proposition 11 Ideologue-Dominated NGO Sector: The fraction of NGO entrepreneurs
who are ideologues exceeds h (i.e. is greater than the average number of ideologues within the
population of R types) if and only if S type ideology is low ((1  S)  1) and inequality is
low ( >   c=d). This corresponds to an equilibrium described by Case (1)(ii) of Table (1).
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Proof By inspection of Table (1), which categorises the equilibria corresponding to Case
(1) of Lemma (4).
Proposition (11) o¤ers a striking result. Our model stacks the deck against having a
charitable sector dominated by ideologues S donors prefer to be matched with R moderate
entrepreneurs rather than R ideologue entrepreneurs, as being paired with a moderate means
that they can enforce their own preferred mission cheaply. Also, R moderate entrepreneurs
prefer to be matched with S donors rather than with R donors, as Assumption (5) (d=d   < 
Heterogeneous Income Earning Ability) implies that the resulting increase in project size
outweighs the utility loss from having to implement mission S. This mutual preference of S
donors and Rmoderate entrepreneurs for each other means that, for a given entry conguration,
these two types of agent will always be paired together preferentially in a stable matching. And
yet, it is possible to have equilibria of the occupational choice entry game in which no moderates
enter as NGO entrepreneurs, and the charitable sector is instead dominated by ideologues.
The reason for this result is that, unlikeRmoderate entrepreneurs, R ideologue entrepreneurs
get their preferred mission when they are paired with an S donor, and this gives them higher
expected utility from entrepreneurship than an R moderate. In Case (1) of Lemma (4), an
R moderate entrepreneur is paired with an S donor for sure, yielding payo¤ d   c. An R
ideologue entrepreneur may do better or worse than this. If paired with an S donor, they obtain
payo¤ d  c > d  c. If paired with an R donor, they obtain payo¤ d  c, which is strictly
less than d  c, as   d=d < . Moreover, an R ideologue entrepreneur is unmatched with
some positive probability, implying a payo¤ of zero. Yet both R ideologues and R moderates
have the same payo¤ from becoming a donor both are paired with an R entrepreneur for sure
and receive payo¤ d.
The payo¤s presented in the previous paragraph mean that R ideologues are less responsive
to changes in  (earnings inequality) than R moderates. Consider an increase in  (a reduction
in inequality) that takes the form of increasing d whilst holding d constant. Then the increase
in  makes being a donor more attractive for both an R moderate and an R ideologue but for
the R ideologue, who unlike the R moderate is paired with an R donor with positive probability,
it also makes becoming an entrepreneur more attractive. Thus, a more equal distribution of
earnings capacities pushes both R moderates and R ideologues towards becoming donors, but
more forcefully in the case of R moderates, as there is no counteracting e¤ect. As a result,
when earnings inequalities are relatively small, the charitable sector can end up dominated by
ideologues.
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Alongside this requirement that earnings inequalities are not too large, it must also be the
case that donors are not too ideological. If donors are so ideological that they prefer to remain
uninvolved in the charitable sector than to give to an ideologue, there cannot be a charitable
sector that is dominated by ideologues in equilibrium.
Proposition (11) highlights that ideologues are more likely to dominate the charitable sector
when income-earnings inequalities are not too large. This result has intuitive appeal when the
correlation between income earnings opportunities and mission preferences is kept in mind.
When income inequality is high, a person of moderate persuasion and low earnings capacity
will prefer to become an entrepreneur, as in so doing, they receive access (either for sure or
with some probability) to an NGO budget that far exceeds what they could achieve via their
own e¤orts in the private sector. They have to implement their less preferred mission, but this
is not too unpleasant for them. By contrast, when wealth inequalities are low, they prefer to
earn in the private sector and donate to a charity that will implement their preferred mission.
Ideologues face a di¤erent trade-o¤, because when inequality is low, moderates have vacated
the charitable sector, but for an ideologue, charitable entrepreneurship is not so unattractive
as it is for a moderate, because they know that, if paired with someone of the opposite mission
preference, they will still be able to implement their own preferred mission. Only in these
circumstances can ideologues come to dominate the charitable sector.
Looking again at Table (1) in light of this discussion, we can see that socially ine¢ cient
donor enforcement of their own preferred mission is driven by wealth inequalities. In Case (1)(ii)
((1 S)  1 and  >  c=d), when inequality is low, entrepreneurs are always ideologues,
so the donors preferred mission is never ine¢ ciently enforced thus the Busan Declaration is
voluntarily enforced, implying that there is no potential role for rectifying policy. By contrast,
when wealth inequalities are high, as in Cases (1)(i) ((1   S)  1 and  <    c=d)
and (1)(iii) ((1   S) < 1 and  <    c=d), both of which involve high inequality, the
charitable sector contains many moderate entrepreneurs, creating a situation in which donors
can ine¢ ciently implement their own preferred mission. The importance of wealth inequality
in driving socially ine¢ cient donor enforcement of their preferred mission could explain why
concerns about lack of recipient control over donor-funded NGO activity have arisen most
prominently in the context of donations to international development assistance e¤orts, rather
than in settings involving smaller wealth inequalities, such as those in which both donor and
recipient reside in a rich country.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has used the Busan Declaration as a springboard to asking a question of broad
relevance to many contexts involving the donor funding of NGO activity  namely, should
donors, as the Busan Declaration suggests, limit their activity to providing funding, and allow
recipients to decide on the uses to which these funds are put? Or are there circumstances under
which it is socially desirable for donors to seek to shape the type of mission that is undertaken
by recipient organisations?
We answer these questions by embedding a model of donor-entrepreneur interactions in a
matching market of occupational choice, in which agents decide whether to enter the private
sector or the charitable sector, private sector entrants decide whether or not to give, and donors
and entrepreneurs are paired endogenously in a stable matching equilibrium.
Using this model, we rst answer a question implicitly posed by the economic literature on
the mission choice problem: namely, why should we expect mission conict to arise in the rst
place, when agents can match assortatively and entry into the donor and entrepreneur roles (or,
in other models, to the manager and worker roles) is endogenous? We show that, even when
occupational choice and donor-entrepreneur matchings are endogenous, mission conict can
arise in the charitable sector when (i) mission preferences are correlated with income-earning
ability in the private sector, and (ii) there are private costs of running an NGO. In such
a world, rich philanthropists may have di¢ culty nding NGO entrepreneurs who share their
preferences, and charitable entrepreneurs may be willing to compromise on the mission in order
to access the larger donation budgets that come from being paired with a rich philanthropist.
These two factors combine to create a charitable sector with a systematic tendency towards
donor-entrepreneur pairings that involve disagreement over the mission. In this way, we o¤er
an insight into how rich philanthropists can exert a decisive inuence over the charitable sector,
but we also suggest that this inuence may come at the cost of a charitable sector riven with
mission conict.
We also show that income-earnings inequalities can be a key driver not only of mission
conict per se, but also of the extent to which donors ine¢ ciently enforce their preferred
mission on entrepreneurs. We suggest that this driver of ine¢ cient donor enforcement of their
preferred mission may help to explain why, although mission conict is a ubiquitous feature of
the charitable sector, concerns about lack of recipient control over donor-funded NGO activity
have arisen most prominently in the context of international development assistance e¤orts,
where wealth di¤erences between donors and recipients are vast.
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As well as shedding light on the drivers of mission conict in general, we also set out to
examine the potential role that ideologues or do-goodersthat is, people who care a lot about
the particular mission that a charity adopts can play within the charitable sector. We found
that, when donors and charitable entrepreneurs with di¤erent preferences over the mission are
exogenously matched, having charities run by ideologuescan be an e¤ective counterweight
against the tendency of donors to ine¢ ciently enforce their own mission, as they raise the cost
of taking such actions. However, it is not at all clear a priori that having a charitable sector
dominated by ideologues will continue to maximise social welfare when occupational choice is
endogenous and donors have an extensive margin, so that they can respond to a high probability
of being paired with an ideologue by simply choosing not to give.
In this richer setting, we consider a possible policy response to the tendency of donors to
ine¢ ciently enforce their mission direct enforcement of the Busan Declaration. We nd that
directly prescribing that charities must implement the entrepreneurs preferred mission can only
improve social welfare if donors are not too ideological, and if doing so does not reduce total
donations too much. If these conditions are not satised, then the reduction in social welfare
resulting from fewer donations may outweigh the static gains in social welfare from enforcing
entrepreneurspreferred missions. These conditions place a signicant constraint on the scope
of policy to rectify ine¢ cient donor enforcement of their preferred mission.
Finally, we show that, in the absence of rectifying policy, having a charitable sector dominated
by ideologues in which case the Busan Declaration is voluntarily implemented can only arise
if donors are not very ideological, and income-earnings inequalities are not too high. As we
also concluded that rectifying policy can only be optimal when donor ideology is not too high,
this further limits the circumstances in which such policy might be warranted.
These nuanced conclusions allow for a reection on the quotes provided at the start of this
paper. Our model of the market for charitable donations suggests that Hillary Clinton was
right to criticise the tendency of donors to impose their own preferences on the organisations
that they donate to but it also suggests that the power of donors to choose whom they give to,
and whether or not to give in the rst place, limits the scope for policy to rectify the problem
of ine¢ cient donor enforcement of their own preferred mission. We also think it is interesting
that the young Somalian quoted in The Economist, who seemed content at the prospect of
his activities being determined by a donor, should be representative of the kind of charitable
sector that does, according to our analysis, tend to arise in situations where income and wealth
inequalities between donors and recipients are large. In these situations, rich donors exert a
disproportionate inuence over the charitable sector, but, in the absence of policies to reduce
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wealth inequalities themselves (which lie outside the scope of this paper), there is little that
can be done about this situation, as it is better for such donors to give and to inuence the
mission than to not be involved in the charitable sector in the rst place.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition (2)
Given the joint surplus expressions provided in Equations (4) and (5), it is socially optimal to implement
S if 
(2 E)+E
+E

d  c  (2 D)d  c () E D(+ 1)+(1 D) (16)

Proof of Proposition (3)
Given the donor payo¤s provided in Equations (4) and (5), the donor implements mission S if


+E

d  (1 D)d () E D(1 D) (17)
As  > 1 and  > 0, we know that +   1 > 0, and hence that D(+ 1)+(1 D)
D
(1 D) .
Combining Equations (17) and (16) gives the three cases provided in the Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition (4)
If Case (2) of Proposition (3) holds, mission S is implemented even though mission R maximises joint
surplus. However, if there is no Limited Liability Constraint and the entrepreneur has independent
resources, he can contribute some amount bE to the project, conditional on implementing R and
receiving the donors whole donation budget d as a contribution to NGO output. If bE is large enough,
it can compensate the donor for the fact that mission R is being implemented. To achieve this, the
entrepreneur chooses bE to ensure that the donors utility from implementing R with compensating
payment bE is equal to the utility that the donor would receive from implementing S in the absence
of any compensating payment:
(1 D) (d+ bE) =


+E

d
bE = d


(+E)(1 D) 1

Note that bE> 0 if  (+E)(1 D)> 0 or if
E<
D
(1 D) (18)
Equation (18) is the opposite of Case (3) of Proposition (3)  if the donor nds it optimal to
implement mission R even in the absence of any compensating payment, there is no need for such a
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compensating payment.
Proof of Proposition (5)
The rst sentence of the Proposition follows immediately from Assumption (3) (Ideologues Enforce
Preferred) and Proposition (3). If the entrepreneur is a moderate, we are in Case (2) of Proposition
(3), and mission S is implemented despite the fact that it is not socially optimal. If the entrepreneur is
an ideologue, we are in Case (3) of Proposition (3), and the socially optimal mission, R, is implemented.
We show that the second sentence holds by comparing joint surpluses. If the donor is paired with a
moderate, mission S is implemented and joint surplus is
J =

(2 L)+L
+L

d  c
If the donor is paired with an ideologue, mission R is implemented and joint surplus is:
J = (2 D)d  c
The latter is larger than the former if
D
(+ 1)+(1 D) 
L
which holds by Assumption (3) (Ideologues Enforce Preferred). 
Proof of Lemma (1)
For each of the two types of matching identied in the Lemma (without mission mismatch, and with
mission mismatch), we rst identify the classes of possible matching; secondly show that classes of
matching that are not included in the Lemma are either not stable or otherwise inconsistent with our
assumptions; and thirdly show that the classes included in the Lemma are stable. In what follows, we
make use of the payo¤s for di¤erent matchings provided in Equations (4), (5) and (7).
First, imagine that the matching involves no mission mismatch. Then there cannot be an excess of
type S donors relative to type S entrepreneurs. If such an excess existed alongside an excess of type
R donors relative to type R entrepreneurs, Assumption (4) (ND< NE) would be violated. If such an
excess existed alongside an excess of entrepreneurs of mission preference R relative to donors of mission
preference R, then the excess S donors would be paired with the excess R entrepreneurs a violation
of our assumption that there is no mission mismatch. A corresponding argument applies if S and R
are switched. Hence the only candidate class of stable matching equilibria without mission mismatch
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is that referred to in Case (1). In the class of matching described in Case (1), all donors receive payo¤
d, matched entrepreneurs receive payo¤ d c, and unmatched entrepreneurs receive a payo¤ of zero.
Unmatched entrepreneurs could do better by being matched, but as all donors are already achieving
the highest possible payo¤, they have no incentive to break their existing match. Hence Case (1) is a
stable matching.
Second, imagine that the matching involves some degree of mission mismatch. This could take one
of three forms: (i) that referred to in Case (2) of the Lemma; (ii) an S donor is matched with an R
entrepreneur while an S entrepreneur is matched with an R donor; and (iii) an S donor is matched
with an R entrepreneur while an S entrepreneur goes unmatched. Corresponding cases exist if S and
R are switched, and the proof that follows is equally applicable to these switched cases. We now show
that (ii) and (iii) cannot arise, and then show that (i) is a stable matching equilibrium.
If (ii) occurs, the mismatched S donors payo¤ is


+E

d< d (if mission S is implemented)
or (1 D)d< d (if R is implemented). When an S entrepreneur is paired with an R donor, they
receive a payo¤ of either

(1 E)+E
+E

d c  d c (if mission R is implemented) or d c (if
mission S is implemented). But if the S donor matched with the S entrepreneur they would have
payo¤s of d and d c respectively, which are strictly higher for the S donor and weakly higher for
the S entrepreneur. Therefore, (ii) is not a stable matching, by Equation (8). If (iii) occurs, the S
entrepreneurs payo¤ is 0 < d c and the S donors payo¤ is not as high as d. Both could do strictly
better by matching with one another, so (iii) is not a stable matching. Given that (ii) and (iii) are not
stable matchings, the only remaining candidate class of stable matching involving mission mismatch is
that referred to in Case (2) of the Lemma.
We now show that this class of matching is an equilibrium. Assume that there is an excess of S
donors relative to S entrepreneurs, which by Assumption (4) (ND< NE) implies that there is an excess
of R entrepreneurs relative to R donors. (A corresponding proof exists if there is instead an excess of R
donors relative to R entrepreneurs.) Then S entrepreneurs receive payo¤d c, while S donors receive
payo¤ of d if paired with an S entrepreneur, or < d if paired with an R entrepreneur. Mismatched
S donors would like to switch from having an R entrepreneur to having an S entrepreneur, but all
S entrepreneurs are already paired with S donors and therefore are already achieving their highest
possible payo¤, and hence have no incentive to deviate from their existing match. R entrepreneurs
receive payo¤ of d c if paired with an R donor, or < d c if paired with an S donor. Mismatched R
entrepreneurs would like to switch from having an S donor to having an R donor, but all R donors are
already paired with R entrepreneurs and therefore are already achieving their highest possible payo¤,
and hence have no incentive to deviate from their existing match. All unmatched entrepreneurs are
of type R. They would prefer to be matched with either type of donor than to remain unmatched.
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However, all R donors are already matched with R entrepreneurs, and all S donors are either matched
with S entrepreneurs (which they prefer to R entrepreneurs) or R entrepreneurs; hence both types
of donor have no incentive to break their existing pairing to match instead with an unmatched R
entrepreneur. 
Proof of Proposition (6)
Suppose that NSE< N
S
D so that we are in Case (2) of Lemma (1), implying that some mission mismatch
exists  some S donors are matched with R entrepreneurs. Let 1  p be the probability that an S
donor is mismatched, and let q be the probability that an R entrepreneur is unmatched.
Case (1): The mismatched donor implements the entrepreneurs preferred mission,
and both S and R types enter both sides of the market
This implies that both S and R types must be indi¤erent between entering as donors and entering as
entrepreneurs. If an S type enters as a donor, they are paired with an S entrepreneur with probability
p, receiving d, and with an R entrepreneur with probability 1  p, receiving payo¤ (1 )d. If
they enter as an entrepreneur, they are paired with an S donor with certainty, receiving payo¤ d c.
Indi¤erence therefore requires that
(p+ (1  p)(1 ))d = d  c (19)
If an R type enters as a donor, they are paired with an R entrepreneur with certainty, receiving
payo¤ d. If they enter as an entrepreneur, they are paired with a donor with probability 1  q,
receiving payo¤ d c irrespective of whether the donor is an S type or an R type, and are unmatched
with probability q, receiving payo¤ 0. Indi¤erence therefore requires that:
d = (1  q) (d  c) (20)
Equations (19) and (20) imply that:
1  (1  p) =d cd = 11 q (21)
The right hand side of Equation (21) is  1 8q2 [0;1], while the left hand side is  1 8p2 [0;1].
Thus, the only probabilities consistent with a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are p = 1 and q = 0:
But q = 0 implies that donors are not on the short side of the market, thus violating Assumption (4)
(ND< NE). Hence this scenario cannot arise.
Case (2): The mismatched donor implements the entrepreneurs preferred mission,
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and only one mission preference type enters both sides of the market36
First imagine that S types are indi¤erent and R types are not. If R types strictly prefer entering as
donors, then donors are not on the short side of the market, contradicting Assumption (4) (ND< NE).
IfR types strictly prefer entering as entrepreneurs, then (1 (1  p)d= d c and d< (1  q) (d  c),
implying that
(1  (1  p)) =d cd > 11 q
which cannot arise, as p 2 [0; 1] and q 2 [0; 1].
Second, imagine that R types are indi¤erent and S types are not. If S types strictly prefer entering
as entrepreneurs, our starting assumption NSE< N
S
D is violated. If S types strictly prefer entering as
donors, then (1  (1  p))d> d c and d= (1  q) (d  c). This implies that
(1  (1  p))>d cd = 11 q
which cannot arise, as p 2 [0; 1] and q 2 [0; 1].
Case (3): The mismatched donor implements her own preferred mission, and both S
and R types enter both sides of the market
An R type considering entering as an entrepreneur now cares whether they are paired with an S
donor or an R donor. Assume that, conditional on being matched with a donor, an R entrepreneur is
matched with an R donor with probability m and an S donor with probability 1 m. The S types
indi¤erence condition is identical to Equation (19), except that, when the S type enters as a donor
and is matched with an R entrepreneur, they implement mission S and therefore receive utility

p+ (1  p) 
 + L

d = d  c (22)
An R type who enters as a donor continues to receive d with certainty. However, if they enter
as an entrepreneur and are matched (which occurs with probability 1  q), they are paired with an R
donor, receiving payo¤ d c, or an S donor, receiving payo¤

(1 )+
+

d c. Their indi¤erence
condition is therefore:
d = (1  q)

md+(1 m)

(1 )+
+

d  c

(23)
36Case (2) makes use of the indi¤erence conditions derived in Case (1).
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Now, let   (1 )++ < 1 and let   m+ (1 m) < 1. Equations (22) and (23) imply:
p+(1 p)( + )
d c =
1
d=
1
1 q
d c (24)
Equation (24) cannot hold for any values of p; q 2 [0; 1], as the numerators of the left and right
hand sides can only be equal if p = 1 and q = 0, but the denominator of the left hand side is larger
than that for the right. Hence, when the mismatched donor implements her own preferred mission,
there can never be an equilibrium in which both S types and R types are indi¤erent between entering
as donors or as entrepreneurs.
Case (4): The mismatched donor implements her own preferred mission, and only one
mission preference type enters both sides of the market.
Note that the proof for Case (3) proceeds in nearly identical manner to Case (1). It can therefore
readily be seen that the proof of Case (4) proceeds analogously from the proof of Case (2). 
Proof of Lemma (2)
Part (1): If an R entrepreneur is paired with an R donor, they receive payo¤ d c. If an R
entrepreneur is paired with an S donor, they receive a payo¤ of d c (if the S donor implements
missionR) or

(1 )+
+

d c (if the S donor implements mission S). Therefore, anR entrepreneur
will always prefer to be paired with an S donor rather than an R donor if

(1 )+
+

d c > d c,
or if  < , where  d=d and   (1 )++ .
Part (2): The proof for Part (2) proceeds in similar fashion to that for Lemma (1), except that, as
the problem is no longer symmetric, we must rule out alternative possible matchings for type S agents
and type R agents separately.
We rst show that an S donor cannot be matched with an R entrepreneur if an S entrepreneur is
either (i) Matched with an R donor or (ii) Unmatched. If (i) occurs, the S donor receives payo¤< d,
while the S entrepreneur receives payo¤ < d c. If they paired together, they could achieve payo¤s
d and d c respectively, both of which are strictly higher than their existing payo¤s. Thus, they
will want to break their existing matches, so (i) is not a stable matching equilibrium. If (ii) occurs, the
S donor receives payo¤< d, while the S entrepreneur receives payo¤ 0. If they paired together, they
could achieve d and d c respectively, both of which are strictly higher than their existing payo¤s.
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Thus, the S donor will want to break her existing match, and the unmatched S entrepreneur will want
to match with her, so (ii) is not a stable matching equilibrium.
We secondly show that an R donor cannot be matched with an S entrepreneur if an R entrepreneur
is either (iii) Matched with an S donor, or (iv) Unmatched. If (iii) occurs, the R donor receives payo¤
< d, while the R entrepreneur receives payo¤ of either d c (if the S donor implements mission R)
or

(1 )+
+

d c. The R donor may wish to pair instead with the R entrepreneur, but the R
entrepreneur will not want to break his pairing with the S donor, by Assumption (5) (d=d  < )
and Lemma (2). However, the S donor and S entrepreneur will seek to break such a pairing, implying
that it is unstable. If (iv) occurs, the R donor receives payo¤< d, while the unmatched entrepreneur
receives payo¤ 0. If they paired together, they could obtain payo¤s d and d c respectively. Thus,
the R donor will want to break her existing match, and the unmatched R entrepreneur will want to
match with her, so (iv) is not a stable equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition (7)
Proof of Part (1)
Assume that c = 0 and that there exists an equilibrium with mismatch. If there are more R (low
earnings capacity) donors than R entrepreneurs, Assumption (4) (ND< NE) implies that there are
fewer S donors than S entrepreneurs, and hence that an S entrepreneur is mismatched with some
probability. If an S type enters as an entrepreneur, they therefore receive a payo¤ strictly less than
d c, the payo¤ they would receive if they were paired with an S donor with certainty. However, if
the S type enters as a donor, they are paired with an S entrepreneur with certainty, and thus receive
a payo¤ of d. As this payo¤ is strictly higher than the payo¤ they would receive from entering as
an entrepreneur, all S types would want to have entered as a donor, thus violating Assumption (4)
(ND< NE).
If there are more S (high earnings capacity) donors than S entrepreneurs, an S donor is mismatched
with some probability, and an S types expected payo¤ if they enter as a donor is therefore < d.
Suppose that at t=  1 such an S type were to change his entry decision to enter as an entrepreneur.
Then he is matched for certain with an S donor and he earns d. This would be strictly worthwhile.
Thus there cannot be more S donors than S entrepreneurs. Hence we have shown that, with c = 0,
there can be no mismatch.
Proof of Part (2)
We now construct an equilibrium with mismatch in which c > 0 and dd by assuming that such
exists and deriving parameter restrictions under which this assumption holds. Assume that there is an
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excess of S donors relative to S entrepreneurs, so that some S donors are paired with R entrepreneurs.
Assume further that we are in Case (3) of Proposition (3) (so   (1 )), which implies that an
S donor matched with an R entrepreneur implements mission R.37 For this situation to arise, S
types must be indi¤erent between entering as a donor or as an entrepreneur. If they enter as an
entrepreneur, they are paired with an S donor with certainty, receiving utility d c. If they enter as
a donor, they are paired with an S entrepreneur with probability NSE=N
S
D, receiving payo¤ d, and
with an R entrepreneur with the remaining probability, yielding payo¤   dmax
n

+ ; 1 
o
.
Hence indi¤erence requires that:
d c =

NSE
NSD

d+

1 NSE
NSD

dmax


+ ; 1 

(25)
Using that NSD + N
S
E= N , it is tedious but straightforward to rearrange Equation (25) to show
that:
NSD=

1
1+ 

N and NSE=

 
1+ 

N , where   d  c
d  (26)
Now consider the indi¤erence condition of type R agents. Our assumption that there is an excess
of S donors relative to S entrepreneurs, combined with Assumption (4), implies that an R type who
enters as an entrepreneur is paired with an S donor with probability
 
NSD NSE

=NRE (where the
numerator denotes the number of S donors left over after pairing preferentially with S entrepreneurs),
is paired with an R donor with probability NRD=N
R
E , and remains unmatched with the remaining
probability. These three scenarios yield payo¤s, respectively, of d c, d c, and 0 respectively. Then
for R types to enter on both sides of the market we require:

NSD NSE
NRE

(d c)+

NRD
NRE

(d c) = d
Combining this result with Equation (26) yields:

1  
1+ 

N
NRE
  
d  c+ NRD
NRE

(d c)= d (27)
Using that NRE + N
R
D= N , it is tedious but straightforward to rearrange Equation (27) to show
that:
NRD=


1+

N and NRE=

1
1+

N , where   d (
1  
1+ )(d c)
(d c)+( 1  1+ )(d c)
(28)
37 It can just as readily be shown that an equilibrium with mismatch occurs when a mismatched S donor
implements mission S. However, as we are simply concerned with proving that a mismatch equilibrium exists,
we conne ourselves to demonstrating the existence of a single class of equilibrium.
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To have R types on both sides of the market, it must be that  0, which implies that the
numerator of  must be positive, or that:
(d d) c
(d+d) c (29)
For Assumption (4) (ND< NE) to hold, it must be that NE> 
H . Using Equations (26) and
(28), NE> ND implies that:

 
1+ 

N+

1
1+

N >

1
1+ 

N+


1+

N ()  <  (30)
Substituting out our value for  in terms of  , Equation (30) implies the following quadratic
condition on  :

 
d d 2+c + c    d d< 0 ()  1 <  <   d  d  c

 
d  d (31)
Combining Equations (29) and (31), and keeping in mind that  must also be strictly positive in
order for S types to enter both sides of the market, yields the following condition:
(d d) c
(d+d) c  <
(d d) c
(d d) (32)
Both the left hand side and the right hand side of Equation (32) will be positive if
 
d d> c that
is, if inequality in earnings capacity between S and R types is su¢ ciently large. Thus, if
 
d d> c ,
there will be a non-empty range of values of  between 0 and the upper bound in Equation (32). The
lower bound in Equation (32) can be made arbitrarily small, while holding the upper bound constant,
by increasing both d and d by an equal amount, so that d d remains unchanged. Therefore, if the sum
of the two typesearnings abilities is su¢ ciently high, and inequality in earnings capacity is su¢ ciently
high, there will be a range of values of  that satisfy Equation (32). For these values of  , a stable
matching mixed strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the occupational choice entry game
exists in which some donors and entrepreneurs disagree over the mission. 
Proof of Lemma (3)
Given that d>d, and that all R and S agents share the same ideology , the optimal matching never
includes an R donor matched with an S entrepreneur, since if it did, the planner could create higher
social surplus by reversing their roles - i.e., requiring the R type to be the entrepreneur and the S
type to be the donor. In the rst case, joint surplus is d(2 ), and in the second case, joint surplus
is d(2 ).
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Supposing that the number of S donors outweighs the number of S entrepreneurs, and given that
the rst best involves an equal number of donors and entrepreneurs, social welfare is given by:
W = NSE(2d c)+ max (NSD NSE ; 0)((2 )d c) +NRD(2d c)
where NSD+N
S
E= N , and N
R
D+N
R
E= N . Given the objective function and the fact that the constraints
are linear, we arrive at a corner solution: either NSD= N
S
E , which gives rise to social welfare of
1
2N(2d c)+ 12N(2d c); or NSD= N , in which case social welfare is N(d(2 ) c). Hence result.

Proof of Lemma (4)
Preparatory: We rst prove that S donors and R moderate entrepreneurs are always paired together
preferentially in a stable matching  in other words, that there must always be min

NRLE ; N
S
D
	
matches between S donors and R moderate entrepreneurs. Suppose that this is not the case and that
there are fewer than min

NRLE ; N
S
D
	
such matches. This means that there is at least one R moderate
entrepreneur who is either (i) matched with an R donor, in which case the former receives a payo¤ of
d c; or (ii) remains unmatched, in which case the former receives a payo¤ of 0. It also means that at
least one S donor is matched with an R ideologue entrepreneur (recall that, as donors are always on
the short side of the market, they are never left unmatched). An S donor in this situation implements
mission R (given Assumption (3) (Ideologues Enforce Preferred)), and receives a payo¤ of (1 SD)d.
However, if this S donor and the R moderate analysed in the previous sentence were to pair together,
they would receive payo¤s of


+L

d and d c respectively, which are both strictly higher.
Hence having fewer than min

NRLE ; N
S
D
	
matches between S donors and R moderate entrepreneurs
cannot be a stable matching.
Case (1): If NRLE < N
S
D, all R moderate entrepreneurs are matched with S donors, so only R
ideologue entrepreneurs remain. But as we focus on equilibria in which there are fewer donors than
entrepreneurs overall, this means that all remaining donors, whether of type R or S, are paired with
R ideologue entrepreneurs. It also means that some R ideologue entrepreneurs will remain unmatched
in equilibrium.
Case (2): If NRLE > N
S
D, all S donors have been matched with R moderate entrepreneurs.
After these two types are paired, there may be R donors left over (who may be either moderates or
entrepreneurs), as well as R moderate entrepreneurs and perhaps also some R ideologue entrepreneurs.
However, ideology plays no role when donors and entrepreneurs are assortatively matched R donors
are indi¤erent between being matched with R moderate entrepreneurs and R ideologue entrepreneurs,
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and R entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between being matched with R moderate donors and R ideologue
donors. Therefore, any matching between these R donors and R entrepreneurs is a stable matching.

Proof of Proposition (8)
This Proposition follows directly from Lemma (4) and Assumption (3) (Ideologues Enforce Preferred).
As we established in Proposition (5), an fS donor, R ideologue entrepreneurg pair generates higher
joint surplus than an fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg pair, and fR donor, R entrepreneurg
pairs generate the same social surplus irrespective of donor or entrepreneur ideology. Hence, if a
social planner could hold entry decisions at t=  1 xed and assign matches from amongst the given
pool of donors and entrepreneurs without regard to stability considerations, they would want to
preferentially match S donors with R ideologue entrepreneurs, not the R moderate entrepreneurs
that are preferentially paired with S donors in a stable matching. 
Proof of Proposition (9)
Part (1): Case (1) of Lemma (4)
Methodology
We proceed by assuming that equilibria of the form given by Case (1) of Lemma (4) exist, and
deriving the parameter restrictions that must be satised for their existence. Case (1) of Lemma (4)
involves some S donors being matched with R ideologue entrepreneurs. Therefore, R ideologues either
must strictly prefer entering as entrepreneurs, or they must be indi¤erent between entrepreneurship
and donorship. For each of Cases (1)(i), (1)(ii), and (1)(iii) in Table (1), we show that two sub-cases
of equilibrium exist corresponding to these two possibilities. Using Equation (14), if R ideologues are
indi¤erent between entrepreneurship and donorship, then:
dNRHE =
 
NSD NRLE
  
d c+NRD (d c) (33)
For each of the three Cases, we rst use Equation (33) to obtain an expression for NRHE . This
requires us to rst obtain expressions for NSD, N
R
D , and N
RL
E in terms of primitives of the model and
NRHE . We then, secondly, establish the condition required for there to be a shortage of R moderate
entrepreneurs relative to S donors (NRLE < N
S
D), which is a dening feature of Case (1) of Lemma (4).
We refer to this condition as Condition (A).
We then, thirdly, analyse the two sub-cases for each of the three Cases, to establish two further
conditions under which this class of equilibrium can arise. The rst, Condition (B), is the condition
dening the sub-case (R ideologues either mix between the donor and entrepreneur roles, or they all
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become entrepreneurs). The second, Condition (C), is the condition required for donors to be on the
short side of the market. For each of these six sub-cases, we then analyse the conditions under which
Conditions (A), (B) and (C) can hold simultaneously, and show that any of the six sub-cases can arise
for some values of fh;NR; NS ; d; dg subject to h 2 (0; 1), NR> 0, NS> 0, and 0 <d<d.38
Case (1)(i): 
 
1 S> 1 and < c=d
All S types are donors (NSD= N
S) and all R moderates are entrepreneurs (NRLE =(1  h)NR).
As all moderates are entrepreneurs, the number of type R donors is equal to the total number of R
ideologues (hNR) minus the number of R ideologues who enter as entrepreneurs: NRD= hN
R NRHE .
Substituting these expressions for NSD, N
R
D , and N
RL
E into Equation (33) and noting that N
RH
E cannot
exceed the total number of ideologues (hNR) yields:
NRHE = min
n
(NS (1 h)NR)(d c)+hNR(d c)
2d c ; hN
R
o
(34)
From the denition of this Case, Condition (A) (NRLE < N
S
D) implies that:
NS>(1  h)NR () h > 1 NS=NR (35)
There exists a value of h 2 (0; 1) that satises this equation for any NS=NR.
Case (1)(a): R ideologues enter as both donors and as entrepreneurs
This implies that the rst term in Equation (34) is the minimum:
NRHE =
(NS (1 h)NR)(d c)+hNR(d c)
2d c < hN
R (36)
Let d and d be such that 
 
d d> c. Then the inequality in Equation (36) gives Condition (B):
h <

1 NS
NR

d c
d c d

(37)
A non-empty range of values of h satisfy both Equation (35) and Equation (37).
For donors to be on the short side of the market, it must be that NRHE + N
RL
E > N
S
D + N
RH
D .
Using that NRLE = (1  h)NR, NSD= NS , NRHD = hNR NRHE , and NRHE dened by Equation (36),
and also assuming 
 
d d> c, gives Condition (C):
h >12

2(d d) c
(d d) c

1 NS
NR

(38)
38 In addition, a fourth constraint must hold for Case (1)(iii), which is discussed at the end of our analysis of
this case.
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As Equations (35) and (38) both place lower bounds on h they are compatible; further, they can
be satised for h 2 (0; 1). Comparing the cuto¤s in Equation (37) and Equation (38), there exists a
non-empty range of values of h that can satisfy both equations if 0 <2d c, which is true. Thus an
equilibrium as described by Case (1)(i)(a) can arise.
Case (1)(i)(b) All R ideologues are entrepreneurs
This implies that the second term in Equation (34) is the minimum:
NRHE = hN
R< (N
S (1 h)NR)(d c)+hNR(d c)
2d c (39)
Let d and d be such that 
 
d d> c. Then the inequality in Equation (39) gives Condition (B):
h >

1 NS
NR

d c
d c d

(40)
Equations (35) and (40) are compatible, as both place lower bounds on h.
For donors to be on the short side of the market, it must be that NRHE +N
RL
E > N
S
D. Using that
NRHE = hN
R, NRLE = (1  h)NR and NSD= NS gives Condition (C):
NR> NS (41)
Equation (41) is compatible with both Equation (35) and Equation (40), therefore an equilibrium
as described by Case (1)(i)(b) can arise.
Case (1)(ii): (1 S) > 1 and > c=d
All S types are donors (NSD= N
S) and all R moderates are donors (NRLD =(1  h)NR). As all
R moderates enter as donors, the total number of R donors, NRD , is equal to the total number of R
types minus the number of ideologue entrepreneurs: NRD= N
R NRHE . Substituting these expressions
for NSD, N
R
D , and N
RL
E into Equation (33), and noting that N
RH
E cannot exceed the total number of
ideologues (hNR), yields:
NRHE = min
n
NS(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c ; hN
R
o
(42)
In Case (1)(ii), there are NS type S donors, and no R moderate entrepreneurs. Thus, Condition
(A) (NRLE <N
S
D) is always satised.
Case (1)(ii)(a): R ideologues enter as both donors and as entrepreneurs
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This implies that the rst term in Equation (42) is the minimum:
NRHE =
NS(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c < hN
R (43)
The inequality in Equation (43) gives Condition (B):
NS
NR
< (2d c)h (d c)
d c
(44)
For donors to be on short side of market, it must be that NRHE > N
S
D +N
RH
D +N
RL
D . Using that
NSD= N
S , NRLD = (1  h)NR, NRHD = hNR NRHE , and NRHE dened in Equation (43), and also
assuming that 2
 
d d> c, gives Condition (C):
NS
NR
> c
2(d d) c (45)
There is a non-empty range of values of NS=NR that satisfy Equations (44) and (45) for h close
to 1 if
c
2(d d) c<
(2d c) (d c)
d c () 1 <
 

c
 2d(d d)
d+d

+

c


1
d+d

This condition holds for a large enough mean-preserving spread of d and d hence an equilibrium
of the kind described by Case (1)(ii)(a) can arise.
Case (1)(ii)(b) All R ideologues are entrepreneurs
This implies that the second term in Equation (42) is the minimum:
NRHE = hN
R<N
S(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c (46)
The inequality in Equation (46) gives Condition (B):
h <

1
2d c

NS
NR
  
d c+ (d c) (47)
For donors to be on the short side of the market, we require that NRHE > N
S
D +N
RL
D . Using that
NRHE = hN
R, NRLD = (1  h)NR, and NSD= NS gives Condition (C):
h >12

NS
NR
+ 1

(48)
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For Equation (48) to hold, h (the fraction of R types that are ideologues) must be at least 12 .
There is a non-empty range of values of h that satisfy Equations (47) and (48) if:
1
2

NS
NR
+ 1

<

1
2d c

NS
NR

(d c) + (d c)

() c
2(d d) c<
NS
NR
(49)
Equation (49) can be satised for NS=NR su¢ ciently large. We nally need to check that setting
NS=NR to satisfy Equation (49) does not imply that h > 1 is required to satisfy Equation (48).
Equation (48) can be rewritten as N
S
NR
<2h  1. This constraint and Equation (49) can be satised for
some N
S
NR
and h in the region h = 1 " if c
2(d d) c< 1, which is true, so an equilibrium of the kind
described by Case (1)(ii)(b) can arise.
Case (1)(iii): (1 S) < 1 and  <   c=d
A fraction  of S donors are matched with R moderates (NSD= N
RL
E ) and all R moderates are
entrepreneurs (NRLE =(1  h)NR). Thus the number of R donors is equal to the total number of
R ideologues minus the number of R ideologues that become entrepreneurs: NRD= hN
R NRHE . By
substituting NRLE = (1  h)NR into NSD= NRLE , we get that NSD=

1 h


NR. Substituting these
expressions for NSD, N
R
D , and N
RL
E into Equation (33), and noting that N
RH
E cannot exceed the total
number of ideologues (hNR), yields:
NRHE = min

( 1  )(1 h)(d c)+h(d c)
2d c

NR; hNR

(50)
Using that NSD=

1 h


NR and that NRLE =(1  h)NR, Condition (A) (NRLE < NSD) becomes:
 < 1 (51)
This condition is always satised for 
 
1 S< 1, which is a dening feature of Case (1)(iii).
Case (1)(iii)(a): R ideologues enter as both donors and entrepreneurs
This implies that the rst term in Equation (50) is the smallest:
NRHE =

( 1  )(1 h)(d c)+h(d c)
2d c

NR< hNR (52)
The inequality in Equation (52) gives Condition (B):
h >
( 1  )(d c)
(d+d)+c
(53)
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Equation (53) can be satised for h around 1 if
> d c
(d+2d)
(54)
As the right hand side of Equation (54) is decreasing in d, it can be made to hold for d large
enough.
For donors to be on the short side of the market, it must be that NRHE + N
RL
E > N
S
D + N
RH
D .
Using that NRLE = (1  h)NR, NSD=

1 h


NS , NRHD = hN
R NRHE , and NRHE given in Equation
(52), yields (after simplication) Condition (C):
2
 
d d> c (55)
Like Equation (54), Equation (55) can be satised for d large enough, hence these two constraints
are consistent and an equilibrium as described by Case (1)(iii)(a) can arise.
Case (1)(iii)(b) All R ideologues are entrepreneurs
This implies that the second term in Equation (50) is the smallest:
NRHE = hN
R<

( 1  )(1 h)(d c)+h(d c)
2d c

NR (56)
The inequality in Equation (56) gives Condition (B):
h <
( 1  )(d c)
d+( 1  )(d c)
(57)
As the right hand side of Equation (57) is positive, it can be satised for some h 2 (0; 1).
For donors to be on the short side of the market, it must be that NRHE +N
RL
E > N
S
D. Using that
NRHE = hN
R, NRLE = (1  h)NR, and NSD=

1 h


NR gives Condition (C):
hNR+ (1  h)NR>

1 h


NR () h > 1   (58)
A non-empty range of values of h satisfy both Equation (57) and Equation (58) whenever (d d) 
c. Hence an equilibrium as described by Case (1)(iii)(b) can arise.
Additional Condition for Case (1)(iii)
In addition to Conditions (A), (B) and (C), a fourth condition must hold in order for the equilibrium
described in Case (1)(iii) to hold. This additional condition arises because, in Case (1)(iii), S types mix
between entering as donors and remaining uninvolved, but the corresponding condition that denes
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Case (1)(iii), 
 
1 S < 1, is merely a necessary condition for mixing to occur it is not a su¢ cient
condition. That is, it is possible for all S types to become donors even if 
 
1 S < 1, in which case
we would be in an equilibrium corresponding to Case (1)(i), not Case (1)(iii). To establish that Case
(1)(iii)(a) and Case (1)(iii)(b) can arise, we must therefore derive the condition under which S types
do mix, and conrm that it is consistent with Conditions (A), (B) and (C) for these sub-cases.
In Case (1)(iii), NSD = N
RL
E and N
RL
E = (1  h)NR hence NSD =

1 h


NR. The corner arises
if this value exceeds the total number of type S agents. Hence for an interior solution we require:

1 h


NR < NS () h > 1  NS
NR
(59)
In Case (1)(iii)(a), the only condition that places a constraint on h is Equation (53), which like
Equation (59) imposes a lower bound hence Equation (59) is consistent with the other constraints
for this sub-case. In Case (1)(iii)(b), Equation (57) places an upper bound on h, while Equation
(58) imposes a lower bound. However, if NS = NR, Equation (59) is identical to Equation (58).
Since we showed in Case (1)(iii)(b) that a non-empty range of values for h 2 (0; 1) could satisfy both
Equation (57) and Equation (58), and since none of the other conditions in Case (1)(iii)(b) impose any
restrictions on NS or NR, we can conclude that Equation (59) is consistent with the other constraints
in this sub-case for some parameter values. Hence, adding this fourth constraint does not impede our
ability to conclude that equilibria as described in both Case (1)(iii)(a) and Case (1)(iii)(b) can arise
for some parameter values.
Case (X) of Table (1): 
 
1 S < 1 and  >   c=d
No S types are donors (NSD = 0) and all R moderates are donors (N
RL
D = (1  h)NR)
IIn the main body of the paper, we note that Case (X) of Table (1) is not consistent with Case
(1) of Lemma (4). In Case (X), 
 
1 S < 1, so S types prefer to remain uninvolved than to
donate to an R ideologue entrepreneur. But in Case (X), all R moderates become donors and all R
ideologues become entrepreneurs, so S types who enter as a donor would be paired with an ideologue
with certainty. Hence, all S types will choose to be uninvolved in the charitable sector. But Case
(1) of Lemma (4) requires that there be at least some S donors, therefore Case (X) is not consistent
with Case (1) of Lemma (4). Furthermore, no entry equilibrium consistent with Case (X) can arise. If
there are no S donors, R ideologues strictly prefer donorship in any matching where donors are on the
short side of the market, as donors are matched with entrepreneurs with certainty, yielding payo¤ d,
while entrepreneurs are matched with donors with probability less than one, implying expected payo¤
< d  c. Thus all R ideologues will, like R moderates, strictly prefer to enter as donors, in which case
there are no entrepreneurs and production in the charitable sector does not occur.
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Part (2): Case (2) of Lemma (4).
As we show in the main text, in Case (2) of Lemma (4), all S types enter as donors (NSD = N
S) and
all R ideologues enter as donors (NRHD = hN
R). We now analyse the two sub-cases of Case (2), which
are dened by the entry decisions of R moderates: either they strictly prefer to become an entrepreneur,
or they are indi¤erent between becoming an entrepreneur and becoming a donor. We rst analyse the
entry decision of R moderates. Then, for the two sub-cases, we note three conditions that must obtain:
Condition (A2), the condition dening the sub-case (either R moderates all entrepreneurs, or they
mix); Condition (B2), the condition dening Case (2) of Lemma (9), namely that all S donors must
be matched with an R moderate entrepreneur (NSD < N
RL
E ); and Condition (C2), that donors must be
on the short side of the market.
We now analyse the R moderates entry decision given by Equation (10). Substituting in that the
number of R donors is equal to all the R ideologues plus all the R moderates that do not enter as
entrepreneurs (NRD = N
RH +
 
NRL  NRLE

= hNR + (1  h)NR  NRLE = NR  NRLE ) yields:
NRD = max

hNR;
NRd NS(d c)
2d c

;
NRLE = min

(1  h)NR; N
S(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c

(60)
We are in Case (2)(i) or Case (2)(ii) depending on which of the two terms in Equation (60) is the
minimum.
Case (2)(i): All R moderates are entrepreneurs
In this case, the rst term in Equation (60) is the minimum:
NRLE = (1  h)NR < N
S(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c (61)
The inequality in Equation (61) gives Condition (A2):
h >

1
2d c

d 

NS
NR
  
d  c (62)
All R moderates are entrepreneurs (NRLE = (1  h)NR), all R ideologues are donors NRD = hNR,
and all S types are donors. NSD = N
S). Hence Condition (B2) (NSD < N
RL
E ) is:
NS < (1  h)NR (63)
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The requirement that donors are on the short side of the market (NSD+N
R
D < N
RL
E ) yields Condition
(C2):
NS < (1  2h)NR () h < 1
2
  NS
2NR
(64)
As Equation (63) is merely a less stringent version of Equation (64), the former is redundant. Note
that Equation (64) rules out h > 1
2
for any values of NS and NR.
There is a non-empty range of values of h that satisfy both Equation (62) and Equation (64) if:

1
2d c

d 

NS
NR
  
d  c < 1
2
  NS
2NR
() c
2(d d) <
NS
NR+NS
(65)
Equation (65) can be satised for d su¢ ciently large relative to d. Hence an equilibrium of the
kind described by Case (2)(i) can arise.
Case (2)(ii): R moderates enter as both donors and entrepreneurs
In this case, the second term in Equation (60) is the minimum:
NRLE =
NS(d c)+NR(d c)
2d c < (1  h)NR (66)
The inequality in Equation (66) gives Condition (A2):
h <
d 

NS
NR

(d c)
2d c () N
S
NR
< d(1 2h)+ch
d c
(67)
Equation (67) can be satised for N
S
NR
su¢ ciently small and h su¢ ciently small. The numerator of
the second equation must be positive, otherwise this condition is violated and Case (2)(ii) cannot arise.
This implies that h must be such that h < d= (2d  c). We henceforth assume that this condition is
satised.
Using that NSD = N
S and that NRLE is as dened in Equation (66), the requirement that all S
donors are matched with R moderate entrepreneurs (NSD < N
RL
E ) yields Condition (B2):
NR
NS
>
(2d d)
d c (68)
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Using also that all R ideologues are donors and hence that NRD = N
RH
D + N
RL
D = hN
R + 
(1  h)NR  NRLE

, the requirement that donors are on the short side of the market (NSD + N
R
D <
NRLE ) yields Condition (C2):
NR
NS
<
2(d d)+c
c
(69)
There exists a non-empty range of values for NR=NS that satisfy both Equation (68) and Equation
(69) if:
(2d d)
d c <
2(d d)+c
c
() 0 <  (2d  c)  d  d  c2 (70)
Equation (70) is always satised by Assumptions (1) (PCs Satised) and (5) (d=d  < ).
Maintaining our assumption that h < d= (2d  c), Equations (67) and (68) both provide lower
bounds on NR=NS and are therefore compatible. Finally, there exists a non-empty range of values of
NS=NR that satisfy both Equation (67) and Equation (69) if:
c
2(d d)+c <
d(1 2h)+ch
d c () h <
d
2d c   c(d c)2d( )+c (71)
This is compatible with our assumption that h < d=(2d  c) 
Proof of Lemma (5)
First consider the case NS< NR. Recalling from Lemma (3) that no R donor can be matched with
an S entrepreneurs and that NE= ND,
39 and also using the linearity of the payo¤s, we discern
the following candidates for the social welfare maximising matching: assortative matching, partial
specialisation and full specialisation. Under assortative matching, exactly half of each type is a donor
or entrepreneur:
1
2N
R(2d c)+ 12NS(2d c) (72)
Now assume thatNS>(1  h)NR. Under full specialisation, all S types are donors, with moderates
being used up before ideologues, and some of the remaining R types are donors, with NE= ND. We
deduce that there are 12 (N
R NS) R donors, because the rst two terms in the following equations
use up NS S types as donors and NS R types as entrepreneurs. Thus social welfare is:
WFS = (1  h)NR((2 min (S ;L))d c)+ max (NS (1  h)NR; 0)(2 min (S ;H))d c)
+ max (0; 12 (N
R NS))(2d c)
39When NE = ND , payo¤s in matching are generally undetermined, so we assume that they take the value
consistent with the limit of the sequence as NE ! ND .
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Under partial specialisation, all moderates are matched with S donors, but some of the remaining
S types become entrepreneurs so that no S donor is matched with an R ideologue. The remaining R
types enter as donors up until NE= ND. We deduce that there are
1
2hN
R R donors, because the
rst two terms in the following equations use up NS S types as either donors or entrepreneurs, and
(1  h)NR R types as entrepreneurs. Thus social welfare is:
WPS= (1  h)NR((2 min (S ;L))d c)+ max ( 12 (NS   (1  h)NR); 0)(2d c)+ 12hNR(2d c)
Comparing full specialisation with partial specialisation, we deduce that specialisation is better
when
1 min (S ;H)   (73)
Comparing specialisation with the assortative case, we nd that specialisation is preferred if:
1  E()   (74)
Noting that min (S ;H)> E(), we have the result in the case that NR> NS>(1  h)NR.
Now assume that NS<(1  h)NR. Then social welfare under full specialisation is
WFS= N
S((2 min (S ;L))d c) + 12 (N
R NS)(2d c)
The partial specialisation outcome does not exist, and so we compareWFS to the assortative case,
which once again yields social welfare given by Equation (72). This yields the result in this case.
Now assume that NS> NR. The full specialisation outcome yields social welfare:
WFS= (1  h)NR((2 min (S ;L)d c) + hNR((2 min (S ;H)d c)+ 12 (NS NR)
 
2d c
(75)
The partial specialisation outcome yields social welfare of:
WPS= (1  h)NR((2 min (S ;L)d c) + 12 (N
S (1  h)NR)(2d c) + 12hN
R
(2d c)
(76)
Again, comparing Equations (75) and (76) to each other and to (72), we obtain the condition in
the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition (10)
Case (1)(i): 
 
1 S > 1 and  <   c=d
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In this case, S types prefer being paired with an ideologue to remaining uninvolved in the charitable
sector, so that when the Busan Declaration is enforced, all S types still become donors: NSD = N
S .
However, enforcing the Busan Declaration may have an e¤ect on the entry decisions of type R agents.
An R types ideology is now irrelevant, as, if they are paired with an S donor, the Busan Declaration
will be enforced (i.e. mission R will always be implemented). If an R type enters as a donor, they
obtain payo¤ d for sure. If they enter as an entrepreneur, they are paired with an S donor with
probability NS=NRE , implying payo¤ d   c; with an R donor with probability NRD=NRE , implying
payo¤ d  c; and remain unmatched with the remaining probability. Hence the condition for R types
to be indi¤erent at t =  1 between entering as a donor and as an entrepreneur is:
d =

NS
NR
E

(d  c) +

NRD
NR
E

(d  c) (77)
Using that NRD + N
R
E = N
R, and noting also that the number of R donors cannot be negative,
Equation (77) becomes:
~NRD = min
n
0; dN
R (d c)NS
2d c
o
(78)
To assess whether enforcing the Busan Declaration increases social welfare, we need to compare
the static gains from enforcement (increased joint surplus from fS donor R moderate entrepreneurg
pairings with the change in welfare (which may be positive or negative) from the change in entry by R
types into donorship. That is, if J1 is the joint surplus from an fS donor, R moderate entrepreneurg
pair when mission R is implemented, and J2 is the joint surplus from the same pairing when mission
S is implemented, enforcing the Busan Declaration increases social welfare if:
NRLE (J1  J2)  (NRD   ~NRD) (2d  c) (79)
The left hand side is the number of pairings involving R moderates multiplied by the increase in
surplus from each pairing that results from enforcing the Busan Declaration. The right hand side is the
change in entry by R types into donorship, multiplied by the joint surplus created by an fR donor, R
entrepreneurg pair, which is equal to 2d  c. J1 is given by Equation (5) and J2 is given by Equation
(4). Substituting and rearranging yields the following condition for social welfare to increase if the
Busan Declaration is enforced:
dNRLE

L(2+ 1)
+L
 S

 (NRD   ~NRD) (2d  c) (80)
In Case (1)(i), all S types are donors (NSD = N
S) and all R moderates are entrepreneurs (NRLE =
(1   h)NR). In this Case, before enforcement, all moderate R types enter as entrepreneurs, so the
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only R type donors are ideologues: NRD = N
RH
D . Recall further that there are hN
R type R ideologues
in total, so that the number of R ideologue donors is given by NRHD = hN
R   NRHE . Equation (34)
from the Proof of Proposition (9) shows that NRHE , the number of R ideologue entrepreneurs, is not a
function of S . This implies that the number of R ideologue donors, NRHD , is also not a function of
S . Finally note that Equation (78) shows that ~NRD is also not a function of 
S . Therefore, the right
hand side of Equation (80) is not a function of S , while the left hand side is a decreasing function
of S . Hence, for S su¢ ciently small, enforcing the Busan Declaration increases social welfare. It
nally remains to be shown that Equation (80) can be satised for a non-negative value of S .40
Case (1)(i)(a). R ideologues enter as both donors and entrepreneurs
Then NRHE is given by Equation (34) and we have that:
NRD   ~NRD =
 
hNR  NRHE
  ~NRD =  12d c (1  h)NR    d  d  c
This equation implies that Equation (80) is satised for S = 0 if:
L(++ 1)
+L
 (d d) c
2d c (81)
Equation (81) can be satised for d   d such that   d  d   c is su¢ ciently close to zero. If
Equation (81) holds strictly, there exists some ~S such that S 2

0; ~S

satises Equation (80).
Case (1)(i)(b). All R ideologues are entrepreneurs
Enforcing the Busan Declaration increases social welfare for sure, as the number of type R donors
before enforcement is equal to zero, so enforcing the Busan Declaration cannot reduce entry by R
types into donorship. In this case, the threshold value of ~S below which enforcing the Busan
Declaration increases social welfare is set by the condition dening Case (1)(i): (1 S) > 1, or
S < 1  1 . That is, enforcing the Busan Declaration increases social welfare for all S 2 (0; ~
S
)
where ~S = 1  1 .
Case (1)(iii): 
 
1 S < 1 and  <   c=d
A fraction  of S donors are matched with R moderates (NSD = N
RL
E ) and all R moderates are
entrepreneurs (NRLE = (1  h)NR). In this case S types payo¤ from being uninvolved outweighs their
payo¤ from being a donor obliged to accept that the entrepreneur chooses mission R. As S types know
40 In what follows in relation to Case (1)(i), we ignore the fact that ~NRD is bounded below by zero. However,
this is without loss of generality, because we are establishing su¢ cient conditions for enforcement of the Busan
Declaration to increase social welfare. If ~NRD = 0, then enforcement always weakly increases social welfare,
because it means that enforcement cannot lead to any loss of entry by R types into donorship, which is the only
possible source of social welfare losses from enforcement in Case (1)(i).
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that, if they enter as a donor, they would have to implement mission R for sure, they all choose instead
to remain uninvolved in the charitable sector. This does not necessarily prove that enforcing the Busan
Declaration decreases social welfare, as the loss of S donors may be compensated for by increased entry
by R types into donorship. However, this does not occur either. In fact, if 
 
1 S < 1 and the
Busan Declaration is enforced, there cannot be any equilibrium of the entry game. No S types enter
the charitable sector as donors or as entrepreneurs, so for the charitable sector to exist, R types must
enter on both sides of the market. This requires R types to be indi¤erent between entering as a donor
and entering as an entrepreneur. Maintaining Assumption (4) (NS < ND), entering as a donor would
mean being paired with an R entrepreneur and receiving a payo¤ of d with certainty. By contrast,
entering as an entrepreneur would mean being paired with an R donor and receiving payo¤ d   c
with probability less than one, and remaining unmatched otherwise. The payo¤ from donorship is thus
strictly greater. Hence no R types will become entrepreneurs, implying no production in the charitable
sector. Thus, in this case, all agents would enter the private sector and not be involved in the charitable
sector, yielding social welfare W = NRd+NSd, which is strictly less than the social welfare obtained
if the Busan Declaration were not enforced. 
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Chapter 3: Figures 
Figure 1 Case (1) of Lemma (5): No Mission Mismatch 
 
 
All S donors are matched with S entrepreneurs, and all R donors are matched with R entrepreneurs. The remaining 
entrepreneurs go unmatched. 
Figure 2 Case (2) of Lemma (5): Mission Mismatch 
 
 
All S entrepreneurs are matched with S donors, and the remaining S donors are matched with R entrepreneurs. All 
R donors are matched with R entrepreneurs, and all unmatched entrepreneurs are of type R. A corresponding 
mission mismatch case exists if there is an excess of R donors rather than S donors.  
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Figure 3 Case (1) of Lemma (9): S donors face a 
shortage of R moderate entrepreneurs 
 
 
If the number of S donors is larger than the number of R moderate entrepreneurs, then a stable matching involves 
all R moderate entrepreneurs being matched with S donors, while any remaining S donors are matched with R 
ideologue entrepreneurs. The former implement mission S, while the latter implement mission R. R donors are 
matched with any remaining R ideologue entrepreneurs. Unmatched entrepreneurs are always R ideologues. 
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Figure 4 Case (2) of Lemma (9): All S donors can be 
matched with R moderate entrepreneurs 
 
If the number of S donors is smaller than the number of R moderate entrepreneurs, all S donors are matched with 
R moderate entrepreneurs, and implement mission S. R donors are matched with the remaining entrepreneurs, who 
may be R moderates or R ideologues. The entrepreneurs who remain unmatched may also be either R moderates or 
R ideologues. 
Chapter 3: Tables 
Table 1 Possible classes of entry equilibrium under Case 
(1) of Lemma (9) 
 Low S ideology 
µ (1 – ΔS ) > 1 
High S ideology 
µ (1 – ΔS ) < 1 
 
High inequality 
ρ < α – c/µ d  
 
Case (1)(i) 
All R moderates are entrepreneurs 
All S types are donors 
 
Case (1)(iii) 
All R moderates are entrepreneurs 
Some S types are donors,  
while others are uninvolved 
 
 
Low inequality 
ρ > α – c/µ d  
 
Case (1)(ii) 
All R moderates are donors 
All S types are donors 
 
Case (X) (Case (1) violated) 
All R moderates are donors 
All S types are uninvolved 
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